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Ph.D., Communication & Journalism, University of New Mexico, 2011

ABSTRACT
This research is an interpretive study of the dynamics of cultural identification
as enacted by Chinese individuals living overseas who participate in a virtual online
community known as Wenxuecity.com. The study draws on intercultural
communication theories of identity proposed by Carbaugh, Collier, and Hecht, as well
as on my own integrative framework for the analysis of cultural identity, to explore
the self-other interaction in identity enactment, the multidimensionality of identity,
and the centrality of communication in processes of identification. Through the
application of a qualitative analysis of online discourse, I found three primary forms
of cultural identification – perceptual, strategic, and positional cultural identification –
that reveal how online commentators make sense of their individual and group
identities. Through online discussion of a variety of topics – from China’s history,
East-West tensions, to academic power structures and racial hierarchies in host
cultures or media stereotyping and global hegemonic relations – and using
vi

communicative strategies like self-other comparison, advice, and ideological debate,
commentators enact both a sense of group cohesiveness as well as their internal,
conflictive heterogeneity. Their discourse allows for the exploration of how multiple
dimensions of identity – individuality, sociality, materiality, and spirituality – intersect
to shape the fragmentary character of cultural identification. In the particular case of
the group under study, the dominant trends observed reveal that cultural identification
is a process characterized by the enactment of a sense of marginalization in host
societies, heightened individuality, strategic attachment to or distancing from Chinese
cultural membership, and ideological divisions.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
“After losing a land and then giving up a tongue,
we stopped talking of grief.
Smiles began to brighten our faces.
We laugh a lot, at our own mess.
Things become so beautiful,
even hailstones in the strawberry fields.”
Ha Jin, Ways of Talking
“Who am I?” is a question pondered perhaps more frequently by people who
reside, on indefinite terms, in a place where they feel out of place. Afraid of being
singled out and ruled out, they strive to accommodate themselves to the host culture
by learning and complying with the norms of the immediate social milieu. Like deafmutes, they might stumble into miscommunication caused by a shifting common
ground and a different understanding of common sense. While both enduring and
enjoying the dynamics of intercultural encounters, they learn how to position and
accept themselves, calculating gains and losses for their livelihoods. Beyond
immediate social contact with their families, peers, employers, neighbors, and
acquaintances in the adoptive cultures, they also partake of interactions in the world
of media, often joining online virtual communities to exchange experiences, share
information, express opinions with members of their own cultures. In interaction
through media messages, members of theses virtual communities often experience the
disheartenment caused by ideological conflict, the perplexity caused by stereotypes
and controversial social issues, embarrassment related to historical accounts of
national disgrace, and affective responses to notions of self and other. Thus, virtual
communities can become spaces to perform the multiple dimensions of identity—
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from individual to social, material or spiritual dimensions-through communicative
interaction.
The current research project explores the complexity of cultural identity and
processes of identification as manifested through textual messages posted by Chinese
overseas online commentators (hereafter COOCs), who are mostly from mainland
China and participate in the cyber-ethnic space created by Wenxuecity.com. Because
of the diverse social contexts of COOCs and their internal differences, the data
collected from interactive message boards suggest a kaleidoscopic scene in which
multiple dimensions of Chinese cultural identity are performed. The study of such
intra-cultural complexity allows for a critical examination of cultural identification
processes. Through an interpretive approach, the systematic study of these cyber
voices—that outside the virtual ethnic enclave are faintly heard—is also an attempt to
let those voices be heard as rich and relevant subjects for the study of identity and
intercultural communication.
With increased mobility of individuals and groups beyond national boundaries
in the last few decades, peoples in the diaspora have more alternative and convenient
means to connect with one another across the globe (Mitra, 2005). The instantaneous,
mediate access to world facilitated by the Internet (Mitra, 2005) helps the world’s
netizens find and define their groups. In an era of Internet bubbles, COOCs are
representative of Chinese sojourners in the West who coincide in the virtual world to
interact with members of their ingroup of Chinese individuals living outside China.
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The current study deals online messages produced by COOCs to grasp the
contemporary manifestation of the group’s cultural identification in a global, cyberspatial context.
Once relocated in multicultural settings outside China, COOCs are likely to
engage in the interpretation of the ways in which China and its people and culture are
viewed by others. As they do so, they also engage the discussion of their own
conflicting and shared understandings of self-other. Both processes provide important
insights for the study of how they negotiate a sense of identity in host cultures. With
the focus on the complexity of Chinese identity enactment in intercultural, mediated
contexts, I intend to examine three central questions: How do Chinese individuals
living overseas use online communication to construct a sense of identity in the
context of intercultural interaction?; What does online discourse reveal about the
dynamics of cultural identification among the Chinese in the diaspora?; What does
online communication reveal about the complex interrelation among dimensions of
identity in cultural performance?
In the present study, the data were selected from readers’ public commentaries
in reaction to news and opinion pieces from various media sources that were posted
on the homepage of Wenxuecity.com, a website headquartered in northern California
in the United States. The news and opinion pieces posted online are re-edited and
posted, along with blog entries, by website editors. The content covered current global
and local events, particularly those related to China. The sources of news vary—from
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Western print and broadcast media to the Chinese official newspaper—and people’s
reactions to the stories are diverse. For instance, highly controversial and
ideologically-loaded news reports often led to emotional and critical responses that
contained traces of multiple positions of identification.
Cultural identity is a central concept in this study of the complex subjectivities
and identifications among Chinese overseas. With emphasis on the pivotal connection
of individual subjectivity to multicultural interaction, the concept of cultural identity
has been widely applied in the analysis of cross-cultural and intercultural issues in
global, multicultural, and post-colonial contexts (Carter, 2005; Friedman, 1994; Hall,
1996b; Parvis, 2006; Powell, 1999; Wilson & Dissanayake, 1996). Cultural identity is
defined here as one's self-concept formed and performed in communication that
emphasizes one's connection to cultural membership. Cultural identification is the
enactment of cultural identity. More specifically, this study draws on theories of
cultural identity developed in intercultural communication by Carbaugh (1988),
Collier (1989), and Hecht (1993) to explore how individual subjectivities in the
context of intercultural interaction through online media manifest processes of
identity formation through communication. I am particularly interested in exploring
how individuals in the virtual community examined perceive themselves in the world
and connect with one another to affirm a sense of identity in an ethnic quarter in the
global cyberspace.
Relatively fixed but always fluid in one’s life, the various realities that help
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form one’s sense of self shape the core dimensions of identity – individuality, sociality,
materiality, and spirituality (Dong, 2008, 2009, & 2011). In identity formation, one’s
belonging to or position in some particular group is welded with one’s connection to
ideological preferences, peculiar body-mind consciousness, and reaction to one’s
material conditions. The constitution of identity is also the result of long-term
cultural socialization that fuels and drives the individual’s perception and
interpretation of the outer world. On the other hand, due to the dynamic nature of
cultural identification (Carbaugh, 1994; Hecht, 1993 & 2005), the textural quality of
identity may also change as a result of constant social construction (Carbaugh, 1994).
In the short run, the changes may be superficial and fluid. But in the long run, they
might substantiate one’s cultural identification and become sources of profound
change in the matrix of an individual cultural identity. For the purpose of this research,
the complexity and dynamic characteristics of cultural identity will be conceptualized
as a prism to discern people’s identification practices embedded in online messages
that react to various media stories as well as to COOCs postings. Through this
prismatic lens, one can view the diversity within cultural identity in a holistic way.
Media and Identity: Reflections and Considerations
Like millions of first-generation Chinese overseas, I live in a foreign land as a
sojourner in pursuit of personal achievement and success. Over the years, some
changes have occurred to my self-perception. These changes are profound and have
influenced my personal growth and reinforced my ambition to become competent in
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intercultural communication. The most important aspect of these changes is related to
my cultural identity. Back in my home country, I worked as an international program
coordinator in a large state university and had encountered thousands of people from
other countries who were “foreigners” as I am now in the United States. They were
tourists, students, scholars, administrators, professional diplomats, entrepreneurs,
missionaries, and/or adoptive parents on tour with their adopted Chinese-looking
children. At that time, I took my cultural/ethnic/national identity for granted and never
questioned them. I was seldom bothered with the image of who I might be as a
Chinese in the eyes of those foreign beholders at home, where I was the respected
Chinese who was able to speak English and communicate with them fairly well.
Actually, I felt being liked by most of them.
Outside China, I suddenly merged into an environment where my Chinese
identity became salient in contrast to the new natural, human, and social context.
Although I may be conscious of my Chinese-ness daily in interpersonal encounters,
what has struck me the most and made me realize my cultural difference were the
diverse images and discourses produced by the media world about China and its
culture. A media world that, free of Chinese government’s censorship, is loaded with
biases in tune with the dominant ideologies in the host culture. In this media world
where free speech is valued and institutionalized, I hear voices from vastly different
perspectives. I can access the world of Western media and become aware of messages
with criticism against China and anything Chinese like Chinese products, human right
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situations, animal right abuses, the struggles for a “Free Tibet,” and the “notorious”
Beijing Olympic Torch Relay. With access to a free press, I can read many Chinese
dissident publications and even participate in some political activities that would be
banned in China.
My reactions to this sudden change of media environment are complicated,
fluid, and hard to explain even by myself. One thing is certain, my sometimes
presumptuous and even naïve assumptions of my Chinese identity are giving way to a
more realistic assessment of what it means to be a contemporary Chinese in global,
multicultural contexts and how Chinese culture is viewed by people outside China,
including Chinese expatriates and exiles. Now I can be more coolheaded about the
complexity of my cultural identity, I could say that I am no longer so jittery or
defensive toward any unfriendly treatment based on Western xenophobic or
Sinophobe (abhorrence of China and Chinese) sentiments. Thus, although the
awareness of one’s cultural difference can be frustrating, embarrassing, and even
hurtful, it can also make one more realistic, mature, and shrewd regarding all sorts of
situation one has to confront.
In this new media environment, the Internet is playing an unprecedented role.
Although people still describe the Internet as a new medium with evolving technology,
the influences of the Internet on our lives have already become materialized and
disseminated to a level unimaginable before. Changes in Internet technology have
taught people become new modes of media production and consumption (Bakardjieva,
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2005; Mossberger, Tolbert, & McNeal, 2008; Wu, 2007; Zheng, 2008). For instance,
traditional print media have almost universally adopted web-enhanced or web-based
formats, many of which feature interactive journalism where editors and writers can
have dialogues with readers. Grassroots and social networking media such as personal
weblogs, Facebook, Myspace, Indymedia, and virtual communities online are
proliferating in cyberspace to open space for content that reflects multiple layers of
human spiritual lives, desires, and social consciousness. And technology has changed
not only our perceptions of the human universe, but also the processes associated with
cultural identification. For instance, computer-mediated communications (CMC)
provide accessible forums that facilitate the manifestation of cultural identities (Mitra,
1997 & 2005). This is particularly true for the large number of contemporary Chinese
living outside China who find themselves in the unique position of receiving and
rethinking texts regarding their Chinese identity from sources uncensored by the
current Chinese government.
In some ways, reading media texts entails a learning process, particularly for
those in a foreign land. The accessibility to media sources brought by the Internet
accelerates this social as well as cultural learning process. In my personal experience,
the immediate consequence of media consumption outside China was the increased
awareness of my cultural identity positioned in a multicultural surrounding where
democracy is extolled, freedom has become a faith, but inequality still prevails. Along
with the deepened realization of one’s individual cultural differences, online media
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reading engenders forms of social or group identification, particularly when one has a
glimpse of how others in similar positions react to the same social issues. Online users’
interpretations, with all sorts of critical, rational, sarcastic, emotive or transcendental
critiques, can have particular influences on one’s self-perception. These might inspire,
reinforce, modify, or alter one’s interpretations of current events and controversial
issues. After years of online media reading in a foreign context, I have developed a
research interest in the manifestation of Chinese identity in online, interactive media
in the global, multicultural, and postcolonial context.
The discourse analyzed in this study comprises messages intended to be read by
in-group members because they are written mostly in the Chinese language. The
website’s editorial eclecticism and target language (the general format of the website
is in Chinese) may define the readership as well as the authorship of the content
analyzed. In contrast to China-based websites pressed by ideological censorship and
Chinese-dissident-run websites skewed by anti-Communism sentiments, the website
examined belongs to a group of diasporic Chinese media attempting to appeal to a
larger audience of Chinese overseas through a pluralistic editorial line that combines
articles produced from different ideological viewpoints. However, site editors or
elected board moderators and forum administrators have their own ideological
leanings, which affect the selection of headline items in the news forum. In addition,
the number of reads (clicks) on news and opinion pieces might lead to quasi-statistical
decision making regarding the general editorial direction. Furthermore, voluntary
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comments from ardent readers can also become a significant factor that may sway the
decision of editors in terms of what would be the best strategy to satisfy the widest
range of readership. This connection among perceptible ideological preferences in
editorial line, selection of news reports, and constitution of readership is a meaningful
aspect of this virtual community.
Yet, regardless of editorial manipulation, the news stories and opinions posted
are sufficiently abundant, diverse, colorful, sensational, informative, and entertaining
to elicit assorted reactions from individual readers. In the context of each specific
event or issue covered, readers’ comments convey insights from diverse perspectives
to reveal the dynamics of contemporary social life and the pulse of global politics.
The messages are public, voluntary, contingent, and thereby representative of
the views and reactions of participants. Besides providing space for the manifestation
of emotional catharsis or “verbalistic flaunting” (obsession with displaying one’s
aptitude for writing), the online environment provides anonymity for contributors who
may also intend to affect the opinions of others. In many cases, the Chinese netizens
overseas are looking for like-minded compatriots with whom to form some sort of
virtual community that can help reduce the uncertainty caused by living abroad.
However, those prone to respond to peers’ messages are those who sense that ideas
are contrary to what they hold true and stand for. Therefore, the consensus,
discrepancies, and bickering that is generated within the ingroup shows both
heterogeneity and common characteristics of the group. This study explores both the
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in-group heterogeneity and positions that lead to the expression of unity within the
cultural group. Because of the diversity among COOCs and the salience of the
intercultural context as an element that prompts interaction among members of this
virtual community, this website becomes a relevant site to explore the enactment of
cultural identity through intercultural communication.
Rationale and Significance
The present study deals with a particular site in cyberspace. The site is a virtual
enclave that can be accessed by Chinese or anyone who can read Chinese in locations
all over the world, except mainland China (including Hainan Island) as a result of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) rigid and sophisticated Internet censorship (Jin,
2008; Wu, 2007). Such unique situation indicates an important aspect of the
demographic characteristics of the population studied – most COOCs are Chinese
living (sojourning, residing, traveling, visiting, studying, and/or working) outside
China. Thereupon they all have to deal with intercultural or multicultural
surroundings immediate to their daily lives. The bond with the homeland interplays
with the connection (be it attachment or distance) to the host culture to offer the
grounds for this exploration of COOCs’ online cultural identification practices.
The results of this study show how Internet media communication facilitates
COOCs’ cultural identification through intercultural interaction. In the complex mix
of opinion and attitudes expressed by COOCs, in-group homogeneities and
heterogeneities can be discerned. The findings will contribute to generate cultural

11

knowledge regarding the global presentation of Chinese culture as well as of the
Chinese voices in their actual and rich diversity.
Furthermore, the current study also aims to contribute to the application of
intercultural communication identity theories in the investigation of mediated
communications. In intercultural communication, identity theories proposed by three
interpretive scholars – Donald Carbaugh, Mary Jane Collier, and Michael Hecht –
have been developed to elucidate the formation of self-concept in interpersonal
interactions among people with specific cultural backgrounds. The basic concepts,
notions, and methods from these theories can form an integrative framework for the
systematic interpretation of online messages produced by migrating people.
Lastly, a primary research goal here is to understand general trends in COOCs’
cultural identification. This exploration of common ground as well as internal chasms
can also shed light on both gaps in communication and chance for mutual
understandings among COOCs who may have competing ideological preferences. To
explore such ferment, I intend to keep a balanced, neutral approach and to be
objective in my analytical endeavors, although it is impossible to maintain perfect
neutrality. To some degree, my own preferences are to be coped with during the
analysis.
Dubos (1981) said: “Human diversity makes tolerance more than a virtue; it
makes it a requirement for survival.” Tolerance is not only an issue for intercultural,
interracial, and international relationships but also for people with competing
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ideological preferences. While Chinese overseas might strive to adapt to the host
culture by active cultural accommodation and spiritual conversion, they might feel
difficult to reconcile some basic internal divisions. By situating competing ideologies
among COOCs in their common challenges of cultural identification under global
conditions, the current study aims to identify strategies to deal with the ideological
complexity and perplexity that any intercultural communication may produce. The
fundamental assumption of the aforementioned research rationale is: If people have
better knowledge of their “selves” and could make themselves better known by the
others, they can have better opportunities to develop tolerance toward each other.
Overview of Chapters
The chapters of the dissertation are organized in the following manner: Chapter
II presents a literature review that links three relevant areas of scholarship:
interpretive approaches to identity theory in the field of intercultural communication;
scholarly work on identity, culture, and Internet mediated communication; and
cultural studies on the Chinese diaspora and media communication. Chapter III
explicates the research design rooted in the interpretive paradigm and the
methodological procedures of grounded theory employed in this research. Chapters
IV, V, VI, and VII elaborate on the findings of research in response to the main
research questions posed, and present the conclusions.
Chapter IV discussed how Chinese overseas online commentators used online
communication to interpret the multicultural differences they encounter in global
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cities and thus enact processes of cultural identification. The chapter discusses how
self-other comparison is the dominant interpretive strategy employed by users of
Wenxuecity.com to make sense of the categories of cultural difference—in this case
racial hierarchies, gender and group stereotypes and national differences—that
provoked discussion among members of the diasporic community. The chapter also
explores the dynamic interplay of self and other through which members of this group
enact cultural identification.
In Chapter V, attention is given to how COOCs also use online forum to give
and receive practical advice on how to manage situations of conflict, suffering or
misunderstanding that result from exposure to new cultural environments and social
contexts outside China. The chapter identifies the categories of life predicaments that
draw most fervent discussion in the forum and the most common strategies given by
COOCs as advice for coping with intercultural conflict, and discusses how cultural
advice fosters a form of group identification that emphasizes a sense of Chinese
cultural membership.
Chapter VI focuses on how Chinese overseas online commentators (COOCs)
assume positions of identification in response to ideological debate and, more
specifically, when reacting to criticism posed by outgroup and ingroup critics of
China. The contending perceptions of China’s political regime and global position and
international relations—particularly the China-Western relations—will be discussed
as instances that illuminate how enactment of identity involves activation of multiple
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points of identification, often simultaneously: individuality, sociality, materiality, and
spirituality.
Lastly, Chapter VII presents the conclusions in the form of summary answers
to questions posed. It also explores the theoretical implications of this study and
discusses limitations and areas of further research suggested by the findings.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
This dissertation aims to probe into the process of cultural identification
among members of the Chinese diaspora as enacted in mediated communication via a
Chinese portal website operated in the United States and accessed mostly by Chinese
outside mainland China. With identity and identification as central concepts, the first
domain of this literature review discusses relevant identity theories developed by
three interpretive scholars of intercultural communication. The second domain
focuses on theorization and empirical research linking identity, culture, and Internet
mediated communication. The third domain outlines various cultural studies on the
Chinese diaspora and media communication that can also shed light on the problem
under study. The fourth section of this chapter incorporates my own theoretical
insights into an interpretive framework for cultural identity and presents a set of
assumptions that will serve as interpretive lenses for the current study of cultural
identity enacted in the online discussions of COOCs. This literature review is meant
to identify relevant sources to frame this exploration of cultural identification among
COOCs in hopes of producing research that leads to a better understanding of a
community that is prone to marginalization, alienation, and sometimes even
demonization outside China (Wu, 2007).
Interpretive Approaches to Identity Theory
Intercultural communication scholarship has embraced the concept of identity
and attempted to unravel the relationship between identity and communication across
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cultural contexts (Mendoza, Halualani, & Drzewiecka, 2002). Some interpretive
scholars define identity as one’s self-concept informed by avowal (self perception of
“who I am”) and ascription (social categorization) (Hall, 2005; Mendoza et al, 2002).
Others have stated that identity is the performed self situated in culture (Carbaugh,
1994; Jung & Hecht, 2004; Mendoza et al, 2002). From this perspective,
identification was defined as the process of enacting identity through the interplay of
the ascribed self and the avowed self (Hall, 2005; Hecht et al, 2005; Jung & Hecht,
2004). Some scholars have conceptualized identification as a cultivable, manageable,
negotiable, and malleable communicative process that is fluid and complex (Collier,
2005; Hecht et al, 2005; Imahori & Cupach, 2005; Ting-Toomey, 2005). Grounded in
this theorization of identity as a communicative construct, I intend to understand and
interpret the cultural specificity of intercultural identification in a particular group of
people sharing a common language and using interactive online media.
The interpretive studies of identity are concerned primarily with sense-making
processes (Hall, 2005). Intercultural communication studies on identity and
identification have focused on the shared meanings, common sense, and committed
values of specific cultural groups in an attempt to describe the nature of identity
(Mendoza et al, 2002). They have scrutinized language codes, symbolic systems, and
other peculiarities to underscore the dialectic nature of identity as coexistence of the
dyadic forces of avowal and ascription in historical and socio-political contexts
(Carbaugh, 1990; Collier & Thomas, 1989; Hecht, 1993; Hecht, Ribeau, & Alberts,
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1989; Katriel, 1986; Philipsen, 1975; Weider & Pratt, 1990). I will focus on the work
of intercultural communication scholars Donal Carbaugh, Mary Jane Collier, and
Michael Hecht, whose works underscore several theoretical dimensions of relevance
for my project: the centrality of communication in processes of identification, the
dynamic interaction between self and social context in identity enactment; and multidimensional and fluid character of identity.
However, it is important to note that these three scholars emphasize different
angles in their research. While Carbaugh starts with a focus on the individual to
explore how biological, psychological, interactive, and contextual factors influence
identity; Collier has emphasized the study of how cultural identity is managed through
communicative behavior in contexts of conflict, power inequalities, and intercultural
alliances; and Hecht centers his theory on communication behavior as an integral
aspect of identity. In this review, I summarize the key assumptions and insights
offered by their research, highlighting the strengths and limitations of their theories
for the development of this dissertation.
Carbaugh (1988; 1994; 1996; 2001) approached the connection between
communication, identity, and culture through his ethnographic studies and narrative
analysis of specific cultural and social communication scenes (Carbaugh, 1988, 1994,
and 1996; Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). To build a theoretical framework in his
studies of the American concepts of personhood that operate in various American
cultural scenes, Carbaugh (1996) treated identity as performed communication. In his
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conceptualization, identity is embedded in the concept of an “agent” acting various
social roles in various social situations. He linked the agent to three identity-related
dimensions: individual (biological being of the smallest social unit), self
(psychological being), and person (cultural being). At the level of the individual,
identity refers to biological existence and identification of a neurological processing
that allows the agent to think and act. At the level of self, identity is socially
constructed, and it is the movement between various social scenes and relational webs
that helps form one’s concept of self, which is primarily psychological. At the level of
person, identity is culturally configured and lived in the diversity of global cultures.
Carbaugh (1990; 1994; 1996) has argued that specific social interactions set stages for
cultural identification and communication facilitates the interplay between identity
and social relationships.
In effect, Carbaugh (1996) has viewed identity as a dimension and outcome of
a system of communication practices produced in social and cultural interactions
through activities such as dialogue. Those who produce and deliver as well as those
who receive and critically react to sociocultural discourses may position themselves
differently in different contexts. Therefore, Carbaugh observed that researchers should
be mindful of the specific “material, economic, religious, political (and so on)
conditions of living in that community” (1996, p.143). As the natural core of
personhood, identity is embedded in individual differences, perpetuated in the
biological existence and psychological reaction of the persons, and situated in social
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contexts. Therewith, he has taken a descriptive, interpretive, and comparative
approach to explore modes of identification in particular messages intentionally or
spontaneously generated in specific social scenes (cited in Mendoza et al, 2002).
Generally, in Carbaugh’s perspective, identities are maintained and evidenced in
interactional social discourses.
Carbaugh’s ethnographic studies of popular scenes, culturally specific
narratives and conversations are defined as sites to explore how communication can
manifest and reinforce the personal and social aspects of identity in social
relationships. Carbaugh (2001, p.122-123) treats narratives as cultural discourses that
provide a space to explore the meanings of identity. Narratives are texts that enact a
variety of situations, forms, meanings, events, acts, instruments, terms, motifs,
motives, and values (Carbaugh, 1996). From this perspective, mythic storylines,
ceremonial occasions, or talk of mundane affairs can reveal specific life challenges or
contingencies of everyday living as well as the material and spiritual dimensions of
cultural identification (Carbaugh, 1996). Carbaugh’s field work through participant
observation and ethnography allowed him to empirically examine the connection
between narratives and cultural identification. Carbaugh (1990) concluded that
researchers can make sense of cultural identity through listening to “culture talking
itself.”
Collier’s theory (2005) on cultural identity and identification is intended to
uncover how cultural identity is managed and performed through various forms of
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discourses, interactions, and social structures. Committed to developing praxis-driven
understandings of the enactment of identities in various contextualized and unequal
human interactions, Collier (2005) has concluded that cultural identities vary in terms
of function, salience, scope, and intensity over time and space. Collier’s theoretical
claims are largely based on a qualitative research agenda and methodologies such as
ethnography and discourse analysis. In ethnographic studies of intercultural
conversations in specific contexts, Collier has developed her notion of the complexity
of cultural identity and identification. For instance, she observed that the norms and
consequences of intercultural conversations are multilayered, multifactorial,
contextual, and relational. Furthermore, she argued that the recognition of identity
politics and power relationships is an indispensable part of the study of intercultural
identification. Different political stances, class-related social statuses, sexuality- and
gender-based ideologies, racial-ethnic-national group memberships, religious-spiritual
affiliations, institutional rules, personal relationships, and many other contextual
factors complicate the application of identity labels (Collier & Thomas, 1988, 1989).
Since the enactments of diverse cultural identities involve various positioning
situations, Collier stressed and elaborated the concept of positional salience (the
situational standing out of a particular dimension or property of identity) and its
dynamic nature over time and space. In her studies of cultural identities as they
emerged in ingroup or intergroup communication, Collier also examined the dyadic
pathways of avowal and ascription and their coexistence as a force driving the general
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process of cultural identification.
Based on empirical and theoretical endeavors, Collier (2005) has moved her
studies of cultural identification toward the integration of critical and interpretive
perspectives with the realization of imbalanced power negotiation as an important
factor, and an awareness of positionality. In Collier’s metatheoretical perspective, the
incorporation of critical perspectives into her interpretive scholarship can orient
communication studies of cultural identity toward social transformation. Collier has
realized that the inequalities of socioeconomic status and imbalance of power
profoundly define the disadvantageous situation of marginalized groups in enacting
their cultural identities. Taking it as a step further, such inequalities and imbalances
produce a variety of positionalities also among those involved in processes of research,
mainly among scholars, informants, and readers. Positionality is a concept that speaks
to historical and social inequalities and questions the presumed equality and agency of
individual actors. With these considerations, Collier has applied the concept of
cultural identification in the study of intercultural alliances and mediation of
intercultural conflict (Collier and Thomas, 1988; Collier and Ribeau, 1993).
Hecht’s communication theory of identity (CTI) places identity in social
interaction and views communication behavior as an integral aspect of identity (Hecht,
Warren, Jung, & Krieger, 2005). Hecht (1993) proposed some important axiomatic
propositions about communication and identity to describe the dynamic features of
identity within a schema of multiplicity. To describe African American and Mexican
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American ethnic cultures in terms of their intra- and inter-ethnic communication
behavior, Hecht and his colleagues conducted a series of empirical studies (Hecht,
Collier, & Ribeau, 1993; Hecht & Faulkner, 2000; Hecht, Faulkner, Meyer, Niles,
Golden, & Cutler, 2002; Hecht, Jackson, Lindsley, & Johnson, 2001) to illustrate
similarities and differences among these ethnic groups. Influenced by this line of
research, Hecht developed CTI, which integrated Tajfel and Turner’s social identity
theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979 and 1986) and identity theory in the
tradition of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Hecht, 1993; Mead, 1934).
Hecht’s CTI views identity as communicative. In such a perspective,
communication becomes identification and communicated messages comprise identity.
Hecht et al (1993) identified two paths through which communication is integral to
the formation of identity. The first path is the creation and exchange of symbolic
meanings through social interaction, in which the sense of identity is felt and therein
identity is formed in relation to self. The generation of messages not only provides the
basis of identification but also becomes enactment or manifestation of identities. The
second path is the association with and contestation of social categorization, which
contextualizes social and personal expectations and motivations. The perceptions of
social expectations and individual motivations, wrongful or righteous, fallacious or
realistic, influence one’s communication styles, rhetorical strategies, and their
consequences.
CTI is also built on a set of assumptions informed by postmodernist notions of
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self. As Hecht (1993; Hecht et al, 2003; Hecht et al, 2005) posited, identity has
multiple loci, designated as the personal, enacted, relational, and communal layers. In
his view, these four interrelated and interpenetrated frames reveal the essence of
identity. According to CTI, in the personal layer, identity represents an individual’s
self-concept or understanding of how one defines oneself. In the enactment layer,
identity is acted out, performed, or expressed in communication. In the process of
relational development, the relational aspect of identity can be further divided into
three levels: formation (constitution), identification (an individual identifies with a
group), and unification (the relational union of two identities can establish a new
identity). The communal layer reflects the influence of group membership on identity
formation. To integrate the four layers of identity, Hecht has stressed the
interpenetration of the layers by obscuring their distinctness or boundary lines.
Hecht et al (2005) also postulated 18 propositions as CTI’s working
assumptions, grounded in the four-layer model. Given my goal of studying cultural
identification enacted in mediated communication texts, I will discuss three CTI
propositions that I believe are most relevant and distinctive. At the end of this
literature review, I will incorporate these propositions into a model of cultural identity
to be used as an analytical framework for the present project.
“Identities are affective, cognitive, behavioral, and spiritual.” This
proposition implies the significance of emotive and psychological factors. The
emotionality and subjectivity involved in the process of identification is inevitable but
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constrained by individual and social perceptions and behavioral norms. Thus,
awareness of social context, cultural knowledge, and ideological influence is crucial
in managing, negotiating, and enacting one’s subjective cultural identity.
“Identities involve both subjective and ascribed meaning.” The subjective
meaning of identities contains one’s self-concept. The ascribed meaning of identities
indicates the influence of social categorization. The two aspects of identity meanings
are oftentimes mixed, though the analytical treatment can help reveal the true sense of
identity in the perspective of an individual as well as in the social milieu existing
outside the individual.
“Identities are codes that are expressed in conversations and define
membership in communities.” This proposition facilitates the coding strategy adopted
in this project to sort out textual evidence of the diversity of Chinese diasporic
communities. After preliminary reading of the textual data from online interactive
discussion, I found that identity codes were prevalent and abounding. The challenge is
how to sort out those identity markers into a more perceptible system via an
interpretive scheme so as to help people better make sense the significance of the
diversity of cultural identity within the researched cultural community. In Chapter III,
I will discuss the coding strategy in detail.
A further development in the examination of the interplay of the multiple
layers of identity was Hecht and Jung’s (2003) concept of “identity gap,” which refers
to the discrepancy or contradiction between and among layers. Altogether, they cited
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six possible identity gaps in the matrix of four interpenetrated layers. For instance, an
individual’s enacted identity in communication or relational interactions may be
different in the personal identity one perceives or expects. Frustration, disheartenment
or lack of security may arise from such gaps.
In sum, identity is a fruitful concept in interpretive scholarship of intercultural
communication. As reviewed above, Collier, Carbaugh, and Hecht offer their
approaches to communication and culture through the concepts of identity and
identification. Nonetheless, each addresses the complexity of identity through
different constructs. Collier stresses the theoretical complexity by deconstructing
multiplicity of identity into issues of salience, intensity, positionality, and social
transformation. Carbaugh, on the other hand, views the identity of an agent culturally
and communicatively configured through biological, social, spiritual, and material
dimensions. Finally, Hecht depicts a four-layer schema of multiplicity that
interconnect personal, relational, enacted, and communal properties of identity into an
interpretive system he labeled CTI. Yet in the perspectives of all three scholars,
identity has been integrated into a conceptual system linking culture and
communication.
Interestingly, to forecast future research orientations in CTI, Hecht et al (2005)
have suggested that online social interactions in the computer-mediated world can
produce virtual communities in which identity may have more salient and diverse
positions and processes. Computer-mediated communication settings provide unique
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environments for people to exchange messages and thus perform, conceal, modify, or
transform their identities. Therefore, some aspects of their identities hidden in face-toface communication can become salient. Online anonymity or, more precisely,
pseudonymity allows communicators to express their points of view in a presumably
unconstrained manner and present what they usually restrain in other settings.
Because Internet-based communication is unbounded by social scale and geographic
restriction, online content providers and commentators may evoke myriads of
viewpoints and identity politics, and even engage in blatant discussions of critical
issues and problematic events. Hecht et al (2005) were confident that the innovative
application of CTI can help explain how identities are formed, acted out, managed,
manifested, challenged, confronted, manipulated, and veered in the online social
interactions. In the next section, I will review relevant literature on computermediated communication that has examined the concept of identity in media studies.
Culture, Identity, and Internet Mediated Communication
Identity connotes subjectivity and power in the world of culturalist and
interpretivist media studies (Appadurai, 1996 ; Grossberg, 1993; Hall, 1996b & 1997;
Hillis, 1999; Shome & Hegde, 2002). Concepts like representation, annihilation,
intention, manipulation, domination, subjugation, creativity, agenda-setting, and even
conspiracy are often employed when approaching the dynamics between production
and consumption of media and the construction of identities. The fragmentation and
fluid dynamics of identity situated in geopolitical and ideological contexts have
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received substantial attention. Identity construction is thus seen as a process caught in
a virtual world where individual, social, global, and historical realities are mediated to
engender a diversity of identifications.
In the epoch of the Internet, identity tends to be viewed as more fragmented
than ever (Hecht, 2005). Rejecting the essentialist, unified, singular, and static
conception of identity, Hall (1996b) stressed a more fragmented, dynamic and
multifaceted idea of identity constructed through discourses and immersed in power
dynamics. As Grossberg (1996) observed, the concept of identity based on the
differentiation of social categories, like nationality, gender or race, becomes
insufficient to count the growing internal fractures of identities. Further, the model
that looks at identity in light of conditions of oppression or subjugation, prevalent in
postcolonial and critical race theories, is limited and inappropriate if one deals with
proliferating fractions of a more and more diverse population in the contemporary
global context (Grossberg, 1996). Along these lines, Hall’s (1996b) theoretical
endeavors to rethink identity in cultural studies have been devoted to the promotion of
an identity theory that considers the internal, “psychic mechanism” of identity as a
product of self’s interplay with society on the borderlands of objectivity and
subjectivity. Concurrent with such critical reflections, is the concern with the
revolutionary impact of the constantly evolving communication technologies on the
landscapes of culture and media.
The fragmentation of identity has been best studied in Internet mediated
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discourses (Mitra, 1997, 2002, & 2005) partly because of a key distinction between
the Internet and traditional media, that is, accessibility and interactivity (Al-Saggaf,
2006). Online communication started by free and open access to shared information
sources among people with common interests (Helland, 2007). As a versatile medium
(Choi et al, 2006), the Internet facilitates the nonlinear presentation of information
and accelerates the convergence of multimedia by blending images, sounds, texts, and
links (Dimitrova & Neznanski, 2006). The Internet or the World Wide Web allows the
almost-instant delivery of content from sources to audiences (Dimitrova & Neznanski,
2006). With help of the Internet, the spatial reach of information becomes
unprecedentedly broader (Choi et al, 2006; Mitra, 2005). Dial-up, landline, Wi-Fi,
satellite, mobile phone, among other technologies, further diversify people’s accesses
to the Internet. Most prominently, the Internet has significantly escalated the
interactivity and strengthened the audience involvement in news (Croteau, 2996; Nah
& Shah, 2006; Owens & Palmer, 2003; Pickard, 2006) and entertainment industries
(Jenkins, 2003; Shefrin, 2004). In Helland’s (2007) words, the Internet has become a
bustling and boisterous “megalopolis” where tensions and aggressions within groups
or across groups over a plethora of topics are heating up people’s mindsets. The
interactivity of online media sustained by reader-friendly formats such as chat rooms,
discussion boards, blogd, instant messages, and convenient online polls can be
categorized as a sphere of both content and interpersonal interactivity (Massey &
Levy, 1999). Content interactivity means consumers can select what they like in terms
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of content and/or providers. Interpersonal interactivity refers to readers’ capacity to
get involved in conversations with the authors of messages and among themselves.
The Internet has caused critical changes in the dynamic landscape of mass
media and human behavior. With nearly unbounded capacity and a decentralizing
propensity, the Internet helps society become more and more individualized
(Hodkinson, 2007). In the observed trend of online individualization, traditional social,
institutional, and relational constraints are losing their coercive force to encircle
individuals within the boundaries of collective identities (Bauman, 2001; DohenyFarina, 1996; Hodkinson, 2007). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have noticed that
new technologies have fostered a DIY (do-it-yourself) culture that makes the
fragmented, isolated, and unstable individual with fluid identities the primary social
unit. However, concurrent with the trend toward individualization is the fact that the
constitution of large communities divided by cultural membership, religious
affiliation, and ideological preferences is also taking place across geographical lines
(Helland, 2007; Sassenberg, 2002).
In this regard, Helland (2007) has noted that as early as the early 1980s
USENET was utilized to preserve and develop Jewish and Hindu Diasporic identities
among people sharing group memberships but residing in different areas of the globe.
The Internet is also a medium of networking for people in various places, particularly
those in a diaspora who would like to maintain some aspects of their identities such as
traditional rituals and spiritual beliefs.
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In addition, the Internet provides a context that makes people across cultures less
restrained in expressing their opinions (Abdulla, 2007; Ho & McLeod, 2008; Nah &
Shah, 2006) and thus contributes to a more democratic public sphere (Pickard, 2006).
Diverse ideas and arguments from multiple perspectives as well as their disputation
and cross-examination can help expand the public sphere of the society (Dewey, 1954;
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1989; Ho and McLeod, 2007; Katz, 1997)
and create a well-informed audience (Fishkin, 1995).
However, according to Noelle-Neumann’s (1993, 1974) spiral of silence
theory—a model of public opinion’s dynamics—hegemonic social situations tend to
diminish the voices of minorities who are constrained by the social sanctions set by
the perceived majority and afraid of being socially isolated by the powerful (Anderson,
1996; Miller, 2005). Still, in the environment of the Internet, people who voice their
views do not have to present themselves as in face-to-face interaction and can more
freely reveal their authentic opinions with less concern for institutional security and
interpersonal facework (Min, 2007; Morris & Ogan, 2002; Tait, 2008; Watanabe,
2007). Most prominently, people can choose to broadcast their individual points of
view anonymously and avoid being trapped in personal or interpersonal
embarrassment. Indeed, empirical research has shown that in computer-mediated
communication people tend to be more comfortable and less inhibited to engage in
heartened discussions of controversial issues (Abdulla, 2007; Ho & McLeod, 2008;
Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976). The Internet makes people more self-righteous
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and this may be good for a more democratic civic society. With minimal presence of
the researcher and the accepted legitimacy of online anonymity, data collected from
online forums can be expected to yield greater diversity of opinions and perspectives
from the participants (Watanabe, 2007).
Recent research on ethnic or cultural virtual communities bounded by
common languages, shared group membership or general social categorizations has
provided insights on both cohesion and internal fragmentation manifested in messages
produced and exchanged among ingroup participants (Watanabe, 2007). For example,
in the context of intensifying tensions between the West and Arabic/Islamic worlds,
scholars have examined how Arabic speech communities may perceive major
historical events such as 9/11 and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq (Abdulla, 2007; AlSaggaf, 2006). Focusing on a descriptive textual analysis of online data from three
major Arabic discussion boards in the Arab and Muslim world, Abdulla (2007)
demonstrated how Muslims reacted differently to the 9/11 attacks. In another study,
Friedman (2005) argued that Web information has already formed a virtual public
space providing Latin American lesbians opportunities and tools for changing the
dominant social perceptions of their cultural and group identity. Likewise Kim and
Yun (2007) employed Baxter and Montgomery’s (1996) relational dialectics theory to
understand how interpersonal relationships become important issues in one major
Korean social network site. Tan and Tan (2008) has argued that language variety (the
local, Singaporean English versus standardized English), regardless of the topics and

32

contents, affected the perceptions of social status and expertise among Singaporean
Internet political discussers. And comparing mainstream online media and
Africana.com, Brock (2006) constructed a content-evaluation framework considering
historical, sociological, and philosophical dimensions in the assessment of cultural
identification and representation in African Americans’ online experiences. Brock’s
analysis showed an existing set of basic cultural differences between mainstream and
black websites.
In this sense, the Internet constitutes a discursive platform that attracts and
encourages more diverse messages and more personal ideas from individual cultural
members. Al-Saggaf (2006) suggested that online discourse is more trustworthy and
therefore more valuable research data to reflect on group thoughts and sentiments
among people who often face a tightly controlled traditional media environment in the
Arabic world. Through the examination of the Arabic readers’ reactions to news
threads edited and published on a popular Arabic website sponsored by a major
Arabic TV station, Al-Saggaf (2006) discussed the potential of online media to
become an influential public sphere attracting Arabic civic participation. In another
study, Muhtaseb and Frey (2008) concluded that the most salient motive of Arab
Americans for using the Internet is to seek information from foreign-based sources.
Observing the increasing trend of Indian immigration in the West and its
presence in the cyberspace, Mitra (1997, 2002, & 2005) did a series of interpretive
studies on virtual ethnic communities formed online and their digital discourses.
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Based on an overview of India-related WWW messages – links, pages, and sites from
as early as 1997 – Mitra (1997) developed his description and explanation of the
formation of an ad hoc virtual Indian community. By focusing on one particular
website, India Related Links, a webpage created by an Indian graduate student in
Canada, Mitra sorted out how the virtual community has been strengthened by
deliberating the distinction between ingroup and outgroup identities among the
perceived contributors and visitors. In another study of online Indian identification,
Mitra (2002) illustrated how Internet could be a relatively secure place for immigrants
to reconcile their identity conflicts with their adopted cultures.
Although the Internet entered ordinary people’s daily life less than two
decades ago, the online manifestation of Chinese culture has become phenomenal
(Wu, 2007). Based on empirical studies of two online communities of new Chinese
migrants in Singapore, Chan (2006) argued that promotion of diverse and distinct
identity options (tolerating different definitions of “Chinese” such as statist, socialist,
or nationalist Chinese) had been a principal strategy of the web administrators to
attract and maintain a wider range of users. Xie (2008) conducted ethnographic
research on the relational dynamics of an online community of older Chinese formed
through three computer-mediated communication modes: voice chat, forums, and
instant messages. Xie (2008) concluded that particular Internet modes had different
communication effects on the socialization of senior citizens, such as the use of chat
rooms for companionship, online forums for information seeking, and instant
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messaging for emotional support. And through a historical approach and with mixed
methodologies (quantitative and qualitative), Wu (2007) described the short but
intense evolution of Chinese cyber nationalism – a more spontaneous, sentimental,
collective, and internet-promoted acclamation of Chinese ideology that is different
from the state-sponsored patriotism.
Chinese Identity in the Diaspora
The study of cultural identification accentuates the nodal connections between
self conceptualization and group membership defined by social categorization
(ascription) and/or personal preferences (avowal) (Hall, 2005). The structure of
identity and the process of identification can be complex (Carbaugh, 1994; Collier,
2005; Hecht, 2005). Considering the inherent heterogeneities of large cultural groups
such as the Chinese, their perceptions of themselves in relation to others—either
ingroup or outgroup—must be kaleidoscopic. It can be argued, on the one hand, an
awareness of the complexity of cultural identity prepares people to deal with problems
caused by intercultural encounters. On the other hand, the discourses in online
messages produced by members of a certain culture also demonstrate how they can
maintain static and even stereotypical perspectives on particular cultural identities.
This section reviews literature that illuminates how different regional origins,
historical and geopolitical influences, and national and transnational imaginaries have
shaped Chinese identity overseas. The complexity of this identity formation has been
discussed in scholarly interpretations of “Chineseness” that have given attention to the
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perceptions and performance of global citizens of Chinese background.
For most individuals of Chinese origin, the Chinese cultural identity is a
combination of ethnicity, nationality, religion, tradition, class, locality, community,
interpersonal relationships, and other factors or politicized personal preferences (Chan,
2006; Gao, 2006; Sun, 2002; Wickberg, 2007). As Chan (2006) observed, the new
waves of Chinese migrants in global cities, relatively more educated and from more
diverse regions of origin than the earlier colonial coolies from a couple of southern
provinces in China, are facing more identity options and therefore more conflicts.
Three models proposed by Ward (1965, quoted in Chan, 2006) to interpret identity
construction among Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora include the immediate model
of dialect awareness, the internal model of inter-subgroup relationships, and the
ideological model regarding a pan-Chinese identity promoted by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). The first two models are based on the knowledge of the
dialects of original regions. These apply primarily to situations before the 1980s,
when Chinese overseas formed their communities with emphasis on the commonality
of native places. Ever since, with the downplaying of PRC’s communist ideology and
the promotion of a discourse of economic growth, new types of Chinese national
identity positions emerged. These are characterized by the tensions between the PRC
government and its dissidents as well as by the frictions between the dominant Han
Chinese and some minority nationalities in the zones of Tibet and Xinjiang (He and
Guo, 2000; Harrison, 1995; Kim and Dittmer, 1993, quoted in Chan, 2006). Therefore,
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the new Chinese migrants from the PRC cannot ignore the conflicts that engender
new identity options, options that challenge the doctrines promoted by the Mainland’s
government.
As Hall (1996b) noted, cultural identity, as both a process and a structure,
matters with the past and projects the future. With a positioning across time and space,
any particular cultural identity is in constant flux or transformation. The history of the
Chinese in the global colonial and contemporary context is often perceived and
thereby interpreted differently by members of the ingroup and outgroup (Sun, 2002;
Tsu, 2006a). The “Chinese factor” was once the source of an inferiority complex
among some Chinese immigrant children (who felt ashamed of their Chinese identity
because of the inferior and marginalized social status of Chinese culture as well as
negative stereotyping of individual Chinese’s physical conditions) in the West,
particularly in the U.S. (Lei, 1931, as quoted in Liu, 2007; Tsu, 2006a & 2006b). The
history of China’s national failures in the colonial period and postwar diplomatic
setbacks after two world wars also had the effect of denigrating individuals of
Chinese background (Lien, 2006; Tsu, 2006a & 2006b; Yin, 2007; Wickberg, 2007),
especially when such perception of national disgrace coincided with particular
personal and communal predicaments, either psychological or physical or both.
From the U.S. Congress’ 1882 legislation of the Chinese Exclusion Act to its
repeal in 1943 (Fowler, 2007; Lee, 2003; Norton, 1924), a period that saw a decline of
Chinese population in the U.S., the rise of Chinese nationalism among Chinese
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overseas was perceptible (Tsu, 2006). During that particular period of exclusion
(1882-1943), an anti-Chinese ideology was widespread and became prevalent all over
the world’s colonial territories and major colonial centers. For instance, besides the
U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act there were the White Australian Policy, Canadian Chinese
Immigration Act (Canadian head tax), and New Zealand head tax, all singling out
Chinese individuals through administrative and legislative means. Due to blatant
racial prejudice, fueled by historically specific labor and economic factors, the
Chinese in the diaspora were physically attacked, mentally abused, politically
marginalized, socially segregated, and culturally alienated in the U.S. and other
nations and colonial territories. Brutal crimes were committed, such as massacres,
homicides, rapes, and abuses of ethnic Chinese. The crimes ended up with few
victims compensated and even fewer criminals punished (Daniels, 1988). For instance,
in the Rock Springs massacre, in Wyoming, Chinese miners were “burned, scalped,
mutilated, branded, decapitated, dismembered, and hanged from gutter spouts,” but
the few criminals arrested as suspects were released and even “treated to a regular
ovation” (Courtwright, 1998; Gardner, 2003; Daniels, 1988; Lyman, 2001). However,
the fact that anti-Chinese sentiments originated in the most heinous aspects of
Western modernity has been essentially overlooked in Western scholarship.
Tsu (2006) has posited that the more oppressive the hegemonic ideologies
against the Chinese overseas, the more they tend to cultivate their Chinese
nationalism—even with its contested meanings. The national failure of China in the
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colonial period and cultural humiliation felt by Chinese produced an immense energy
with the potential to become a source of resistance and internal cohesion among the
adherents of Chinese nationalism (Tsu, 2006). In postcolonial times, particularly
since the second half of the 20th century, global cultural movements fueled by Western
economic expansion and Cold War ideological battles have once again undermined
and even demonized China, Chinese culture, and Chinese identity (Liu & Li, 1996;
Wu, 2007). In contemporary Western discourse, China is often portrayed as a defeated
super nation instead of a victim of colonial atrocities, and anything “Chinese” is
associated with a homogeneous brand of continental, cheap products (Tsu, 2006b).
Yet, disqualified as a colonial sufferer, Chinese identity is in the perennial blind spot
of postcolonial criticism rooted in the West (Barker & Hulme, 1994; Chrisman &
Parry, 2000).
Facing enduring disrespect and discrimination, Chinese individuals are given
limited sympathy. Individual Chinese overseas have to spend extra energy dealing
with unfavorable social environments, where their Chineseness frames their selfconceptualization (Wickberg, 2007). While deeply entrapped in the perception of
national disgrace and negative stereotyping spurred by the Western military
spoliations, political incursions, ideological oppression, physiological prejudice, and
cultural harassment (Tsu, 2006b), Chinese overseas directly witness the bigoted
ignorance, ethnic discrimination, and stereotyping that prevails as common sense in
their adopted cultures (Dikotter, 1992; Liu & Li, 1997; Wu, 2007). According to
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Gramsci (Joll, 1977; Hall, 1996a), in any political context, common sense is formed
and fueled by hegemonic ideologies – in the case of the Chinese overseas, by
hegemonic Western ideologies. On the other hand, the Chinese may also develop a
hypersensitive mindset that keeps them entangled in the psychosis of victimization
and makes them particularly susceptible to derision. This hypersensitivity and fragile
self-esteem among Chinese individual has to do with the historical positioning and
imaging of Chinese national identity in the global context (Osnos, 2008; Pei, 2002;
Wickberg, 2007). However, the victimization among Chinese and their descendents in
the global diaspora has seldom become the central topic of scholarly discussion (Tsu,
2006). As this research will show, this victim complex is manifested indeed in the
online discourses of random but passionate, contingent and persistent Chinese
commentators.
After 1949, with the establishment of a communist regime in mainland China
– the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chinese identity was further split along the
lines of ideological struggles (Pei, 2002, as cited in Keane, 2003). The PRC has been
represented as a subjugated nation ruled by an inhumane government, culturally
exotic, politically different, and alien to Western sensibility (Wu, 2007). After the
period of internal political strives (early 1950s to the end of 1970s, such as the Great
Leap and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), the discourse about the infamy
of PRC’s human rights records has been intensified in the Western media by a series
of historical events climaxed at the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, clampdown on Fa Lun
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Gong, and repression of the “unrestful” Xinjiang and Tibetan margins (Chase &
Mulvenon, 2002; Hughes, 2006; Mann, 2007; Perry & Selden, 2003; Schell, 1995;
Shirk, 2008; Tsao & Seymour, 1998; Wu, 2007).
The complexity of the identity performed by Chinese in the global diaspora
thus echoes these discourses about the internal divisions and irreconcilable ideological
positionings, such as diverse opinions regarding Tibet, East Turkistan (Xinjiang
Uigur), Taiwan independence, Chinese democratic dissidents, and other regional
differences (Bush, 2005; Pei, 2002; Keane, 2003). Keane (2003) referred to the chaos
of Chinese internal divisions as the “China imploding.” Townsend (1996 as cited in
Chan, 2005 & 2006) posited that the coexistence of four different nations sustains the
complexity of Chinese identity: the official Chinese nation of the PRC, the dominant
Han’s nation, the PRC plus Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, and the Chinese overseas
with cultural affinity to the PRC.
Nonetheless, to describe the complexity of Chinese identity in an exhaustive
way is impossible, because the meaning of being Chinese is always dynamic and
contested. In effect, this “imploded” China and fragmented Chinese identity (Chan,
2006; Sun, 2002; Wong, 2003; Wu, 2007) manifest themselves in the online
discourses analyzed for this dissertation, particularly in the reactions to news and in
the discussion produced by Chinese individuals in the global context. A Chinese
diasporic identity is enacted through conflicting discourses such as criticism or
appreciation of the Chinese homeland, promotion or discouragement of acculturation,
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or individualist resistance to racism in the host cultures.
The enactment of a diasporic identity has found in cyberspace a meaningful
social space. The Internet provides a specially versatile and powerful medium that can
serve a utilitarian function in the migrants’ adaptation to the adopted cultures as well
as in the assertion of their cultural identity through discursive connections with other
“like-minded” people in the world (Sautman, 1994; Wickberg, 2007; Wong, 2003; Wu,
2007).
In North America alone, research has shown that about two thirds of the Chinese have
Internet access (Wickberg, 2008). Further, Yang (2003, as quoted in Chan 2006) has
called attention to the formation of an online transnational Chinese cultural sphere
constituted of Chinese-language websites and producing globally circulated
discourses targeting the Chinese readership. Simultaneous with the expression of
Chinese national identity is the force of internal fragmentation displayed by online
discourses that collide with or corroborate each other (Befu, 1993; Chan, 2006).
Instead of neutralization, the cyber media’s dual forces of homogenization and
diversification (Mitra, 1997, as quoted in Chan 2006) have further intensified the
chaotic situation of an “imploded” China and fragmented Chinese identity. This
internal diversity concurs with homogenization and contributes to the formation of a
transnational Chinese identity that is dynamic, contested, negotiated, multifaceted,
and contingent (Befu, 1993; Chan, 2006). While even the essential characteristics of
such a transnational Chinese identity are in constant flux, any attempt to grasp the
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cultural identification processes among Chinese overseas has to consider the internal
differences within the Chinese diaspora dispersed across the globe. The current
research aims to explore general tendencies within the transnational Chinese identity
as well as its internal diversification.
In general, to study Chinese identity as manifested in cyberspace, we need to
deal with the complexity of Chinese glories, disgraces, and hopes in the past, present,
and future, which can be reflected in a prismatic manner through the various realities
that any individuals of Chinese background have to live in. While ancient glories can
be extolled, discounted, or appropriated, past national failures and present ideological
embarrassments may become sources fueling deliberate or spontaneous reactions. The
future of the Chinese identity, which represents one fifth or more of humanity, ties to
not only people’s interpretations of the world’s colonial past and perceptions of the
present global geopolitics, but also to the multifarious realities of all human beings,
including those of non-Chinese origin. National failures, diasporic predicaments,
racial oppression, social marginalization, ideological demonization, body stereotyping,
cultural alienation, and other discursive forces derived from the Western hegemony
combine to create an unfavorable global public sphere that Chinese overseas may
have closer and more direct contact with than their compatriots within PRC.
Paradoxically, concepts of national pride and national shame coexist and codetermine
the nature of Chinese nationalism performed in online discourses; these are
interpretive frames around which the identification with Chinese culture can be
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questioned, challenged, and manipulated. Thereupon, it would be fruitful to analyze
the online discourse via the interpretive framework informed by communication
theories of cultural identity. In the next section of this chapter, I provide description of
a theoretical framework that I formulate and use in the analysis of selected online data.
An Integrating Theoretical Framework
Drawing on Collier, Carbaugh, and Hecht, hereafter I configure an interpretive
framework of cultural identity to be used in the analysis, interpretation, and discussion
of diasporic Chinese identities as enacted through online discourses. This framework
contains: a) a definition of cultural identity from a communication perspective; b) a
description of the structural properties and dimensions of cultural identity; and c)
consideration of contextual issues related to the positioning of cultural identity. The
section closes with a discussion of the particular dynamics of enacting cultural
identity in online presentation, followed by the exposition of the basic assumptions
underlying this research.
The Concept of Cultural Identity
Cultural identity is defined here as one's self-concept formed and performed in
communication that emphasizes one's connection to cultural membership. Cultural
identification is the enactment of cultural identity. Cultural identity has a dimension
that I term the “cultural core” to refer to the individual’s sense of connection of the
self with group membership, as in, for instance, the manifestation of sentimental
attachments and attitudinal orientations toward one’s nationality or ethnicity. Through
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communication, individuals develop their concept of self based on the self-perception
as well as others interpretations of their social image, which is subject to the
influences of all sorts of social categorizations and cultural stereotypes. The formation
of cultural identity is a constant dynamic process that responds and reacts to specific
sociocultural contexts.
The Four Constituent Prongs of Cultural Identity
Cultural identity is a schema of multiplicity with four dimensional properties
intersecting and interpenetrating each other at its cultural core, forming a crystalline
and tetrahedral image like that of a caltrop (Dong, 2008 & 2009). The four
dimensional properties of cultural identity are two pairs of foundational dialectics:
individuality—sociality and materiality—spirituality, which influence the generation
of identity discourses.
Individuality. Similar to Hecht’s personal frame of identity (Hecht, 2005), the
prong of individuality refers to personal traits like corporeality, personality,
temperament, and biogenetic traces. The dimension of individuality and its rotation
can be exemplified by the following quote:
Discrimination? What is discrimination? How to prove the allegation of
discrimination? I don’t see this case has anything to do with discrimination.
Ms Han deserves sympathy but this could happen to anybody of any
race…That woman’s personal academic quandary has nothing to do with other
Chinese students… (Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005)
Sociality. The prong of sociality refers to internalized social norms and
perspectives on social structures and relations derived from one’s communal,
relational, familial, cultural, institutional, and public communication experiences. For
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instance, in demonstrating a perspective about the US higher education system, one
commentator belabored:
The system that produces PhDs is skewed. After doing bench work in a lab for
several years, what will you learn? Your mind will be narrowed to a set of
experiments and some writing skills that can wrap up garbage into published
papers. Let's face it. PhD students are cheap labor and post-docs just bench
jobs (commentary from Bao Bao Jiu Le Bu, Sept 5, 2007).
Materiality. Materiality means the perception of and actions on objective
conditions of existence or livelihood, such as family deficit, control of resources,
lifestyles, socially recognized personal accomplishment, individual economic
situations, and other macro socioeconomic situations like economic development or
global finances that influence the constitution of a cultural identity. For example, in a
self-cultural-depreciating commentary, one attributed Chinese in the U.S. as “Stingy,
as five thousand years of parsimony did a good job… If one smells a little bit of
money all others will follow.”
Spirituality. In contrast to materiality, spirituality represents one’s subjective
perceptions and reactions to matters of value, belief, and faith issues, including both
fundamental (e.g. ideological and political stance) and transcendental (e.g. moral and
religious belief) topics. The following commentary illustrates the commentator’s
transcendental worldview with a strong pro-China cultural core:
Confucianism and Chinese culture in general are much superior compared to
those ridiculous West religions, which are causing a lot of problems in today's
world and may eventually result in the demise of human civilization. Hatred
among conflicting religions have lasted thousands of years and cost millions
of lives and the worst is yet to come. It may not take very long before a
Muslim terrorist group gets access to nuclear technology and sets one dirty
bomb off. In contrast, our Chinese culture doesn't worship any stupid self46

claimed “god” and never seeks to “rule the world” or “export ideas.” I am very
proud to see China as the only major player in today's world with no official
religion. Don't tell me moral standards would be low without religions.
Confucianism teaches people more than enough to be good citizens
(commentary from Zhong Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010).
These four interrelated prongs constitute the basic structural constituents of
cultural identity. Intersecting one another, they engender multiple cognitive and
interpretive frames and positionalities, from which one makes sense of self and
society. Such frames also influence how people generate discourses with embedded
identity traces.
The generation of identity discourses is the very process of identification.
Every message in a certain context reflects some aspects of one’s cultural identity. In
this research, I will study identity discourses through the analysis of the four
constituent prongs of cultural identities and their interrelationships in the process of
cultural identification.
The Contextual Factors of Identity Discourses
Interpretation of particular identity discourses needs to consider various
contextual issues that constrain and enable their presentations. The consideration of
the contexts of identity discourses addresses the connection between individual
enactments of online commentators and their sociocultural, political, and economic
environments. This connection is, arguably, shaped by four contextual factors.
Gravity force – Influence of existing hegemonies. The omnipresent
influence of power is like the gravity force on the planet, inescapable and fundamental
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for the formation and performance of any individual cultural identity. Power
asymmetry, such as in the control of resources, unequal representation of voices or
differential institutional legitimacy, leads to existing social inequalities. Under the
influence of power dynamics, cultural identification may encounter unexpected twists
and contradictions that work to reinforce the dominant system of power.
Resistance – On emancipation and empowerment. The energy from
resistance is an antithesis of gravity force, meaning the capacity to counterforce
oppression from hegemony. Resistance is, arguably, proportional to the extent to
which individuals perceive their oppression and, thereby, may exist mostly as
discursive acts that shape identity discourses through the choices of particular
rhetorical strategies. The movement from rhetoric of resistance to the constitution of
social of political movements is a process that can be sporadic but momentous.
Topography – Geopolitical landscape and social/institutional hierarchy.
This category includes historically formed structures, ranging from global geopolitical
constructs, corporate or state entities, and all levels of institutions, to the immediate
platforms of discourses supported and limited by technology.
Timeline – The historical contexts. History influences the formation and
performance of cultural identity through chronology of events and people’s memories
and interpretations of things past.
All the contextual factors operate simultaneously to shed light on the online
enactment of cultural identity. Like the structure of a caltrop, cultural identification is
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also a multidimensional and holistic scenario, whose analysis calls for the elaboration
of an integral model for the study of identity (Dong, 2008). The presentation of such a
holographic picture through discourse analysis can deepen our understanding of the
dynamics of cultural identity.
The Online Presentation of Identity Discourses
Cultural identity can be enacted and observed in online discourses. Online
manifestation of cultural identity is an identification process that reveals individual
identity positioned in particular contexts. Yet, comments to specific postings by
Internet users are also shaped by the topography of cyberspace. The distinctive online
setting becomes a key factor in understanding the characteristics of online identity
discourses. Given the medium’s accessibility, anonymity, reach, contingency, and
popularity, online identity discourses constructed in interactively by random readers
have unique features that make them valuable qualitative data for the study of
particular groups of people such as the Chinese overseas.
An ethnic quarter in the global cyber public sphere. The common use of
Chinese language and accessibility of the website combine to determine a sense of
ethnic membership among Chinese individuals who are far from the homeland and
scattered around the world. The individuals in this group constitute the target
population within which I will explore the concept of Chinese identity overseas.
Although it is reasonable to expect that they will share some identity traits, they are
also expected to perform a variety of discourses in their public and voluntary
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commentaries on digested media messages as well as in discussions with other online
users.
Presentation, representation, and re-presentation. Even in anonymity, a
random online commentator can still reveal some aspects of his or her identity. Such
enactment, though apparently contingent when observed as part of a group, is still a
meaningful discursive act because of the message creator’s communicative
intentionality. Since most of the messages under investigation are the commentators’
reactions to news digests or other users’ comments, the presentation of cultural
identity becomes a re-presentation that results from the interaction between self and
others in this group.
Identity enactment and manifestation. The framework described above is
informed by a set of assumptions or premises that will guide textual analysis and
interpretation of identification among the population studied.
1)

The structure of cultural identity is constituted by four interrelated
properties, which produce the multiple dimensions of identity and
can crystallize into forms of identification such as national,
professional, racial, political, and economic identity.

2)

The distinctive context of the website poses limitations to
interpersonal and social interaction such as face consideration. For
instance, one might argue that the anonymity of cyberspace can lead
to phony and mendacious messages; however, the texts also may
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convey truthful feelings, attitudes, and preferences of their
anonymous creators.
3)

Although frames and agendas embedded in the editorial selection of
news stories and commentaries inevitably influence the
commentators, the latter have the freedom, capacity, and discretion
to respond with their independent thoughts and genuine feelings.

4)

Most, if not all, online commentators live in globalized, postcolonial,
and multicultural surroundings, which is expected to have an
influence on their self identification.

5)

The study of cultural identification among diasporic Chinese is
expected to lead to the analysis of internal heterogeneity and
multiplicity of group identities.

As indicated in the review of literature and the proposed integrative framework
for interpretation, the current project explores the online enactment of cultural
identification among Chinese overseas through an interpretive perspective informed
by identity theories developed in intercultural communication studies. The
interpretive framework to be used will guide the selection and analysis of data. In the
next chapter, I will elaborate on these methodological issues and describe the
procedures and criteria of data collection and analysis.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
A main assumption of this research is that an analysis of textual data can
illuminate the cultural heterogeneity of the targeted group as well as how processes of
identification take place through discursive interaction. This chapter focuses on the
discussion of research design, including research method employed, general research
procedures (description of the Web site, data collection, and sampling), and strategies
of data analysis. As discussed in Chapter I and II, the current study examines cultural
identification or identity practices manifested in messages produced by COOCs in a
particular website operated outside China. Hence, this research focuses on a volume
of textual messages comprising news stories, opinion pieces, and personal blog entries.
Prior to the description of sampling strategies, general research procedures, and
analytical strategies, I present research questions, definitions of the key concepts, and
discussion of grounded theory as the method employed.
Research questions
Over years of being a loyal user of the website studied as well as a member of
the target community, I have observed the complexity of cultural identification
enacted in textual and visual messages posted by COOCs. The central research
purpose, as elaborated in Chapter I, is to gain a systematic understanding of such
complexity via the lens of cultural identity theory. Upon approaching this research
objective, this study should provide answers to the following set of research questions.
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RQ1: How do Chinese individuals living overseas use online communication to
construct a sense of identity in the context of intercultural interaction abroad?
RQ1a: How does the immediate multicultural living environment
influence identification processes?
RQ1b: How does global politics influence identification processes?
RQ2: What does online discourse reveal about the dynamics of cultural
identification among the Chinese in the diaspora?
RQ2a: What are the most salient points of convergence within the
group?
RQ2b: What are the most salient internal divisions within the group?
RQ3: What does online communication reveal about the complex
interrelations among the dimensions of identity?
Definition of Key Concepts
To analyze the textual data, I draw on several key concepts commonly used in
intercultural, media, and critical studies. The data selection criteria and analytical
strategies are set in close reference of these concepts.
Culture. For the purpose of this research, culture is defined here as a
historically rooted and shared system of values and norms that allow for the grouping
people into large communities distinguished by group membership (nation/state),
social categorization (race/ethnicity), self-identification (role/position), and/or
ideological preferences (values/worldview)
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Cultural identity and identification. Cultural identity is defined as one’s self
concept formed and performed in communication that emphasizes one’s connection to
cultural membership. Situate in culture, the concept of cultural identity can also be
described as a cluster of subjectivities that relate to various dimensions of an
individual’s experience as a member of a group. Cultural identification is the
enactment of cultural identity. In the conceptualization of identity, culture is the
central core of the cluster, connecting the sense of individuality, sociality, spirituality,
and materiality to form the individual’s self-perception. In the current study of
cultural identity, the performance of the dimensions of cultural identity is assumed to
be situational and subject to individual willful enactment, which can be manifested in
discourse practices such as posting online commentaries. Such process of online
communication is approached here as one kind of cultural identification with its own
rules and rituals.
Chinese overseas. Chinese overseas is a broad term, hard to define in a strict
and absolute way because of its rich connotation and often contesting, ambiguous
meanings. In its most basic meaning, Chinese overseas would mean any Chinese
individual living outside China. However, an ethnic Chinese who has been naturalized
in another nation and travels back inside China with a passport issued by another
country is also a Chinese overseas or more precisely an overseas Chinese. As for the
use of this term in the current study, Chinese overseas are defined as those who access
and interact through the selected website, which is effectively blocked and banned in
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Mainland China. About the constitution of Chinese overseas as a group, I will
elaborate more in the section discussing research procedures.
Global, multicultural, and post-colonial context. Any communication act of
cultural identification cannot escape the influence of global, multicultural, and postcolonial contexts. Coming out of China, through international travel, the Chinese
enter a social milieu that inevitably makes them think more globally. In many cities,
Chinese overseas enter in interactions with many other racial/ethnic groups (Wickberg,
2008). Immersion in the multicultural surroundings can alter the Chinese overseas’
perceptions of social, racial, ethnic, and cultural distinctions that at first may be
startling to them. Furthermore, with increased awareness of colonial legacies and
post-colonial ideologies – or the rethinking and rectifying of negative legacies of
colonialism (Barker & Hulme, 1994; Chrisman & Parry, 2000) – acquired in the
global and multicultural environment, Chinese overseas may develop new lenses for
the political understanding of international dynamics. Among the online messages
analyzed, this awareness of post-colonial ideology is indeed evident. Thus,
international experience, intercultural contacts, and critical social learning seem to
shape the global, multicultural, and post-colonial social environment that serves as the
context for online cultural identification.
Cyber ethnic quarter. Like a real-life living area of an ethnic community
submerged in and distinct from a surrounding mainstream culture, a cyber ethnic
quarter is a space organized, clustered, and visited by members of an ethnic
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community – only that this has a virtual instead of physical location (even though the
data might be material stored in a server). A cyber ethnic quarter is like an online
ethnic agora designed and operated for the exchange of information, opinion, emotion,
and artwork in all sorts of hypertexts and digitalized visual and acoustic formats
sustained by Internet technologies (Mitra, 2002). Although the site exists in
cyberspace, it does have a physical operating location – ChinaGate Group located in
Fremont, California, according to the website’s own description. Although the
accessibility of a cyber ethnic quarter could be unbounded, the one studied here has
always been banned since its establishment in 1997 by Mainland China, where the
growth of Internet users has been sensational. Such a virtual yet substantial barrier
imposed by the current PRC government helps define the researched site and
population.
Methods
To describe the clamor of this cyber ethnic quarter and grasp the complexity of
Chinese overseas cultural identification, I adopted a qualitative methodology featuring
textual analysis to identify and link themes and categories that emerged through the
close reading of data. To carry out the qualitative textual analysis, I drew on the
coding techniques and basic research procedures developed in grounded theory as
originally proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), further developed by Clarke (2005)
and Charmaz (2006), and applied in communication studies (Becker & Stamp, 2005;
Becker, 1998; Blythe, 2007; Fisher & Hawes, 1971; Gales, 2003; Gilchrist &
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Browning, 1981; Martin, 2008; Muylle & Despontin, 1999; Park & Qin, 2007; Right,
1997; Skeat & Perry, 2008; Thompson, 2008). For instance, moving back and forth
from specific data to more abstract categories, the current study is not aimed at
generating theory but rather interpreting data and elaborating insights to answer the
research questions.
Research Procedures
This study started with my own experience as a user of the website and a
mindful observer (or “lurker,” in a web term) of the complexity of Chinese cultural
identity in today’s global, multicultural, and post-colonial context. Just several months
after arriving in the United States, I was introduced to the website Wenxuecity.com
(literally translated as “Literature city”), where I could seek information shared by
other fellow Chinese on how to survive outside China—for instance, how to apply for
credit cards, how to buy or fix computers, how to buy used cars, and where to find
sales information. Inevitably, I was also attracted to some online forums set up in the
website regarding current political events and tabloid-typed news stories. Gradually
the website became the default home site of my personal computer’s Internet browser.
I use this website as my main source of news information almost on a daily basis
because almost all major current events are covered in this site. Although I seldom
participate in the heated debates in some of the popular forums, I have been observing
these discussions among registered users, especially after the website added a function
that allows users to leave their commentaries on the homepage frontline news stories.
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Consequently, I began to develop my research interest in analyzing the complexity of
Chinese cultural identity manifested through these messages so as to gain a thorough
and systematic understanding of cultural identification processes as enacted through
new forms of communication technologies.
A description of the website. According to its self-description,
Wenxuecity.com, founded in the United States in 1997, is “The Largest Portal Site for
Overseas Chinese Worldwide,” a user-centered global website providing “theme
browsing, web navigating, overseas authorship, news tracking, free services, and
electronic commerce and so on” (my translation from Chinese) and targeting the
market of overseas Chinese worldwide. It can be inferred that the founder(s),
designers, and operators of this site were probably from Mainland China. The
principal clue leading to such an inference is language encoding. The general setting
is in Chinese language with two optional encodings: Traditional Chinese and
Simplified Chinese. The PRC developed and adopts the Simplified Chinese writing
system that is repelled by the Republic of China (POC) in Taiwan. While the language
encodings of the general setting are optional, the page “About us”—containing the
company’s mission statement and some self-promotion—is a mosaic picture
seamlessly composed of 40 smaller pictures all in GIF format, which contains only
the Simplified Chinese language. There is no way for common users to switch the
Simplified Chinese on the “About us” into the Traditional Chinese encoding. From
any computer with Chinese language encodings (Simplified or Traditional), the first-
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time opening the website shows the Chinese words encoded in the Simplified Chinese.
This also indicates that a selective priority was definitely given to the Simplified
Chinese, which would be rejected by Taiwanese Chinese and seldom adopted by
Chinese other than the Mainlanders (Singaporean Chinese is in simplified Chinese
and is an exception to this estimation). The website also states information about the
“Target Demographic,” including gender (72% male), education (73% holding
master’s degrees or higher), age (73% between ages 25-35), locations (73% in the
U.S.), and average duration of an individual’s daily visit to the site (26 minutes).
Many of the messages in the website’s self-description seem directed at potential
advertisers, which reveal the commercial, profit-seeking initiative and motive of those
who run this website.
The homepage of wenxuecity.com, relatively stable in its format, is composed
of numerous online forums and users’ weblogs. On the homepage, there are three
main sections in a hierarchical order – News Express, Hot Forums, and Best Weblogs,
which are surrounded by visual images of various advertisements. The hierarchical
positioning of the three main sections shows that the website is designed primarily as
a news portal. As one of the 80 various forums on the homepage, News Express is
given a prominent position on the homepage with 60 concise and trundling headlines
(each headline is only one line in length) in two columns—about 10 percent of space
is given to advertisements in slightly different colors. Every headline is a link to a
webpage containing the content of the news. At the bottom of every news story,
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readers can check commentaries by clicking the link or post new comments after
logging in. All the comments left by registered users are also in a separate webpage
and vertically placed in a timely order (older postings would be placed in lower
position). The discourses under investigation are mostly in these commentary pages.
Besides target audience, the number and quality of readers’ comments were the
main factors for selecting wenxuecity.com as a prime site for the current study.
Compared to numerous other Chinese websites, wenxuecity.com has many noticeable
advantages that attract more elaborate comments from a more diverse group of
readers (for a list of snapshots of other overseas Chinese websites please see
appendix). First, wenxuecity.com overtly adopts an eclectic (inclusive) editorial
orientation in order to appeal a larger and broader Chinese reading audience. Second,
the posting procedure is user-friendly and accessible for commentators. To register or
log in is relatively easy. What a commentator needs is only a viable email account.
This helps avoid flooding of superfluous messages and allows anonymous
commentators to post their messages swiftly. All contents of all postings are open to
any unregistered users. Third, the commercial content of the website is moderate and
restrained, providing ample room for information and opinion sharing. Fourth,
although the reliability and credibility of news reproduced are questionable, a crossexamination of some translated, digested news stories with their original sources
showed a significant degree of faithfulness to the original content. To get to know
current events, this site with second-hand and even third- or fourth-hand news
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accounts could be a fair starting point for further exploration by readers. The Internet
helps make such second-hand news stories available to readers nearly in synchrony
with the original accounts.
Since wenxuecity.com does not have its own news reporting staff, most of the
news stories reproduced are digested, translated, and compiled from other sources,
which have a great variety, including many from mainstream media in Chinese,
English, Japanese, French, German, Korean, Spanish, and a few other languages.
Chinese sources are preponderant, exceeding all other sources. The majority of
Chinese sources are from major news agencies in Mainland China, such as Xinhua
news agency, People’s Daily, China Daily, Guangming Daily, and Nanfang Daily. A
large number of Chinese sources are from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and other
news agencies outside Mainland China. While most of the English-language sources
are mainstream news agencies such as United Press International, Reuters,
Washington Post, New York Times, and Financial Times, the articles are actually
translated into Chinese by often unnamed translators belonging to Chinese media
agencies specialized in reporting international news, such as Global Times and
International Herald Leader.
Although described by Wikipedia.com (Wenxuecity, July 2011) as a “site that
mainly collects gossip and rumors,” Wenxuecity.com posts a large portion of serious
commentaries and critical news, especially in times when some major events happen.
On all major events, such as the Virginia Tech shooting, the Beijing Olympic Torch
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Relay, and presidential elections, this site usually would have serious coverage. The
design of the trundling headlines on the homepage suggests the website’s intention to
cater the interest of the imagined readership on timely coverage. Since most serious
news stories originate in mainstream media outlets, the news reports can be reliable
and easily corroborated. Because of the swiftness of the Internet, the site sometimes
can report breaking news ahead of regular print and television news. Of course, the
general content of the news forum may be an important factor that attracts and retains
website users who may or may not leave their commentaries.
Sampling process. The sampling of data is a dynamic process that includes
observation, collection, and selection. In observation, I immersed myself as a user of
the website, browsing news stories, reader commentaries, and other postings on a
daily basis. My research interest developed through such personal experience. This
media-watch behavior not only kept me well informed but also became the initial step
to locate what might be meaningful. My deliberate observation started in the spring of
2004 when I began to collect news stories, records of online discussions, and reader
commentaries from this website. My memo-writing started during 2005, when I was
engaged in writing a paper about identity construction in one of the site’s forums on
current events. In spring 2007, the data-collection became more purposeful. The
collection of data followed this pattern: browsing headlines; selecting news stories
plus related reader commentaries according to the criteria discussed below; storing
specific webpage of news content and commentary pages. The procedure for data
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storage included copying and pasting the textual content in text documents and saving
them as html document (for pages with embedded visuals).
For s ampling of data, I developed the following criteria:
1. A focus on news stories about China, Chinese people, and Chinese cultures,
and readers’ commentaries on such news;
2. Preference was given to news and commentaries that relate to themes such
as intercultural experiences and sojourner lives, which led to the
identification of content with focus on ideological conflicts, historical
perspectives, social, racial, and ethnic stereotypes, and other issues relevant
to the cultural identification of Chinese in a global, multicultural, and postcolonial context.
3. Preference was given to commentaries on news stories that originated in
sources other than Chinese media, especially those from English-speaking
or other Western cultures.
4. Preference was given to the news stories that generated the higher number
of reader’s commentaries.
5. Exclusion of all “junk food news,” including information promoting
products, sexual titillations, celebrity news, gossip and rumors.
Based on these criteria, I accumulated over 600 news stories and over 5,000
commentaries. The earliest archival of news date back to January 1, 2003. In this
collection over a period of more than four years, I did: 1) perusing the selected news
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stories and corresponding commentaries; 2) conducting preliminary analysis; 3)
writing initial memos for those most noticeable; 4) forming preliminary categorization
strategies. This was an ongoing process, so new entries were continuously adding to
this collection until December 2010, when the first draft of the last analytical chapter
was completed.
This preliminary data collection underwent further sampling to reduce the
volume and refine the scope of a manageable data set for analysis. The criteria for
selecting readers’ commentaries and news were closely related to three interrelated
main themes that emerged from my preliminary analysis: 1) Global politics
(international relations, political criticism against PRC government, Cross-Strait
relationships, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc); 2) Multicultural lives (cultural shock experience,
cultural accommodation and adaption, racial and ethnic awareness, ethnocentrism,
stereotypes, prejudices, cultural hybridity, and immigration or naturalization); 3) Postcolonial perspectives (Westernization, colonial history, Huagong or Coolies, Chinese
exclusion, post-colonial ideology, emancipation and empowerment). After applying
these criteria, a selection of 120 news and 1,500 commentaries constituted the data for
further analysis.
The population - COOCs. The definition of the population studied is based
on the authorship of online commentaries, which is part of the target readership of the
website. The authors of the postings, labeled here Chinese overseas online
commentators or COOCs, are mostly anonymous commentators of news events. Due
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to the website’s eclectic editorial orientation and apparent priority to content related
more to the PRC, it is estimated that the majority of COOCs is from mainland China.
This group may contain Chinese overseas who are students, professionals (including
those who were once students but stayed abroad after graduation), personnel working
in Chinese embassies or consulates, spouses and dependents, and other types of
visitors or travelers. According to United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO, 2006), China leads the world in sending students overseas –
14 percent of all students studying abroad worldwide are from China. The majority of
Chinese students overseas are graduate students. As a graduate student myself, I was
able to find out that Wenxuecity.com is indeed very popular in the circle of Chinese
graduate students attending the same university. Besides students and professionals
with working visas, an important portion of this population is those who have
permanent residency or even citizenship in the host countries. In a strict sense, these
are the ethnic Chinese in host cultures. Who would be more likely to post or to post
what kinds of messages from what kinds of identity positions – those who are
newcomers or those who have been more tenured and more successful in their
survival as sojourners – is an arguable and testable question that is beyond the scope
of the current study. However, personal experiences and economic conditions are
definitive contextual factors that affect the online identity practices and constrain their
communicative behavior. In only a few cases, commentators seemed to be nonChinese, who might have been Chinese language learners and whose messages were
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analyzed. COOCs can represent a population defined as Chinese residing outside
China who actively use the Chinese language in cyberspace.
Analytical strategies
Based on the integrated framework informed by three primary intercultural
communication scholars’ cultural identity studies, the current study adopted a
qualitative textual analysis methodology that features tactics for data collection as
well as tools for data analysis developed by grounded theorists (Charmaz, 2005;
Strauss, 1987). Employing the “constant comparative method,” the current study
follows a qualitative research protocol that focuses on close, constant, and
comparative readings of data to render concepts, categories, and their connections,
which synergies form inductive and local theories (Charmaz, 2006).
In the current study, the analytical process was divided into three phases. In
Phase one, a three-stage coding process was applied to the selected data (in three
broad thematic categories of perceptual cultural differences, multicultural lives, and
global politics respectively), including open coding, axial coding, and selective
coding (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this phase, the data examined was
placed in emerging categories (open coding), with conceptual interrelationships (axial
coding, the four identity dimensions, for instance) explored and identified and then
systematically related with the core concepts – cultural identity and identification
(selective coding, such as the three kinds of cultural identification as represented by
the three analytical chapters). Phase two included an interpretive examination of data
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via the framework of cultural identity introduced at the end of Chapter Two. In this
phase, commentaries on specific news events are sorted out to illustrate the concepts
and relationships among them that are part of the framework of cultural identity. In
Phase three, theoretical insights resulting from grounded theory analysis were further
elaborated. To be noted, the three-phase analytical procedure indicates only a basic
and general process. Going back and forth over the phases occurred oftentimes.
On phase two, as elaborated in Chapter Two, an interpretive framework
integrating concepts from established intercultural communication theories on identity
and identification (Carbaugh, Collier, and Hecht) was used as the primary analytical
strategy. In this framework, cultural identity is communicative, multidimensional, and
dynamic. Online commentary messages are produced by individual commentators,
whose life realities vary over two binary tensions (individuality-sociality, materialityspirituality) and generally converge at their common Chinese cultural membership
and position toward China’s place in the global context. It is the two dimensional
dialectics and crystalline structure of that distinguishes this integrated model from
established literature on cultural identity represented by Carbough, Collier, and Hecht.
This is a dialectical model because the characteristics of cultural identification by
individuals can be represented in the two pairs of dialectical tensions and their
rotations – individuality to sociality and materiality to spirituality. To sort out and
interpret the variety of identity messages from the researched textual data, the
allotment of the four kinds of life realities crisscrossed in two dimensional dialectics
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and converged at common cultural membership served as the basic coding within
each of the three thematic categories of cultural identification. See Chapter Two for
examples of axial coding from the integrated model of cultural identity.
The following chapters present the findings of this investigation, organized in
relation to the research questions stated above.
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CHAPTER IV: ENCOUNTERING MULTICULTURALISM:
IDENTIFICATION THROUGH PERCEPTION OF CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES
In this chapter, I explore how Chinese overseas online commentators (COOCs)
interpret the multicultural differences they encounter in global cities and thus enact
processes of cultural identification. More specifically, this chapter focuses on
examining: 1) what are the interpretive strategies employed by users of
Wenxuecity.com to make sense of perceived cultural differences in their multicultural
realities, 2) what are the salient categories of cultural difference that provoke
discussion among members of the virtual, diasporic community, and 3) what does
online discourse reveal about the dynamic interplay of self and other in cultural
identification among members of this virtual community. Cultural identity is defined
here as one's self-concept formed and performed in communication that emphasizes
one's connection to cultural membership. Cultural identification is the enactment of
cultural identity, a process that features the interplay of “looking-in” or selfperception and “looking-out” or other-perception. Both self perception and other
perception then contribute to the complex and dynamic process of identity formation.
The data analyzed show that Chinese online commentators opened up their
senses to absorb sharp cultural differences that emanated from the particular national
contexts in which they lived. This opening up to difference often led to a comparison
of cultures as the main interpretive strategy through which Chinese online
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commentators revealed their conceptions of self and others and affirmed a sense of
identification with their own culture as well as the host cultures. The discussion of
findings is organized around the identification of the categories of cultural difference
framing online discourse that elicited the most commentary: race and ethnicity, gender,
personal attributes of the Chinese, and nationality. Each of these general categories
was articulated in online discourse through discussion of particular issues of interest
to COOCs, such as repatriation, discrimination against Chinese individuals in Western
societies, or stereotypes of Chinese masculinity and Chinese students in Western
universities. The analysis of these data revealed that interpretations of self and other
cultures are most often constructed through comparative characterizations of Chinese
and non-Chinese groups and their cultural practices. Through comparison,
commentators locate themselves in the social and cultural landscapes of their adopted
nations and address the meaning of cultural and power inequalities in the negotiation
of the individual, social, spiritual, and material dimensions of their identity.
The online discourse about cultural differences analyzed in this chapter
suggests a particular dynamic of cultural identification that I have labeled perceptual
cultural identification. In this form of identification, COOCs enact a sense of cultural
membership through comparison between self and other in a process that is driven by
the exchange of information and heuristic interpretation of perceived differences
rather than the by the need to take any strategic action or assume ideological positions.
Thus, subjects are engrossed with making sense of differences and are motivated to
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exchange cultural knowledge so as to react to negative representations of Chinese
culture and peoples with a positive affirmation of identity or to reduce the uncertainty
inevitably felt in intercultural contexts.
Comparing Cultures as an Interpretive Strategy
Cultural identity is, in part, the development of a self-concept through cultural
comparison. According to Cooley’s notion of “looking-glass self” (Cooley, 1902,
cited in Rogers, 1997, p. 153), people strive to develop their sense of self in constant
comparison to others and by revealing how they think they are viewed by others.
Through the comparison of cultures, people in intercultural contexts can acquire
knowledge about the new society they have come to inhabit and, at the same time,
strengthen their self-awareness at the individual and group levels. This cultural
knowledge and self-awareness can help reduce the uncertainty that is often felt by
people in intercultural contexts. Comparison, in the context of intercultural interaction,
can be result of different types of direct or indirect contact: from personal,
interpersonal, and impersonal interaction to mediated, public, organizational, and
institutional interactions (Carbaugh, 1990; Gudykunst & Kim, 2003; Halualani, 2008;
Stephen & Stephen, 1992). In any context, direct or indirect intercultural contact
affects the perceptions of self, one of the core dimensions of identity (Halualani,
2008).
Comparison of cultures is indeed a pervasive interpretive strategy across
categories of difference and topics of discussion in the website studied. Arguable, this
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tendency may indicate the influence of the Chinese maxim “Expertise comes from
comparison,” a maxim well known across generations of Chinese and repeated like a
cultural credo. As understood in Chinese culture, comparison is a way to achieve
Zhenzhi Zhuojian or “real knowledge and true insight,” so as to transcend limitations
caused by absence of common sense and to reduce uncertainty in a new environment.
Among Chinese online commentators, comparison is a common strategy to make
sense of cultural differences they encounter. The data suggest that COOCs use two
main orientations in cultural comparison: one that stresses the opposition between
Chinese and other cultures, and another that downplays and trivializes cultural
differences.
Cultural comparison through opposition emphasizes confrontational
dynamics—often posed as binary oppositions—between cultures and cultural
practices. From this perspective, cultures, groups, or individuals are understood
primarily in terms of conflicting social systems, historical evolutions, ideologies, and
individual and collective belief systems. Online commentators who stress comparison
through opposition are most often the ones who take strong positions on issues
discussed or see clear boundaries defining self-other. On the other hand, other
commentators in this virtual community make comparisons to downplay cultural
difference by attenuating, ignoring, or denying the relevance of difference. Those who
downplay cultural difference more stress the necessity of cultural accommodation and
reconciliation within the host culture so as to pursue some sense of security in the host
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society. These perspective is also one that leads to a sense of fluidity in personal or
group identity.
Both types of comparison operate as interpretative strategies through which COOCs
articulate positions of identification as Chinese individuals living overseas. In the
following section of this chapter, I will provide textual evidence that highlights how
website users used cultural comparison in the context of the particular issues and
topics debated. In the third section of this chapter, the focus will shift to the discussion
of how online discourse relates to the positions of identification enacted in this
particular community.
Salient Categories of Cultural Difference: Race, Nationality, and Gender
In this section, I identify three categories of cultural difference salient in online
discourse and within which COOCs make sense of who they are: race, nationality, and
gender. These broader categories, as the evidence below will show, are not mutually
exclusive, since references to race may intersect discussions of gender or nationality.
However, I selected these three as most salient because they function most often as
central or dominant categories that structure the flow of online discussion on cultural
difference, with other categories incorporated as secondary frames of interpretation
depending of the particular topic or issue discussed.
Race and Ethnicity: Finding a Place in the Racial Order
Chinese individuals living in multicultural cities outside China are often struck
by the racial and ethnic diversity of the societies they inhabit. They strive to
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understand the implications of racial difference and to find their place in the existing
racial orders (Sun, 2005; Wickberg, 2007). Dealing with racial and ethnic differences
is a salient aspect of an individual’s process of cultural identification, particularly in
multiracial societies that value diversity. This is particularly challenging for Chinese
individuals coming from a society often characterized as racially homogenous. China,
the most populated nation in the world, is considered a racially homogeneous society
in which the social, economic, and political/ideological classification of peoples
relates more to regional origins and ethnic backgrounds than to racial distinctions
(Befu, 1993; Dikötter, 1992; Sautman, 1994). For most Chinese students in China,
discussions about race are generally limited to a brief introduction to Western
colonialism and racial conflicts in other countries as topics in world history classes.
Therefore, it is not surprising to find Chinese online commentators struggling to make
sense of the new racial dynamics encountered in the countries where they reside
through heated debates on the website.
In the online commentaries examined, references to race feature bold
comparisons that convey racial understandings and perceptions of self and other. In
presenting their perceptions of racial and ethnic differences, COOCs enacted their
Chinese identity and developed their cultural awareness in a more global and diverse
context. In this topic area, comparisons tend to involve the construction of
hierarchical racial orders, with a strong emphasis on creating oppositions between
groups. Little attention is given to stressing commonality and collaboration among

74

racial groups, or to downplaying racial and ethnic differences. Overall, the discussion
of racial and ethnic differences leads to the articulation of a position of identification
among Chinese overseas as disadvantaged in the racial hierarchy. For instance, one
commentator perceived the existing racial order in North America as composed of
“the Victorious Whites, the Physical(ly competent) Blacks, the Freaky Hispanics, the
Depressed Natives, and the forever Alienated Asians” (Mao Yan Kan Ren, 2009)
One particularly animated exchange will be used here as example of these
dynamics of racial identification. In a posting titled “A Canadian (Chinese)
immigrant’s viewpoint: Where do the Chinese fall short of Whites?” (Mao Yan Kan
Ren, March 10, 2009), a commentator listed the good qualities of the White people he
or she had encountered in two years of living in Canada as a new immigrant. The list
included morality, honesty, fairness, law-abidingness, cooperativeness, politeness,
intelligence, and personal hygiene. The same writer then asserted that Chinese people
fell way short of Whites in quality of character. This posting generated numerous
commentaries, many of which placed the “Victorious Whites” under scrutiny and
attributed their success to an innate hypocrisy. Critical responses to this commentator
fueled a debate about White, Chinese, and other groups. The writer of the article in
favor of Whites was even labeled the “Chinese White Supremacist” by another
commentator. Others replied that limited experience living abroad blinded the article’s
“naïve” writer from knowing the true nature of Whites. These commentators used
personal experience and the same type of comparison by opposition to refute the
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claim that “Whites are morally better than the Chinese” and other races, with
comments like: “You either haven’t seen true White people or haven’t truly seen
White people,” or:
What honesty and credibility? That is simply because you haven’t been fooled
by White people or you just haven’t found that you’re fooled by the White.
White people are great deceivers. They can deceive you and still make you
believe it is your fault. (Commentary to Mao Yan Kan Ren, March 10, 2009)
One commentator mentions that one white friend who owned a construction company
only hired Mexicans because his former white workers were too lazy and nitpicking
(Mao Yan Kan Ren, March 10, 2009). The critical commentators also offered
admonitory advice, suggesting that it takes time to recognize the hypocrisy of White
people – “Need more years, then you will learn to see through the color and sense
their true nature” (Mao Yan Kan Ren, March 10, 2009).
In another forum about a comment made by US President Barack Obama in
defense of his friend and Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, when Gates was
arrested in front of his own home, some of the reactions made reference to the
character of African Americans in contrast to that of the Chinese (Zhou Guo Wang,
July 24, 2009). In the eyes of some commentators, aggression and outspokenness
constitute the African Americans’ “audacity,” as in comments like: “(Blacks are) bold
and brazen and tend to easily accuse others of racial discrimination whenever needed”
(commentary to Zhou Guo Wang, July 24, 2009). Some commentators appear to
appreciate the perceived direct, forceful communication style of Black Americans
then to turn attention to the idea that the Chinese lack such ability. For instance, one
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commentator stated that:
A Black [person] could become the [U.S.] President because Black people are
so outspoken and dare to speak out for their own interests – so much unlike
the Chinese, who can only whisper to complain behind the back and under the
scene (commentary to Zhou Guo Wang, July 24, 2009).
The same commentator argued that such audacity helps cultivate the Black political
forces, deterring the dominant Whites who “are so afraid of Blacks and have no other
method but give way to accommodate them” (commentary to Zhou Guo Wang, July
24, 2009). But then the commentator pointed out that “awe and fear” is not true
respect and won’t be “until Blacks win the genuine social respect in the U.S.” In
response to this, another commentator suggested that Chinese in U.S. society share
this “awe and fear” of African Americans with the dominant White groups. In
comments like these, commentators reproduced racist, stereotypical opinions of
Blacks as physically superior but intellectually inferior persons who rely on
intimidation rather than reason in their “audacity.” At the same time, they
characterized the Chinese as having the same fearful reaction to African Americans as
white European Americans.
As the examples above illustrate, these comments about race entail a
comparison of Chinese groups with the dominant White or Black race that leads to an
affirmation of Chinese identity. In other instances, the commentaries involve the
inclusion of the Chinese in the category of people of color. This categorization not
only illustrates enduring prejudices but also the uneasiness of Chinese commentators
as they try to locate themselves and to establish connections to other non-White racial
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groups. In one example, commentators responding to a news story about how black
South Africans protested their government’s classification of Chinese individuals as
“colored” people (Zhou Xin Wang, July 5, 2008), one commentator claimed that
“colorless Chinese are transparent, existing but invisible.” In another instance,
commentators who responded to the news about new proofs that some American
Indians might be the heirs of ancient Chinese Yin people who migrated across the
Bering Strait declared that the efforts of Chinese scholars to find new evidence about
the genetic links between ancient Chinese and modern American Indians are just
“sheer acts of will” or “one-sided love” (commentary to He Nan Shang Bao,
September 3, 2009). Their view is based on the assumption that Indians do not like to
be associated with the Chinese because the commentator never heard such thing, and
in real life he or she never met Indians who had special interests in China or Chinese
culture.
Likewise, on the topic of racial miscegenation, commentators expressed a
sense of that invisibility and marginalization. For instance, in a forum about hybrid
celebrities (Chao Xian Ri Bao, Oct 2, September 3, 2008), some commentators regret
that personalities such as Tiger Woods, whose parents both have one fourth Chinese
decent; Sean Paul, whose mother is Chinese; and Keanu Reeves, whose father is
Hawaiian Chinese, would never identify themselves with their Chinese heritages for
some reason. Commentators seem to feel singled out and at a disadvantage among
other racial groups.
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Another popular topic that led to debate was the comparison of how
Westerners are treated in China and how Chinese living in foreign countries are
treated. For instance, in one of such discussions, Chinese online commentators called
Westerners in China “white trash,” since they perceived that foreigners from more
developed countries who go to China for career opportunities do so because they are
failures in their own nations (Di Hua, July 23, 2007). On the other hand,
commentators viewed themselves as the “elites” who are able to leave China after
winning a series of scholastic or professional competitions. This view is, perhaps,
echoing the Chinese proverb “People climb high while water flows low.” In this case,
such perspective relates to the belief that going to China for career opportunities is
against the rule of moving upward since China is perceived as being in a lower
position (socially and topographically) than the West. On the other hand, having a
career and obtaining citizenship in Western nations like the U.S. is a sign of success.
The reason why “those who are already US nationals are wasting time in China,” one
commentator surmised, was because they could not function well socially and
psychologically in the developed, industrial nations. So the white “trash” goes to
China to repair their impaired dignity and to seek lost opportunities (commentary to
Di Hua, July 23, 2007).
Even though foreign nationals in China may be labeled “trash” by some
Chinese online commentators, they acknowledged that foreigners are treated with
reverence by the Chinese inside China (Di Hua, July 23, 2007). This point led to the
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complaint that even though Chinese overseas are “elites,” their treatment in other
countries is comparatively unfavorable, like “secondary citizens.” This opposition
between “trash” foreigners revered in China and “elite” Chinese facing prejudice
against them in other countries baffled some commentators and fueled their cultural
identification as disadvantaged or marginalized.
In sum, these comparisons, often drawing on stereotypical and prejudiced
generalizations about racial groups, exemplify how some Chinese online
commentators assumed a position of identification in a foreign context, stressing
cultural opposition to articulate their sense of being marginalized or kept in a lower
social status in their new societies. In this category, consensus rather than internal
division dominated the online discussion. Simultaneously, through polarized
generalizations—as in the description of others as “trash” and self as “elite”—some
commentators asserted their perception of the disadvantaged socioeconomic reality of
their country of origin in comparison to that of Westerns nations. In their discourse,
living standards and career opportunities in China do not match those of Western
countries, a reason why they seek to relocate outside China in the first place.
Yet, the discussion of racial relations in their new societies allowed
commentators to develop an understanding of the unequal power relations among
cultural groups labeled by ethnic or racial origin. And although Chinese online
commentators seemed to see themselves in a position of disadvantage as an ethnic
group, they seldom identified themselves with ethnic minorities and peoples of color.
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In general, they tended to identify more often with the dominant racial group. They
believed or perceived the White dominant group as the one establishing the norms or
the rules of the game. As “elites,” they believed such alignment was not only realistic
but normal because they have been game winners in China and strive to continue
winning and enriching their track-records. Winning as an ideology, as illustrated in the
characterization—“victorious Whites” cited above—was expressed in the comments
of online commentators who tended to accept hegemonic racial structures in host
cultures and stress their individuality in their cultural survival. In the game of cultural
competition, some are winners and some turn out to be underdogs. When
individualistic gain becomes an ideology, it is easier to take the norms, rules, and laws
for granted and be oblivious of the possibility of overturning the system. In this
respect, Chinese overseas online commentators did not identify themselves with poor
immigrants, including fellow Chinese who enter and stay illegally, in the global
migration flow.
Resisting Gender Stereotypes: On Chinese Masculinity
Online debates on how Chinese men are viewed by Westerners constituted
another topic area that generated poignant reactions among commentators. In
particular, the characterization of Chinese men as physically weak and lacking sex
appeal generated an animated debate. As research has suggested, comments on the
characteristics of a particular group from an outgroup critic can evoke cultural
identification practices among ingroup members (Hornsey et al, 2002; Tajfel & Turner,
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1979). Further, some studies have supported the hypothesis that members of a group
are more sensitive to and defensive of outgroup criticism than of ingroup criticism
(Hornsey et al, 2004). On the topic of gender, the debates stemmed primarily in
reaction to outgroup critics and illustrate how commentators struggled to make sense
of aspects of their cultural identity revealed in the eyes of non-Chinese critics.
Research has also shown that negative physical stereotypes against Chinese as
an ethnic group are prevalent in media (Wang & Cooper-Chen, 2009). Contesting
such stereotypes can be difficult and even taboo in daily, face-to-face interactions with
others. However, in the anonymous online environment, the debate on stereotypes is
open and extensive. For the purpose of illustration, I selected three articles featured in
the website that elicited intense debate among commentators. The articles include one
titled “Chinese men in the eyes of 100 Western women” originally published in the
magazine Oriental Weekly of the Outloock (a popular Chinese political magazine) (Da
Yang Wang, Aug 11, 2007); the second one was titled “Why would so few Western
women marry Chinese men?” (Zong He Xin Wen, Feb 25, 2007); the third was titled
“Can Chinese men subdue foreign women?” (Li, Dec 21, 2008). These pieces focused
on how Westerners, particularly Western women, view Chinese men. The central
message in the articles reinforced the view of Chinese men as undersexed and
physically weak. They refer to the image of Chinese men as short in statute,
physically weak, with limited sex appeal, and, therefore, charmless and unattractive to
Western women. Reactions from online commentators included both agreement with
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and contestation of the stereotype. Many did not deny the stereotype and accepted
Chinese men’s sexual disadvantage (compared to white and black men) and physical
incompetence as the-fact-of-the-matter in their responses. Dissenters, on the other
hand, rejected the attributes and treated them as unfounded prejudice against the
Chinese. Regardless of positions, the comments tend to shift the focus from collective
body image to individual traits and personal strategies to maintain the mental health
of Chinese men.
For example, commentators who reaffirmed the stereotype did so with
different arguments. Some placed Chinese men in a low position in an imagined
racialized sexual order. One commentator delineated a U-shaped model to designate a
so-called “racial masculine hierarchy,” with Asian males at the bottom and Blacks and
Whites on the top of each apex. Other commentators agreed with such racialized
hierarchy by claiming that the differences have been proved empirically, statistically,
and objectively in many scientific investigations—but provided no concrete reference
to such evidence.
Other commentators who did not challenge the stereotype cited evolutionary
processes. For example, some saw the basis for the stereotype in the evolution of the
human race and the social development of different civilizations. They treated
Chinese masculinity as a phenomenon linked to the early civilization of Chinese
culture. For instance, one stated:
… the Chinese are the earliest civilized; the genetic heritage was determined
by social status rather than sexuality . . . unlike European and African ancient
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counterparts, who practiced cluster marriages where only men with longer
phalluses and more sex drive could guarantee their sperm would get through
the female genital tract and reach the uterus (commentary to Li, Dec 21, 2008).
From this view, Chinese culture was civilized too early, and the more civilized
society—with more a complex stratified social structure—the less effective the
natural selection and, therefore, the sexual competence. This type of interpretation
also implied that Western societies are less civilized than China, indicating a kind of
ethnocentrism.
Along the same lines, other cultural factors were cited to explain the
perception that Chinese men were undersexed. For instance, one COOC stated that as
an “old” nation, China had always promoted literacy and courtesy rather than physical
education and sexuality. Another writer observed that in Chinese classic literature and
historical records, men or women with super sexual power and overt, exuberant sex
drive are antagonistic figures, despised by generations of Chinese because Chinese
culture values brain power much more than physical power. From this view, culture
had affected the genetic evolution in producing an undersexed race. According to
these commentators, the particular dynamics of Chinese culture enable male
individuals who are over canny, scheming, calculating, restrained, imperturbable, and
timid while casting out those who are passionate, liberal, bold, ambitious, adventurous,
and aggressive. Arguably, by blaming culture and tradition, these commentators
alleviated the pressure on the individual and shifted attention to culture and history. In
addition to providing cultural explanations to make sense of the stereotype, these
commentators provided culturally grounded principles of ideal manhood as a strategy
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to cope with the stereotype. One wrote: “To foster (mental) strength and circumvent
(physical) weakness, Asians should exploit more of their brain power and utilize what
they are really good at.” Other commentator sated: “Asians work, while Blacks and
Whites play; Asians make a living, while Blacks and Whites enjoy life.” Another said:
“Chinese men in the U.S. usually have a stronger ability to make a living and a better
attitude to live a life,” since physicality and sexuality are not exactly correlated to
one’s viability or ability to live a good life. From this view, ideal manhood for
Chinese men is contrary to the hedonistic version of Westerners.
Another group of COOCs reaffirmed the stereotype by using sarcasm and selfmocking, claiming that this is a “healthy” way to protect the overall Chinese
collective psychology. One suggested: “We need someone who could ridicule our own
culture.” Another commentator put in this way: “Oops! Stamp on your tail (or catch
you on the row). Couldn’t agree more, I raise my both feet to agree: Small, indeed
small.” Another commentator pointed out that the physical and sexual degeneration
of Chinese race is the consequence of the heavenly nemesis on the bad behaviors of
Chinese male ancestors, who were “addicted to opium, prostitution, concubinage.”
Such self-mocking and lightheartedness is a way to ease tensions that still end up
reinforcing the stereotype.
These messages show how the assenters of the stereotype positioned their
Chinese cultural identity in an inferior position in a racialized order of physicality and
sexuality. At the same time, they managed the pressure against Chinese manhood by
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separating physical prowess from intellectual and moral aptitudes as alternative
criteria for manhood. Their commentaries constructed a virtual community that
provided support to their distinct cultural identification in the process of coping with
negative attributions in host cultures.
On the other hand, messages that challenged the stereotype were abundant and
driven by different interpretations. In general, they denied the factual validity of the
sexual stereotype against Chinese men and its correlation to physical strength. The
central arguments of objectors explained the stereotype in various ways: as an illusion
rather than scientific fact, falsifiable for it can be disproven with easy examples; as
the result of faulty common sense; as an image created and reinforced by media and
other types of public communication produced with a pro-Western agenda and filtered
through a colonial ideology; or a form of prejudice coming from distorted personal or
social perception.
For some commentators, this false allegation had been initially fabricated and
disseminated by Western colonizers who wanted to rule indigenous peoples in their
own lands not only physically but also psychologically—as in the case of the
exploitation of African slaves or the marginalization of Chinese laborer in the U.S. As
one commentator pointed out, the Chinese as a nonviolent people from a nonviolent
culture with minimum outbound violence—such as colonial conquest—in history is
likely to be unfairly stereotyped into a view of Chinese men as flimsy and submissive,
with feminine traits.
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Another type of response appeared to be contesting the stereotype but end up
reinforcing sexual and racial stereotypes by focusing on East-West hegemonic
struggles. This position proposed a kind of Chauvinist ideology: only winning wars of
conquest against the West would completely uproot the Chinese male stereotype. In
this view, all Chinese men should, for the sake of Chinese manhood, be prepared to
fight for the reestablishment of a world order that favors China and allows for the
correction of distorted imagery of Chinese culture. When one commentator
questioned the latter reasoning by asking: “What about Black men, who are also
victims of colonial conquest and much more oppressed than the Chinese and have
been able to successfully establish their ‘supreme’ masculinity in contemporary
culture?,” the same commentator further explained that Black men could create a
strong manhood because some of their “big” and “capable” representatives have
fought their ways to conquer other races individually, interpersonally, and in some
public arenas such as sports and entertaining venues, music, and, more directly
pornography. In this regard, the same commentator argued that the Chinese only
needed some “willing” Chinese “supermen” to show off their manhood and at the
same time to avow their Chinese identity at the individual level, instead of relying on
international wars to reconstruct Chinese masculinity. These commentators thus
challenged the stereotype from the position that White masculinity had indeed been
established as superior on the basis of hegemonic power and colonial domination,
which represented a systematic, collective violence. The superiority of Black
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masculinity, on the other hand, relied on the strength of physical attributes and
promotion in media and popular culture, which represented a kind of sporadic,
individual aggression. This view reaffirmed the position of blacks and white men as
dominant in the sexual hierarchy and assumed that male sexuality relies on aggressive
behavior.
Another type of reaction against the stereotype shifted attention to the
individual traits of Chinese men or the individual misconceptions of those promoting
the stereotype. As one commentator stated, “It’s all about whom the Western women
have actually encountered.” In this line of argument, a commentator argued that
Western women form the prejudice and spread it just because they may just have
happened to experience a relation with small Chinese men who craved Western
women in the first place. The writer countered the stereotype by arguing that big
Chinese men tend to be more self-restrained and ethnocentric, or culturally
conservative, and thus less attracted to Western women and more attracted to women
at home.
One commentator argued: “Male Chinese overseas are generally less attractive
than those in China.” Another echoed this idea with a historical claim:
Historically, Chinese coolies compelled or cajoled to leave their homeland to
be cheap laborers in colonial territories were almost unexceptionally from the
Southern coastal provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong, where the natives
were normally shorter, smaller, and less physically competent than those from
the North . . . Modern Chinese overseas students are mostly nerds, bookish,
lacking of physical training, and unable to represent the real Chinese manhood
(commentary to Zong He Xin Wen, Feb 25, 2007).
In this case, commentators attempted to deal with prejudice by engaging in a kind of
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internal self-loathing that sacrifices the dignity of a subgroup of Chinese men. These
spontaneous and candid responses reveal, to some degree, how eager Chinese
commentators want to get rid of the stereotype to assert pride in being Chinese.
Underscoring individual differences among Chinese men and highlighting Western
women’s inclination to over-generalize is a way to rationalize their predicament and
to strengthen their Chinese cultural core.
In sum, with the exception of the example of internal division presented above,
COOCs generally identified themselves as a cohesive group that has been singled out
for negative characterization by outsiders. They tended to identify themselves with
Chinese culture in a gesture of spectatorship, cheering or booing as they accepted,
rejected or rethought the stereotype constructed by others in Western culture. Using
comparison through opposition and regardless of their acceptance or contestation of
the stereotype, COOCs saw their gender/sexual identity bound by common lines of
racial and ethnic identity and history as Chinese.
Resisting the Stereotyping of Chinese Students Overseas
In addition to race and gender, discussions about the stereotyping of Chinese
culture and individuals were also triggered by stories about Westerners’ comments on
perceived personal attributes of Chinese individuals. For instance, the perception of
Chinese individuals as shy, socially inept, dependent, and obedient to authority was at
the center of a report on how several European and Australian professors described
the perceived weaknesses of Chinese students overseas (Zhou Guo Qiao Wang, Sep 9,
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2008). The piece was copied and posted online in the daily headline section of
Wenxuecity.com. According to this report, in the eyes of some European and
Australian professors, Chinese students are diligent but remain socially isolated
(lacking teamwork spirit) and show blind obedience to authority (academically
dependent). A professor from the Swedish Royal Institute of Technology is quoted as
saying that he was “impressed by the diligence of Chinese students” but regretted that
“Chinese students would prefer to study alone and incapable to effectively participate
in teamwork.” From this view, Chinese students overseas do not socialize with peers
or participate in group activities effectively, and academically they develop a
dependency on existing theories and modes of the established scholarship.
Although that image is not completely denied by COOCs, it is largely resisted
by commentators who stated the view that it was unfair to expect Chinese overseas
students to be sociable in a foreign context and impossible for them to challenge the
academic authorities who can determine their fate. Regarding social isolation, no
commentator denied it. However, some referred to the social and cultural barriers
faced by students to justify this inclination: language differences, lack of adequate
knowledge about the new culture—in matters such as social etiquette—and limited
experience abroad prevented the Chinese students from effectively and
enthusiastically socializing with different peoples in a new context. Others justified it
by emphasizing an individualistic notion of self-reliance as fundamental for surviving
in a foreign context. From this view, because of “language barriers,” Chinese
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overseas students would need extra mental energy to interact with others and to figure
out “the general rules of teamwork”; this extra effort would keep them from focusing
on what they could contribute to the teamwork. .
In regards to obedience to authority, most commentators responded based on
the view that this is not a weakness but a pragmatic imperative given that immediate
supervisors or professorial advisers can alter the students’ career fates. For
commentators, survival in an academic system where unequal power relations prevail
was given a much higher priority, a goal that is more pressing than developing
independent scholarship in Western academic environments that cannot be easily
challenged, not even by Westeners. As one commentator stated:
Overseas, surviving is the first priority for us Chinese. Indeed, compliance
with power is probably related to life pressures felt by the Chinese
(commentary to Zhou Guo Qiao Wang, Sep 9, 2008).
Another commentator put it in this way:
How the hell to challenge? Where-ever and whenever you are a student, your
advisor is the God. Challenge your advisor if you don’t want to live
(commentary to Zhou Guo Qiao Wang, Sep 9, 2008).
Drawing on personal experience, one writer argued that U.S. professors are the first to
stress the power of and respect to the authority and would never tolerate any challenge
from students. One commentator self-identified as Dogslayer even described the dark
side of U.S. academia as a kind of “mafia or gangland” tyrannized by “the academic
hegemons and their henchmen.” Along these lines, a commentator nicknamed Dr.
Buffalo added:
Foreigners who say such things (encouraging Chinese students to challenge
authority) are either genuinely naïve or purely hypocritical. I was once almost
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kicked out by my boss for challenging him (commentary to Zhou Guo Qiao
Wang, Sep 9, 2008).
Like this one, other personal accounts of retaliation against challengers serve as
admonition for those who dared to challenge. The last comment on this posting is
from a commentator self-identified as Wiserman, who moved beyond reacting to the
report to suggesting face-saving strategies to succeed in case of confrontational
communication: “You have to give enough face to your professor when you are trying
to question him. You can’t be too abrupt and direct to say that he has made a mistake”
(commentary to Zhou Guo Qiao Wang, Sep 9, 2008).
Keeping a functional interpersonal relationship with those in power thus seems
to be highly valued by the online commentators, who perceived it as a rational choice
for survival in a foreign context, as a way to deal with the hierarchical oppression that
exists even in a democratic society. One commentator labeled this choice “social
pragmatism.”
In sum, these commentators identified as a cohesive group that contested the
negative characterization of the Chinese to shift the focus from personal attributes to
the social and structural realities faced by Chinese in foreign contexts. For them, the
negative attributes and behaviors ascribed by outgroup, Western observers were not
essential or innate qualities of the Chinese—as suggested by observers. On the
contrary, these perceived attributes were, in fact, strategic, rational, and pragmatic
choices imposed by the disadvantaged political positions occupied by Chinese
students in Western institutions, and by the lack on intercultural competence when
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managing life in a new cultural context.
Nationality: Defining National Identity across Borders
Conceptions of national cultures and national character are a common point of
reference in discussions among COOCs. These references often entail the
communication of a sense of national identity in a context of comparison and debate.
Under this category, China is discussed as an imagined cultural system with a distinct
history, set of beliefs, social structures, and ideologies that set it apart from any
individual Western country—often the U.S. is the main point of comparison—or from
“Western culture” as a general cultural categorization. Here, commentators compare
national cultures using broad generalizations about the beliefs and values that are
deemed to be defining the national character. The comparisons–in most cases by
stressing opposition—often lead to debate a range of opinions that reveal diverse
positions of identification among participants as they make sense of their place and
status in the global multicultural environment. For the purposes of discussion, I will
present evidence from online discourse under the particular topics of discussion
addressed by commentators: the Chinese moral character and xenocrentism,
citizenship and repatriation, and historical evolution of the Chinese nation.
Defending the moral character of the Chinese against xenocentrism.
Chinese outside China, exposed to marked individual and cultural differences, start
judging their own cultural group differently and may become critical, even cynical,
about what used to be familiar to them. These self-revelations entail discussion of the
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perceived attributes that define the Chinese individual or collective “moral character,”
often defined in comparison with members of other nationalities. Such discussions
often lead to contentious debates on the moral qualities of the Chinese and, in many
instances, to a debate on the existence of xenocentrism among Chinese individuals
who criticize Chinese culture. The term xenocrentrism is applied pejoratively by
Chinese nationalists to criticize Chinese admirers of Western civilization, who are
often labeled as xenocentrists or ChongYang MeiWai (worshipping the overseas and
adoring the foreign).
In most cases observed, debates on the Chinese character were triggered by
comments by other COOCs who reflected on the collective, moral character of the
Chinese people. For instance, when one commentator self-identified as Kaola
summarized his impressions after visiting Australia, he finished the piece with a
reflection on the moral character of the Chinese people (Hai Wai Bai Gan, Nov 19,
2005). In this case, exposure to a different social milieu and ethos in another
country—where evidence of crime and social insecurity was not visible—made the
writer reflect on the “low qualities” of the Chinese culture and people. Kaola argued
that in contrast to Australia, in China people lack good faith, integrity, honesty,
credibility, trust, and even law-abidingness. The resulting social insecurity in China
was leading to a general climate described as “a culture of wall, partition, and antiburglary facilities.” Kaola concluded that The Great Wall, once the proud symbol of
Chinese culture, now symbolizes immense fear or insecurity among people.
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This ingroup criticism stirred waves of mostly negative reactions against
Kaola, with only a few agreeable ripples. Those in disagreement with Kaola pointed
out that self-criticism might be reasonable and constructive, but “to disparage one’s
culture in an incomprehensibly destructive manner is detrimental.” One commentator
stressed that constructive self-criticism must emphasize opportunity to change and
create goodwill for establishing intracultural bonds and touching the conscience of
people. For this commentator, Kaola’s moral judgment, without consideration for
cultural self respect, was seen as “repulsive” and evoked intense disapproval. Some of
these commentators were suspicious of the motives of those who magnify the flaws of
the Chinese while having blind faith for Western culture. Their reactions led to a
different reflection on their own culture: xenocentrism as a cultural aspect of Chinese
culture. As one commentator stated, the real motive behind the belittlement of
Chinese culture is the author’s interest in distinguishing him or herself from the
Chinese mass in order to get aligned with Western powers, whose dominant status is
insurmountable. For some, the most “indecent” Chinese are those who play the role of
destructive critics of their own culture while professing blind faith in foreign things.
So xenocentrism, from the perspective of one these commentators, was the most
notorious quality of the “uncivilized Chinese.”
The messages that resounded with Kaola’s observation fueled the debate on
Chinese xenocentrism. For example, a commentator claimed that the Chinese, even
those outside China, were not on such high moral grounds for they are obsessed with
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petty tricks and small gains: “Cheap Chinese clientele love to explore the generous
Western customer services” with customer-friendly refund policies. This claim
provoked the reply of those who downplayed cultural differences to point out that
people from other cultures also practice similar tricks. Some quotations from online
text illustrate this position: “Too many white ragpickers in Canada . . .,” “In Paris,
many white ticket evaders in public transportation . . . ,” “Honest Americans follow
the rules, but they also love free stuff,” “In corporate America, infighting is also a
common thing. Gossip is abundant even among Whites,” “Such self-criticism is
unilateral in ascribing some commonness of all human beings to the disposition of a
specific culture.” One commentator replied to the comment by stressing that the
reality of the Chinese overseas did not fit such moral accusation and affirmed the
moral qualities of this group:
…the Chinese are most law-abiding, fair, and easy-going citizens in other
nations; petty tricks are played by the poor, who simply want to save some
money that they so much need in largely lawful ways, not just Chinese
individuals (commentary to Hai Wai Bai Gan, 2005).
For some ingroup critics, the debate on the Chinese character and society was
framed within a comparison with the Western world as a better society—an
impression held by many if not most Chinese online commentators who disclosed that
they were living in Western nations. For example, a commentator wrote: “All those
who say the West is no better than China should get out and go back China.” Another
commentator offered this unfounded, seemingly objective statistical generalization:
“the indecent Chinese per 10 thousand are more than the indecent Westerners per 10
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thousand.” In a similar, pseudo-sociological reflection on the matter, a commentator
expressed the belief that the overall moral qualities of the population in the U.S. were
better than in China. In other entries, different commentators stated: “Refusing to
accept one’s own problems is a manifestation of self-inferiority” and “Chinese should
prioritize self-examination to defending themselves or even whitewashing or excusing
their flaws.” In some of these commentaries, the identification of the West as superior
and Chinese as inferior often entailed a reflection on what needs to be done for
cultural improvement; as one writer put it:
Chinese culture should improve in terms of behavior, manner, sanitation,
consideration for others . . . since improvement of national quality is
determined by the quality of individual character; the ideal situation for the
agglomeration of Chinese overseas is to be magnanimous and of heartsease
commentary to Hai Wai Bai Gan, 2005).
According to some of those who identified Western societies as superior, the West not
only had better infrastructure and material resources but also humanitarian standard.
These commentators were frequent targets of the “angry youth”—the “furious
Chinese online nationalists” as Osnos (2008) and Wu (2007) label them—who are
likely to focus on the issue of xenocentrism to interpret cultural difference. In their
discourse, negative evaluation of the moral fiber of the Chinese culture is more related
to political, colonial, ideological position of the commentators than to the moral or
biological essence of the Chinese people. For some of them, internal attacks were
racist and simply incomprehensible, which led to express suspicion of the true cultural
identity of these critics. As some presumed, most of the critics who badmouth China
and Chinese culture cannot be Chinese but possible Japanese, Koreans or other
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foreign nationals who practice their Chinese language skills while taunting the
Chinese ideologically. In their perception, ingroup criticism becomes outgroup
criticism, which perhaps made more sense for them and was easier to deal with.
The debate over citizenship and repatriation to China. Emigrating to and
relocating in a new national culture inevitably leads to experiencing cross-cultural
interactions in the institutionalized contexts of immigration and naturalization
processes, such as taking language proficiency tests and applying for college
admission, visas, immigration status or citizenship in a new country. These are
experiences that users of Wenxuecity.com often discuss in their virtual community.
Some of these discussions, particularly on applying for citizenship in a new country or
choosing repatriation, are particularly poignant for they involve reflection on the
meaning of a Chinese nationality or giving up Chinese citizenship. These debates on
citizenship and repatriation reveal the users’ diverse points of identification in regards
to cultural affiliation to China. At the core of the debate are the different positions
taken by commentators regarding the inseparability of an affective identification from
Chinese nationality and legal status as citizens.
For instance, a headline story posted online was about a Chinese celebrity
actor who has British citizenship but is still active in the Mainland and Hong Kong
markets (Dong Fang Zao Bao, 2008). According to the story, the actor once told a
reporter that his naturalization in Britain made “China better known to the world” and
made himself “become a better Chinese.” This type of self-promoting discourse
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sickened some members of the virtual community, evoking negative reactions from
the Chinese online debaters. As argued by one commentator, the actor’s position was
all “for the sake of personal convenience.” Another commentator asked: “How come
he could be representing China to the world if he is still working in China and making
Chinese wages?” Reactions like these suggest that the actor’s effort to separate legal
immigration status from affective attachment to Chinese nationality so as to make
them both work for personal advantage was received as hypocritical by some online
commentators.
However, for those who disclosed that they had already formalized their status
as citizens of another country, the separation of legal status and affective cultural
attachment was a pragmatic choice, a conciliation that was not only possible but often
prescribed to others. Maintaining a core Chinese cultural identity and a sentimental
bond with China, even after taking oath of allegiance to another country, was
promoted by some Chinese overseas online commentators. Even among those who
wrote about the seriousness of an oath of allegiance in the citizenship ceremony,
keeping a sentimental closeness to the old country seemed basic for maintaining their
peace of mind. One commentator analogized being granted citizenship to becoming a
grown up: “As a grown up with your own family, you can and ought to have close
relationship with your parents.” From this view, the new citizenship symbolized that
one’s independence and cultural attachment to motherland can be and should be
maintained sentimentally even after giving up legal affiliation to her. For others,
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Chinese identity can be coated by new citizenship but nobody can completely
“squeeze the old country out of their blood (Jin, 2007).” As one commentator
expressed it:
Anywhere and anytime, poor or rich, high or low, you’re always wearing that
yellow skin, allergic to dairy foods, and desperately nostalgic of hometown
cuisine in the old country. Chinese like all Asians are forever foreigners in the
eyes of those white and black hosts (commentary to Bei Fang Han Ge, 2008).
Debates over citizenship in a foreign country were complemented by debates
on repatriation to China, as commentators tried to negotiate immigration status and
affective attachment to Chinese national identity. In this respect, online commentators
compared the challenges and opportunities for personal advancement that they are
likely to face in China and in their host country. Framed around the topic of
repatriation, commentators reflected on the dilemma of staying in a foreign land or
returning to the motherland by comparing individual choices, social structures, and
institutional climates in China and host societies. The online discourse on repatriation
reveals the complex, multidimensional realities lived by Chinese individuals. Some
are forced to go back due to personal situations. Some choose to stay abroad to seek
improved living conditions or better career opportunities. Others have to stay but
always be pining to move back. Some feel lucky for getting away from the old
country—for them, repatriation is out of the question. Some would like to consider
the option of returning to China after achieving certain goal abroad. Many flinch
while pondering the potential difficulties for a returnee in China.
Among the COOCs, a frequent point of discussion was raised by those who
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were pursuing academic careers abroad and questioning whether to go back or stay
abroad. In the early years of the “Studying Abroad Wave” in China, from the late
1970s to late 1980s (Chang, 2004), perhaps few could foresee that they were
permanently leaving their country. But today, with direct contact with other social
systems and the realization of the socioeconomic distance between China and the host
cultures, more and more Chinese are determined to settle down in more developed
countries in order to improve their professional and personal status. At the same time,
with recent economic trends bringing prosperity to China and significant financial
crises to the West, some Chinese overseas begin to reconsider the prospect of starting
over in their country of origin and many have already done that. In this online forum,
stories of overseas students returning to China—many of which express deep remorse
for going back—provoke heated discussion that allow for the enactment of positions
of national identification.
One of such stories was posted as a blog posting titled “A top ocean turtle
treated as a common land tortoise: How remorseful to have come back to China for
career” (Hui Guo Fa Zhan, 2008). The phrase “ocean turtle” is a Chinese phonological
metaphor for a returnee from overseas. The author of this piece has a doctoral degree
in liberal arts from a top U.S. research university and returned to China to pursue an
academic career. The writer described her or his frustrating experiences in China and
manifested regret for choosing repatriation. The blogger self-identified as a “brilliant”
liberal arts Ph.D. who had the credentials to secure a faculty position in the U.S. but
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somehow chose to return to China for career development. However, frustrated by the
social milieu of China—described as a climate with arrogant, authoritarian personnel
and where social networking is much more important than personal credentials—the
blogger stated: “I sincerely realized that in China it is far more important who you
personally know than who you really are.” Having been rejected, discouraged, and let
down in China’s academia, the blogger finally gave up and joined the business sector.
To the online community, the blogger offered an admonitory conclusion: “Those who
want to devote to scholarship would be better off staying in the U.S.” Through
cultural comparison based on perceived oppositions between China—seen as a system
of authoritative patronage—and the United States—by implication a meritocracy—the
blogger chose to advice pragmatic adaptation to the U.S. as the best choice based on
his or her personal experiences.
In a different online article addressing a more nuanced comparison of China
and the United States, a Chinese doctoral candidate who was approaching graduation
wrote about the factors that discouraged repatriation (Bao Bao Jiu Le Bu, 2007).
Among these factors he cited problems related to securing housing, education, jobs,
social welfare, and security in China. Titled “Motherland, it’s not easy to say I love
you,” the article conveyed a double-edged complaint. On the one hand, it presented a
complaint against the Chinese social reality that disabled the patriotic sentiment
among Chinese overseas. On the other hand, instead of exalting living conditions or
meritocracy in the U.S., the writer denounced the “exploitation and enslavement”
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inflicted by the “bosses” on their “employees” in American academia. The blogger
stressed the merciless exploitation by Chinese “bosses” (Chinese faculty in American
research institutions) of their Chinese post-doctoral colleagues who earned their
degrees in China and found themselves living miserably in U.S. academic institutions,
like the migrant workers in their old country. This message triggered a heated debate.
Some criticized the blogger for prioritizing personal interests over loyalty to the
motherland as follows:
You’re too mindful of your personal gains and losses to be capable of
understanding the love for one’s native land . . . as such a selfish person, you’d
better stay abroad and harm foreigners . . . always prioritizing personal
interests . . . such love is so cheap, your motherland does not need it
(commentary to Bao Bao Jiu Le Bu, 2007).
Along these lines, others believed Chinese students studying abroad are talented
intellectuals that form a huge reservoir of intelligentsia with great potential benefits
for the development and prosperity of their motherland. One commentator even
accused the blogger of being a shame for Chinese students in the U.S., who should be
“hard-working, enduring, resilient, and ambitious.” This commentator used the phrase
“the Chinese overseas students in the U.S.,” as an identity label that one should be
proud of. From this view, Chinese doctoral students in the U.S. should become the
world’s best in their areas so as to be more assertive and determinant in their strategic
life or career choices. This position, while focusing on personal achievement, still
retained a link to Chinese nationality as a key anchor.
In contrast, other critical reactions shifted the focus from selfishness or loyalty
to Chinese nationality to a pragmatic, individualist view on personal winning and
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losing. The majority of commentators that shared this view stated their believe that
the “top guys survive abroad (while) most guys (not all of them) who go back-toChina are losers,”—this with the exception of those who returnees who have deep
social networks and eminent family backgrounds in China. Among these
commentators, one characterized the blogger cited above as “such a big loser” for
failing to develop a positive relationship with an American boss and predicted that the
blogger could be a failure in both the U.S. and Chinese academia. Shifting the focus
from social factors to personality traits, one commentator stated: “Personality
determines fate. One with such shilly-shally character would be a loser anywhere;” in
a similar note another declared: “You must learn to be a person before you learn to do
things.”
Other reactions to the blogger were more hateful and cynical; these often are
interlaced with an ideological tone against the Chinese system and in defense of the
U.S. or in defense of China based on the notion of loyalty to motherland. For
example, when responding to a commentator who wrote about returning to China, two
COOCs wrote: “Go and kill yourself …” and:
Don’t care about your personal gains and losses . . . Just go back China. Your
motherland’s poisonous rice and milk are waiting for you, as well as the
corrupted officials and temptresses’ STD . . . You shouldn’t wait but jump into
the warm embrace of your motherland (commentary to Bao Bao Jiu Le Bu,
2007).
Yet others use sarcasm to express their criticism: “I’m a loser … I can’t find a job in
China; and my parents are also losers, they can’t help me find a job in China either.
As a loser, I chose to stay in the U.S.”
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On the other hand, there were commentators who were sympathetic with the
blogger’s negative view of the U.S. climate. For them, the blogger just delivered some
“honest remarks” containing some “truthful thoughts” and should not be blamed,
accused, and condemned. One sympathizer pointed out the systematic flaws and
institutional vices of the U.S. graduate research establishment as the fundamental
reason why people like the blogger, who are doing “bench jobs” in laboratories,
would like to quit:
Ph.D. students are cheap labor for professors. To extend your privilege as
cheap labor, you can (have to) do post-doc. It is skewed because the first
priority is never science. It’s always about publishing papers so that you can
get funds and get tenure . . . This system is killing science. So I quit
(commentary to Bao Bao Jiu Le Bu, 2007).
Other sympathetic commentators counterpunch hit the critics with the same cynical
and insulting language, calling rival commentators “wretched, pathetic, snobbish
perverts who are addicted to badmouthing people anonymously online.” One
resounded with a comment made by the blogger about the meanness of Chinese
professorial bosses in the U.S. by generalizing that all “Chinese in the U.S.” are
“stingy, cruel, greedy, and arrogant.” One commentator called the blogger “a brave
warrior who dares to tell the truth” and chided critics for their “small-mindedness,
intolerance, and verbal brutality.” According to his COOC, fellow Chinese should
help each other by giving constructive advice instead of hurling invectives to one
another. In contrast to critics who focused on individual character or attributes,
commentators who sympathize with this blogger tended to focus on how structural
factors at home and abroad hinder an individual’s life options. They struggled against
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being labeled “loser.” For them, going back or planning to return to China might
seem unimpressive to many Chinese overseas but should not be regarded as a sign of
“failure;” it is an option that does not need to be target of virtual smashes and smears.
Further, their comments also departed from the construction of binary opposition
between China and the U.S. that pits the faults of the Chinese system against the
unquestioned virtues of the U.S. system.
The cultural comparisons and perspectives that come into play as
commentators debated the dilemma of going back to China or staying abroad
exemplify the multiple positions of identification taken by the Chinese overseas as
they weigh personal, social, ideological, material, and spiritual challenges in the
multi-dimensional reality of a multicultural and postcolonial global society. Often,
their interpretations follow the expected ideological frames regarding criticism or
defense of the Chinese political regime. But transcending political-ideological lines
are deeper structures of meaning that relate to competing notions of stable, bounded
Chinese identity versus a more fluid and accommodating sense of personal and group
identity.
Comparing the historical evolution of China and the West. The
comparison of national cultures often involves references to history as a major force
shaping the evolution, present condition, and future of nations and peoples (Bei Fang
Han Ge. 2008, Aug 23; Qing Nian Can Kao, 2007; Ren Zai Bei Mei, 2007, Mar 1).
Among COOCs, the comparison of the historical trajectory of China and the U.S. is a
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popular topic that prompts debate as the enactment of positions of identification. The
flow of the discussion seems to enact a Chinese dialectic philosophy that is
summarized in the saying “30 years to the west of the river and 30 years to the east of
the river.” This saying suggests the vicissitudes of a society over history, in which
rival states change their relative advantageous or disadvantageous positions in some
rhythmic pattern. Some of the posted commentaries comparing the historical
trajectories of China, Europe, and the U.S provide a space to illustrate the dynamics
on online discussion under this topic.
In one commentary posted regarding, for instance, the writer used
metaphorical language to stress historical and political differences between the “West”
and China:
When the West is in daylight, China must be at night; when the West was in
the dark age of medieval Europe, China was basked in the glaring sunlight of
the Tang and Song (dynastic) prosperities; while the European-originated
colonizers exulted in their victorious postures as conquistadors, China had to
bear the humiliation losing resources and dignity to ethnic groups on her
border (Qing Nian Can Kao, 2007).
This writer also pointed out how spiritual belief systems in China and the West also
separated them: that of Christian Westerners, who believe that people are born with
original sin, and the Confucian Chinese belief that all humans are born with pristine
virtue. This polarizing discourse, revealing and magnifying cultural differences, was
largely rejected by online commentators who found this framing of differences as
cultural antithesis “shallow, flimsy, naïve and intellectually pretentious.” Some
commentators stated that the so-called “observations” by the author were noted by
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others for a hundred years and yet the author presented them as original insights. In
the words of some commentators: “Such pretension is a shameful result of Chinese
education;” “Next time think twice before publishing this shit;” “Such naïve, childish
comparison is joking in such a high-information society.”
One commentator invalidated the comparison by minimizing differences: “I
found . . . no much difference at all between China and the United States after so
many years of living in the U.S. and becoming a U.S. citizen.” Another commentator,
using the pseudonym Old Cowboy, argued that China-U.S. cultural differences are
fundamentally confined to differences regarding awareness and interpretation of
human rights. Among those who underplay differences, some even suspected that the
real motive of the article’s author was to instigate conflict and undo Western
influences on common Chinese people.
In other instances, the comparisons of Chinese and U.S. historical trajectories
were framed as a debate opposing China’s “progress” to U.S. “regress” over the last
two or three decades. In a forum dedicated to this topic, an article written by a blogger
with the pseudonym Northern Brother (NB) approached this topic by contrasting the
changing attitudes of U.S. and China custom officers over a span of about two
decades. The blogger drew on direct, personal experience to observe that the attitudes
of Chinese custom officers have changed from cold and nagging to genial and tidy,
especially before the Beijing Olympics. Meanwhile, he added, U.S. custom officers
have become more indifferent, business-like, and impatient compared to how they
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were years ago, probably due to the tightened border security after the terrorist attack
of September 11, 2001. Thereby, for NB, the Beijing Olympics and the 9/11 attacks
become two significant historical events that signify an epochal rotation: China is
progressing as the U.S. is declining.
This piece triggers a reverberation of reactions and divergent opinions. Some
echo the main argument with supportive evidence. Some oppose it with a cynical tone.
Some sound equivocal. One even wrote a poem to corroborate NB’s observation. And
while some use cultural opposition to support or refute the main argument, others
seem to reject the construction of binary cultural oppositions and opt to trivialize or
transcend cultural differences. Relatively more commentators adhere to NB’s
observation, since the forum is maintained by NB in his own Web blog.
For example, to support NB’s position, a commentator with the pseudonym
Northeast Languid stated that his personal experiences of going through customs in
China and in the U.S. corroborate NB’s observations. Another commentator selfidentified as redsun indicated that he or she encountered the same “indifference” and
“coldness” from custom officers in the San Francisco Airport, who have “no idea that
their faces represent the image of the U.S.”
Suspecting of NB’s antagonistic approach, a commentator identified as Foxy
Fox (FF) placed NB into a special category of Chinese overseas: those who “criticize
the U.S. vehemently while at the same time enjoy all the benefits from the U.S with
ease . . . Such disparity is hypocritical and irrational . . . duality out of extreme self-

109

inferiority.” Others in disagreement provided references to personal experiences that
contradicted NB’s observations. In one of such replies, the opposition is inverted
when the commentator cited the “nice and considerate” treatment received in the
Orlando and Chicago airports and “straight, long faces” of custom officers at the
Beijing Capital International airport.
Other reactions in disagreement with NB’s original blog entry avoided the
binary opposition of historical trajectories to offer a more dynamic reading of
historical trajectories, one in which differences are not in conflictive opposition. From
this view, China’s progress might be “real and normal” but the comparison to the U.S.
is “unnecessary”; furthermore, as one commentator pointed out, using such trivial
comparison to arrive at the “far-fetched” conclusion about U.S.’s regress is simply
“frivolous.” Even when commentators hold that the distance between China and the
West might be abating, they perceive a gap still big enough to declare—using the
competition frame “winning vs. losing”—that China and/or Chinese culture is and
will be the loser in a long run.
Overall, the discussion of historical evolution seems to suggest that
exaggerating cultural opposition between China and the West is unwelcome in the
virtual community of Chinese overseas. In the view of most online commentators,
cultural difference is not equivalent to cultural opposition. Chinese overseas might
experience and accept differences but seem to reject or eschew the polarization of
cultures to favor a pacifistic point of view. In this sense, the reactions to this
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comparison of U.S. and China’s historical progress also reveal the positions of
identification among commentators. Those in agreement with the comparison made
by the blogger might be wishful for the brightness of China’s future and foreseeing
the fundamental transformation of the whole word’s political and economical situation.
Those who disagree tend to be sensitive to the current material reality and stubborn
about their assessment of a better society in the West than in China. For many,
rejecting the notion that China’s progress is linked to U.S. regress seems to be the
pragmatic way to articulate a position of identification as Chinese overseas operating
in a cultural borderland. This interpretation seems to be necessary if one is to hold the
legitimacy of the ideology of the American dream (in the U.S. context) and of upward
mobility in Western nations that drive many Chinese to relocate in the first place. In
other words, they have their invested interests in the prosperity of their host countries.
In this sense, if China and the U.S. were to be perceived a pair of antitheses, Chinese
individuals in the U.S. would inevitably feel difficult to deal with their split cultural
identification.
Chapter Summary and Conclusions
Online interaction among members of this global, ethnic cyber community
often leads to the comparison of cultures as an interpretive strategy that allows
commentators to make sense of the place of Chinese culture in multicultural contexts.
One of the salient fields of discursive activity relates to social categorizations of
difference such as race and ethnicity, gender, and nationality. Through this perspective
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of identity, cultural identification is enacted as a response to perceived cultural
differences encountered by COOCs while living in host cultures.
On Race and Ethnicity
Upon encountering cultural difference, COOCs struggle to discover and
rediscover their cultural identity within new social hierarchies that become more
immediate to them in their host societies. In discussions about race and ethnic
difference, COOCs use comparison by opposition to place themselves in an imagined
racial order and contrast the treatment afforded to foreigners in China and to the
Chinese in foreign countries. In the multiracial U.S. society, they identified
themselves as members of a relatively cohesive Chinese racial group that is
disadvantaged, marginalized, inferior, and invisible in the existing racial hierarchy.
Further, they see no meaningful connections to or sense of common purpose with
other races and ethnic groups. In their imagined racial order, stereotypical and
prejudiced constructions of other racial groups are common, which leads to the
positioning of White and Black Westerners as preferred point of reference and of their
culture as normative, with much less attention given to other peoples of color or
ethnic minorities. When assessing the lower status and invisibility of Chinese
individuals in Western societies, many COOCs drew a comparison with the privileged
treatment received by Westerners in China, as a way to vent feelings of frustration and
resentment toward both Chinese and Western hosts. Although in this area of
discussion the commentators tend to refer to the Chinese and other races as groups
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rather than individuals, making sociality the most prominent dimension of their
identity, they may also stress personal achievement and individual traits in their
explanation of differences or as ways to deal with the perceived inferiority of the
Chinese in host cultures.
On Gender and Group Stereotypes
As in the forums addressing racial difference, online discussions of
stereotypes of Chinese masculinity in Western societies and of Chinese students in
Western universities serve as a site where commentators affirmed a sense of
identification as members of the Chinese cultural group. A shared feeling of being
victims of prejudice or cultural misunderstanding lead COOCs to express their views
with little attention given to internal differences and divisions within the group. On
the contrary, the views expressed enact a tension between “us” the Chinese and “them”
the Westerners who disseminate the stereotype.
This is the case regardless of whether COOCs agreed or rejected the stereotypes. In
terms of the stereotypical view of Chinese males as physically weak and sexually
undesirable, individuality and sociality intersected in discourse to drive COOCs’
cultural identification.
And in debates on the character of Chinese students overseas, COOCs stress the
sociality and materiality dimension of their identity by highlighting social and
institutional contexts where unequal power relations and cultural and institutional
barriers account for the negative traits ascribed by Westerners to Chinese individuals.
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On Chinese National Identity
In contrast to discussions about race and gender, online discussions of topics
related to Chinese national identity feature a much more fragmented spectrum of
positions of identification and a more fluid sense of individual and group identity.
Specifically, the debates expose the divide between critics of Chinese culture and
society and those who defend the positive moral traits of the Chinese collective
identity while accusing Chinese critics of xenocentrism and pointing out flaws and
shortcomings in U.S. or Western peoples and systems. Those who defend China enact
a clearly defined sense of group identity bound by loyalty and affective attachment to
Chinese nationality and citizenship. Their discourse features the attribution of high
moral standards to the Chinese people, the affirmation of pride in Chinese ancient
history and culture, and confidence in the ascending position of China as a world
power, and the attack of critics who are labeled xenocentric. This positioning places
them in an antagonistic relation with COOCs who compare the Chinese and Western
nations to stress the moral flaws of the Chinese and the economic and social
underdevelopment of China, while affirming identification with the superiority of
Western values and social systems. COOCs who are critical of Chinese culture and
peoples tend to enact a more fluid sense of identity that allows them to seek
accommodation or conciliation of differences as a rational strategy for cultural
survival and economic success in their host societies. Driven by an individualist and
pragmatist perspective, they may not see disloyalty in adopting a foreign citizenship
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and renouncing Chinese citizenship or consider that taking a critical stance against
China and for the West means the absence of any affective identification with Chinese
culture. The spectrum of identity positions in regards to nationality illustrates the
internal diversity of the virtual community and the intersection of individuality,
sociality, materiality, and spirituality in processes of cultural identification.
Perceptual Cultural Identification and the Interplay of Self and Other
In the communication approach to identity studies, , cultural identity is defined
as one’s self concept formed and performed in communication that emphasizes one’s
connection to cultural membership. In the virtual community studied, performance of
cultural identity involved the expression of awareness and judgment of cultural
differences observed trough intercultural interaction with both members of the
ingroup of Chinese living overseas and with non-Chinese peoples. The online
discourse analyzed in this chapter featured a particular dynamic of cultural
identification that I have labeled perceptual cultural identification. In this form of
identification, COOCs enact their sense of cultural membership through comparison
between self and other in a process that is driven by the exchange of information on
and heuristic interpretation of perceived differences rather than the by the need to take
any strategic action or assume ideological positioning. In this form of identification,
individuals strive to understand who they are by looking-out at the cultures they are
having close interactions with and looking-in at their own culture. In perceptual
cultural identification, subjects are engrossed with making sense of differences and
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are motivated to exchange cultural knowledge so as to reduce the uncertainty
inevitably felt in intercultural contexts or to react to negative representations of
Chinese culture and peoples constructed by others with a positive affirmation of their
identity.
Within the community examined, a salient frame for the interpretation of the
meaning of the cultural differences discussed is the dilemma between cultural shame
and cultural pride. According to Hecht et al (2005), cultural identification can
generate subjective – emotive, affective, and spiritual—reactions during the process
of gaining awareness of one’s cultural membership. Cultural shame and cultural pride
represent two polarized subjective reactions in this virtual community. Particularly in
the debates on national identity, online discussions reflect a dialectic tension between
pride and shame. In the enactment of pride, the spiritual dimension of identity is
expressed as an affective attachment to a sense of collective cultural membership in
Chinese culture. On the other hand, individuality and materiality fuel cultural shame
and provide justification for a pragmatic, individualist accommodation and adaptation
to host societies. As observed in the examples provided above, the tension between
those who affirm cultural shame and those who express cultural pride becomes a
source of internal division among COOCs.
Furthermore, expressions of pride and shame reflect the particular ways in
which Chinese individuals living overseas learn to conciliate conflicting dimensions
of their fractured identity. For instance, while COOCs are mostly realistic about
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differences in economic and social conditions in both China and their host country,
most of them respect the cultural connection with their home country. Thus, many
express the view that the socioeconomic factors that become determinants for their
leaving and staying overseas do not contradict but rather complement their different
levels of sentimental connection with Chinese culture. This separation of
socioeconomic and cultural factors in their sense of cultural affiliation allows them to
settle down on a meaningful borderland, whether they emphasize loyalty to China or a
critical stance toward their own culture and people.
In the matrix of the four intersecting dimensions of identity that I have
proposed as an interpretive framework (see Chapter 2) to understand the complexities
of cultural identification, socioeconomic influences are closer to the dimension of
materiality while cultural attachments are closer to spirituality. A clear awareness of
the need to separate and conciliate these is crucial for the stability of the cultural
identification of individuals in the researched community. In trying to do so, many
perform a heightened sense of individuality—expressed through notions of
pragmatism and survival—in the total constitution of their identity. Across topics,
many stress personal achievement and individual traits in their discussion of how to
deal with differences or as ways to deal with the perceived inferiority of the Chinese
in host cultures. In effect, I note a general trend of stressing individuality (personal
identity) and diminishing sociality (group identity), even though they are intersecting
in every discussion, and even when the format in the online environment provide
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room for community building.
This tendency to heighten individuality and diminished sociality can be
explained with the interpretative framework elaborated in Chapter II. First, in the
landing context of global and multicultural realities, the Chinese as a cultural group
are neither in powerful social positions nor enjoy a favorable public image. As the
discussion of their interpretations of racial hierarchies and gender stereotyping
illustrates, they may react to negative perceptions of their culture by emphasizing
group identity or sociality and identifying as victims of unequal social, cultural and
political relations or power. Yet, the consideration of collective action or group
empowerment to level the playing field is out of the realm of discussion. As a general
tendency, commentators opt for focusing on individual strategies to affirm their selfesteem through demonstration of personal achievement and individual performance.
This escalation of individuality is also related to the ways in which COOCs manage
tensions between cultural shame and cultural pride, for individuality, personal
achievement, and moral qualities become a source of pride and success in the new
environment.
This tension between individuality and sociality, and materiality and
spirituality, in identity negotiation speaks to the position of COOCs, many of whom
are pursuing careers and taking a pragmatic approach to the acceptance of Western
culture as a means to secure their livelihoods abroad. Although in the comments
posted one reads affirmations of cultural cohesion and pride and of opposition to
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Western practices, the majority of commentators also need to maintain a sense of
connection to their new environments and viability as students and workers in the host
cultures they inhabit. For some, their positioning is facilitated by the fact that they
choose to relocate in the West because they were attracted to Western lifestyles and
willing to experience and accept them in the first place. But even among COOCs who
affirmed cultural pride and a strong sense of group identity, even the more appealing
Western lifestyles should not alleviate one’s loyalty to Chinese culture. As one
commentator put it, “Enjoying life abroad doesn’t mean you should betray your
motherland.”
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CHAPTER V: MANAGING LIFE PREDICAMENTS: STRATEGIC
CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION
Along with discussing perceived cultural differences through self-other
comparison, another salient interpretive practice among Chinese overseas online
commentators (COOCs) is using the online forum to give and receive practical advice
on how to manage the predicaments of life abroad. In the particular context of
Wenxuecity.com, I use the term predicaments of life to refer to situations of conflict,
suffering or misunderstanding that result from exposure to new cultural environments
and social contexts outside China. In effect, a salient topic that tends to attract heated
discussion by the COOCs relates to contemporary and historical misfortunes faced by
the Chinese in their interactions with members of other cultural groups. As some
members of this Chinese virtual community share their tribulations online, a sense of
common cultural membership motivates other online users to show empathy through
comments that offer advice—in the form of guidance and admonishment—and
prescribe concrete strategies to cope with life predicaments. In this chapter, I discuss
how this practice of giving and receiving advice opens space for the enactment of a
form of cultural identification that I term strategic cultural identification. This form of
identification refers to the affirmation of group membership rooted in a sense of
sharing some core cultural traits and facing similar conditions as marginalized,
oppressed, and even victimized outsiders in a foreign culture. This particular sense of
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identity is enacted through the discussion of strategies or steps of action deemed
necessary for successful adaptation to life in an intercultural context.
More specifically, this chapter examines 1) the categories of life predicaments
that draw most fervent discussion in the online forum, 2) the most common strategies
given by COOCs as advice for coping with life predicaments, and 3) how cultural
advice in online reactions to life predicaments reveals a form of identification that
emphasizes a sense of Chinese cultural membership. The findings presented in this
chapter identify four salient categories of life predicaments that evoked the most
fervent responses among COOCs in various online forums. These predicaments
stirred up heated discussions because many COOCs could recall their own
experiences or imagine themselves in the same difficult situations. Therefore,
empathy emerged spontaneously and motivated commentators to share their thoughts
with the body of a virtual audience. Although the ways in which COOCs expressed
empathy and offered advice varied significantly—and sometimes even mutated into
sarcasm or cynicism—cultural identification regarding the life predicaments of other
Chinese reflected a sense of group cohesion. Interestingly, the strategic advice given
by COOCs was not only directed toward the individuals involved in specific cases at
hand but as admonition to, presumably, all Chinese. Hence, the altruistic act of
helping an individual in trouble better adapt in the foreign land involved also the
affirmation of group identity and pursuit of positive self-conceptualization bound by a
sense of cultural membership as Chinese. This affirmation suggests that beyond the
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individual and ideological differences manifested on the surface of the discourse,
COOCs seek to build a cohesive community upon which they can rely and to which
they can relate on the basis of shared cultural traits.
Given its particular dynamics, I have termed this form of identification
strategic cultural identification. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner,
1986) posits that individuals tend to prefer and maintain the positive distinctiveness of
the group they believe they belong to in response to an inherent demand for positive
self-conceptualization. Although people from the same culture might show different
degrees of attachment to their cultural membership, most of them normally have a
preference for the positive evaluation of their culture. Along these lines, one may
notice that in the online messages analyzed the majority of COOCs prefer a positive,
distinctive, and realistic evaluation of Chinese culture. However, when COOCs read
stories of other Chinese entrapped in real-life predicaments, the unpleasant realities
faced by their compatriots seem to remind them of dimensions of vulnerability in the
Chinese identity. This vulnerability becomes apparent when other COOCs express
victimhood, disenchantment with life abroad or personal maladjustment in a host
culture.
In order to make up for sunken cultural pride and uplift their sense of Chinese
identity, COOCs provide counsel to the imagined virtual readership. I would argue
here that this type of cultural counseling in COOCs’ responses to the misfortunes of
other Chinese expatriates reveals a particular kind of cultural identification: strategic
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cultural identification. This is a form of communication that involves the enactment
of identity through: a) articulation of a culturally specific perspective on a situation; b)
identification of values to guide action; and c) prescription of a strategy or steps of
action for managing existing and potential cultural challenges.
One way strategic cultural identification is enacted is when COOCs exchange
their interpretations of collective, historical experiences of trauma and their enduring
effects on contemporary Chinese culture. Another way in which we observe this
dynamic is when COOCs discuss personal experiences or real-life stories in which a
Chinese individual becomes disoriented in foreign cultural context and seeks help
from other COOCs. Whether the focus is on collective processes or interpersonal
settings and individual cases, interactivity among COOCs make strategic cultural
identification a source of cultural knowledge and, arguably, intercultural competency
for the larger community.
More importantly, the dynamics of strategic identification open a window into
processes of identity formation through intercultural communication. COOCs’
responses indeed reflect an interest in maintaining a positive personal attitude and
image of the Chinese culture, which signifies a sense of ingroup solidarity or cohesion.
Simultaneously, the repertoire of diverse—and often divergent—cultural strategies
prescribed by COOCs reflects the heterogeneity of identity positions within the
ingroup and thus serves to illuminate the tensions that characterize processes of
identity formation. In the next sections, I present the findings through description and
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discussion of four salient categories of life predicaments and the strategies suggested
by COOCs for coping with them. In the last section of the chapter, I address who this
online discourse reveal the complexities of identity performance among members of
this group.
Salient Categories of Life Predicaments
According to some COOCs, the editors of Wenxuecity.com are adeptly
selective and deliberate in presenting stories that would stir up the sentiments of their
readers. Stories of the life predicaments of Chinese individuals in their interactions
with people of other cultures tend to stir emotional reactions and empathy among
COOCs. The four most salient categories of life predicaments, identified as the ones
that attracted more frequent and scorching commentaries from the COOCs, were: 1)
the effects of China’s historical burdens on contemporary Chinese people and culture;
2) the academic quandaries of Chinese students overseas; 3) ethnic/racial crimes
against Chinese victims; and 4) ethnic/racial crimes perpetrated by Chinese
individuals against others. The effects of historical burdens refer to how the
humiliation and suffering bore by China as a nation and by early Chinese immigrants
affect attitudes and conditions of contemporary Chinese individuals overseas.
Academic quandaries comprise individual cases of Chinese students entrapped in
conflicts within foreign educational institutions due to a variety of personal,
interpersonal, and social factors. Ethnic/racial crimes against Chinese victims refer to
incidents in which Chinese overseas were brutally mistreated. The last category
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comprises situations in which Chinese individuals became the perpetrators of crimes.
Across topics and positions enacted by individual commentators, I focused on coding
the forms of advice offered by COOCs and analyzing their meaning for processes of
identification.
Historical Burdens: Reminiscing on Past Humiliations and Sufferings
Online discourse produced by COOCs seems to reaffirm the notion that
History has been burdensome for the Chinese nation. The history of China overseas is
closely related to the vicissitudes of the Chinese diaspora and of China as a global
power (Lien, 2006; Pei, 2002; Tsu, 2006a & 2006b; Yin, 2007; Wickberg, 2007). Past
humiliations are not easy to disregard for those who are seeking the meaning of their
true identity in a foreign land. Furthermore, even China’s past glory might become
lackluster when compared to the more recent, splendid achievements of Western
science and technology. Yet, the rationale of the current Chinese school curriculum is
that students should take pride in China’s glorious past and, at the same time, learn
from those historical lessons to develop a unifying energy (Sun, 2005). Thus, the
contemporary Chinese often show complex reactions when reminiscing about their
motherland’s history (Sun, 2005; Tsu, 2006).
COOCs’ responses to stories about China’s past and its effect on the present
indicate that notions of cultural pride and shame are recurrent constructs in their
interpretation of China’s history and their process of cultural identification as Chinese.
Regarding the Chinese past, there seems to be more accounts of cultural shame than
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cultural pride among COOCs. Noticeably, the articles about the suffering and
humiliation of the Chinese nation attracted more fervent discussion than those about
the historical glories of Chinese civilization. COOCs’ cultural identification was more
often activated in responses to stories that triggered collective memories of the
nation’s traumatic experience caused by interaction with other nations, races, or
ethnic groups. The articles that attracted more commentaries from COOCs are related
to the following two themes: 1) the humiliations that China underwent during
European colonial expansion in Asia, particularly the Opium Wars (the first from
1839-1840; the second from 1856 -1860) and the Invasion of Eight Allied Forces
(1900-1901); and 2) the acts of ethnic cleansing, roundup, and demonization against
early Chinese immigrants in the United States and other Western colonial territories in
the 19th century.
Chinese humiliations from colonial times. In the writing and teaching of the
modern history of China, Chinese educators seldom avoid the factual accounts of the
“Guo Chi” or “national disgrace” forced onto old China by Western colonial and
imperialist powers (Lien, 2006; Pei, 2002; Tsu, 2006a & 2006b; Yin, 2007; Wickberg,
2007). Through exposure to these historical narratives, one might expect that many
COOCs would know this part of Chinese modern history and be sensitive to any new
revelations related to such “national disgrace.” Certainly, their commentaries reflect
familiarity with such narratives. The responses also show how COOCs manage the
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negative dimensions of their cultural identity with messages of cultural advice that
draw on historical lessons to offer strategies for action.
On this issue of historical humiliations experienced by the Chinese nation,
three articles were posted online. The first is a blog entry by British reporter Malcolm
Moore, titled “Did we mention the Opium War (Anti-CNN, Jan 11, 2010)?” Moore is
identified as a Daily Telegraph Shanghai correspondent and wrote his piece in both
Chinese and English. The starting point of the article is China’s execution of a British
drug trafficker. The news about the execution led the author to reflect on and
complain about how the Chinese would not get over the Opium War that occurred
some 170 years ago. The second article is a report about how the statements of movie
star Jackie Chan were widely approved by Chinese netizens after he publicly
denounced France for auctioning two bronze historic sculptures looted by French and
British invaders from the Chinese imperial palace during the Second Opium War
(Hua Qiu Zai Xian, Feb 27, 2009). The third item is an article re-posted from the
cultural forums of bbs.people.com.cn. In this article, a writer disapproved the looting
of 12 bronze Zodiac animal heads considered national treasures from the Old Summer
Palace or Yuanming Yuan (the Garden of Perfect Brightness) (Ren Ming Wang – Wen
Hua Lun Tan, Feb 23, 2009). All the three articles evoked memories of China’s
humiliations at the hands of colonial powers and provoked many commentaries
among COOCs.
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Among the responses to these articles, two distinctive positions of
identification reflect how COOCs were struggling to deal with memories of national
disgrace. One, apparently the predominant in the forums, stresses the unforgettable
nature of China’s national disgrace and criticizes Western hegemonic hypocrisy—
seen, for instance, in the fact that Westerners promote justice and agape but refuse to
return looted treasures from other nations. The other position, expressed less
frequently but with intense rhetorical and argumentative efforts, emphasizes the value
of cultivating internal peace by undoing the Chinese “collective psychosis” that has
resulted from past traumatizing experiences. In articulating both positions, COOCs
allude to values and prescribe strategies to deal with the enduring cultural o
psychological burden of past national disgraces. The following analysis focuses on
commentaries that can best illustrate the values and strategies offered.
In responding to stories of China’s national disgrace, some COOCs reiterated
the value of remembrance, manifested in the view that all past humiliations of China
at the hands of other world powers should never fade in people’s memory. For these
COOCs, remembrance of China’s humiliations, seen as an unjust consequence of
unbalanced international conflicts forced by Western colonial powers in late modern
history (the 19th century mostly), suggests one form of identification with Chinese
culture. One commentator even quoted William Gladstone, a prominent British
statesman at time of the Second Opium War, who described the War as “a war more
unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent
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disgrace (William Ewart Gladstone, May 11, 2011).” In reasoning the value of
remembering China’s humiliations, another commentator cited Jewish people as a
referent to suggest that the Chinese should “learn from Jewish people who make a
movie about the holocaust every year. We should shoot a movie about those looters
every year and compete in film festivals.”
In tandem with the value of remembrance, four strategies to manage historical
burdens are advanced: revenge, indifference, forgiveness, and rotation. The first
strategy discussed as a way to deal with the burden of national disgrace was revenge.
Occasional voices in the forums called for revenge to get even and clean up the
disgrace, as in expressions like: “It’s never too late for honorable people to
retaliate”—a saying that has a similar meaning to the English proverb “Revenge is a
dish best served cold.” On the other hand, expressions such as “We don’t care what
the Brits think,” exemplify the strategy of indifference. Here, COOCs attempt to
promote an attitude of detachment and thus neglect the negative effects and authority
of those who speak from Western hegemonic standpoints. Forgiveness involves
letting go of the past for the sake of one’s inner peace; and rotation entails a cognitive
distinction of identity properties and strategic shift of emphasis, in this case from
social to individual meanings. For instance, one commentator who advised
forgiveness and rotation from sociality to individuality put the issue in this manner:
As individuals, we should be magnanimous and learn to forget and to forgive.
Actually Chinese are taught the value of tolerance and avoidance since
childhood. But the bloody lessons of history for a nation should never be
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forgotten. Because those are national disgrace, the permanent scars of the
entire nation . . . (commentary to Anti-CNN, Jan 11, 2010).
For this commentator, tolerance and forgiveness and individual choices encouraged
even though the nation as a whole should never forget. All three strategies are set on
the condition of keeping the memory of national disgrace alive. In this regard,
COOCs who promote the remembrance of national disgrace seem to turn negativity
into something positive that helps consolidate group unification, collective pride or
individual self-confidence through a sense of righteousness or higher moral ground
that can serve individuals in their intercultural experiences with Westerners.
On the other hand, some COOCs reminded readers that keeping the memory
of disgrace alive and being hotheaded at the nation’s inglorious past is a form of selfvictimization and self-abuse that undermines one’s internal tranquility. Stressing the
opposite value, forgetfulness, they prescribed the same strategy: forgiveness, to “let
go” and “get over it.” As one COOC wrote:
Honestly, all these (instances of national disgrace) are China’s
embarrassments . . . the Chinese should get rid of the victimization complex
and stop such self-abusing. Don’t overreact to disrespecting provocations and
let go of the historical burdens. Overreaction and indulgence [in the past] can
only incur more atrocious, contemptuous taunts from those who abhor China
with ill wishes. The outcome would be a more isolated China that seems to be
turning against the whole world (commentary to Ren Ming Wang – Wen Hua
Lun Tan, Feb 23, 2009).
The same commentator cried out: “Let go of it, idiots!!!!!!!!!!” and “…be real, and be
practical.” He repeated: “You can’t have endless inquisition into the historical matters,
otherwise India might want China to return Tibet and Sichuan.” He then incorporated
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his critique of the Chinese Communist Party’s patriotic indoctrination for contributing
to this phenomenon:
Probably due to its internal diffidence, by adopting a frustrating mode of
patriotic education, the CCP always likes to expose China’s historical scars
and relentlessly talk about how Chinese were bullied and oppressed . . . until
ordinary Chinese become so fragile, jittery, and testy, lacking toughness for
tolerance and internal peace. A true Chinese patriot should transcend the
governmental indoctrination and maintain the deep attachment to the
motherland by profoundly understanding this nation’s immense tradition
(commentary to Ren Ming Wang – Wen Hua Lun Tan, Feb 23, 2009).
The commentaries contributed by the writer typify the view that managing a negative
property of one’s cultural identity through forgiveness and tolerance entails a strategy
of getting over the past and letting go of the memory. The COOCs who resonated
with this position identified China’s national disgrace as a form of cultural shame,
which should and can be put in oblivion after so many years. In their view,
forgetfulness and forgiveness can benefit individual Chinese in their immediate
connection to the outside world. For them, the Chinese who would unload unbearable
historical burdens can live better, especially when they have to interact with the
outside world and need to happily live in Western and other nations that may have
been part of the history of Chinese national humiliation.
Pai Hua or driving out the Chinese: Miseries of early Chinese migrants.
Unlike other well-publicized historical instances of national defeat or subjugation, the
history of the miseries suffered by Chinese people who emigrated to colonial and
other foreign territories—often victims of deceit and pillage by their hosts and
neighbors—are seldom mentioned in China’s school curricula (Chang, 2003). On the

131

contrary, there have been public debates on whether Chinese emigrants should still be
regarded as Chinese nationals (Lee, 2003; Tsu, 2006). Within the standard curriculum
in China’s general education programs, discussion of the atrocious treatment of
Chinese migrants abroad is very limited and understated (Lee, 2003; Tsu, 2006).
Therefore, one might expect to find that upon leaving China, individuals have a vague
knowledge of the experiences of Chinese migrants upon leaving China. However,
upon encountering stories of early Chinese migrants to the West, COOCs seem to
easily identify with their predicaments in foreign nations due to common cultural
membership and similar sojourning situations—such as cultural isolation in a host
culture.
As one might expect, during the time period observed the website featured a
low number of headlined stories on this topic. Nonetheless, when posted, the
reactions to the stories were salient in terms of the intensity of discussion. I selected
four articles that featured this topic. The first contains 14 cartoons published over 100
years ago satirizing early Chinese immigrants in the United States (Wang Yi Li Shi,
Aug 13, 2009). These images reflect how U.S. American media demonized and
belittled Chinese immigrants as dirty rat-eaters over. The second article is an in-depth
feature with photos titled “Unbelievable humiliations in the past: The nightmares of
early Chinese immigrants on Angel Island (Beijing Qing Nian Bao, March 15, 2009).”
The third article is another in-depth article about how an early Chinese immigrant
hero, Mr. Yixi Chen, whose actions left in awe a mob of hundreds of U.S. Americans
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that were trying to brutally beat up a Chinese man (Zhong Hua Bo Ke, March 8,
2009). The fourth article is a review of U.S. professor Jean Pfaelzer’s history book on
how early Chinese immigrants were driven out from their shelters in several Western
states of the United States in the 19th century (Guo Ji Zai Xiang, Aug 11, 2007). These
articles presented a grim picture of the life of early Chinese migrants attacked or
bullied by their hosts and neighbors in foreign lands. The commentaries in response
reflect how COOCs enacted a sense of identity by relating to previous generations of
Chinese immigrants and how they derive lessons and strategies for cultural survival
from the treatment of their predecessors.
For instance, when debating how to interpret the cartoons with stereotypical
and nasty images of early Chinese immigrants, one commentator refers to the need to
abandon a “victim’s mindset” and stressed the principle of self-respect to suggest the
strategy of reinterpretation of meanings to subvert the negativity in the cartoons. This
entails the re-interpretation of negative messages produced by a hegemonic culture
about the Chinese sub-culture in ways that turn their negative meaning into more
favorable or even empowering meanings for the Chinese. For example, when one
commentator asked: “Why do we have to interpret these images as something really
bad (like racist stereotyping) (commentary to Wang Yi Li Shi, Aug 13, 2009)?”
another responded in agreement:
I think the images in these cartoons only intended to be satirizing. None of
these should be taken seriously. They are not necessarily racist at all. Our
Chinese always like to use a victim’s mindset to interpret others’ artworks that
depict them, and so they easily become so tense, which is a reflection of our
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inferiority complex. Being too sensitive to discrimination is not a good thing.
Actually the others might not have discriminating intentions at all. Even if
they do, we can still take it with our own understandings. Like Asian Indians
who translate ‘cheap’ into ‘smart’ and so they never feel inferior and always
have good relationships with the Westerners. No complaint, no pain. How
could you get respect from others if you don’t respect yourselves (commentary
to Wang Yi Li Shi, Aug 13, 2009)?”
The perspective in this comment implies a two-step cultural strategy for ingroup
members. First, the Chinese should abandon the sense of victimization as the primary
lens through which they read a cultural message and be aware of multiple meanings
and even any original intention (sarcasm) and special context that produced criticism
by an outgroup. Second, these COOCs suggest the strategy of reinterpretation to
digest negative stereotypes and avoid feelings of victimization.
In another discussion, the strategy of rotation (sociality and individuality)
leads to competing positions on how to deal with negative stereotyping. Some
COOCs stress that group membership (sociality) should have no connection to one’s
personal success (individuality). As one commentator put it,
I don’t understand why Chinese overseas always bank on the prosperity of
their motherland. Black people don’t even have a motherland and one of them
now becomes American president (commentary to Beijing Qing Nian Bao,
March 15, 2009).
Another group makes the opposite interconnection between individuality and sociality,
emphasizing collective identity, as in this comment:
Chinese overseas having been oppressed for over a hundred years in foreign
lands of course would naturally hope a more prosperous and powerful China.
The position of a culture, such as an ethnic/racial group like Black people, is
determined by the whole group rather than any individuals. The American
president is only a half black, a typical Black-Skin White-heart. Besides he is
just an exceptional individual case and cannot represent the whole group
(commentary to Beijing Qing Nian Bao, March 15, 2009).
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The first leads to the suggestion that the Chinese should be more self-reliant and
minimize their emotional attachment to the motherland, so as to easily deal with the
negative stereotyping from other cultures. The second implies that the Chinese should
keep positive identification with their motherland, whose global status can help
improve any individual Chinese. These interpretations are enactments of how COOCs’
struggle to deal with negative aspects of their cultural identity. The strategy of
rotating from sociality to individuality can make individual Chinese lessen their
identification with perceived negative meanings of the Chinese culture, while
correlating individuality and sociality can make individual Chinese strengthen their
identification with and attachment to a group identity.
In sum, responses to stories of China’s historical disgrace and miseries of
early Chinese immigrants in the West exhibit some distinctive sets of cultural
strategies. Those who favored remembrance of past disgraces, revenge, indifference,
forgiveness, reinterpretation, and rotation from social to individual meanings were
proposed as strategies to cope. Those who favored forgetting past disgraces advised
forgiveness. With these cultural strategies, and driven by an internal demand for
positive cultural identification, COOCs manifested their sense of cultural membership
while prescribing ways to manage negative aspects of Chinese identity activated by
historical references.
Entrapped on Campus: Cases of Academic Quandaries
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Cultural identification was activated also by stories that referred to realities
that were temporally and socially closer to COOCs’ lives. Similar age, social
background, education, and intercultural experiences can all become factors that
facilitate an individual’s emotional and cognitive identification with other ingroup
members. As the findings indeed reveal, compared to historical burdens, life
predicaments of Chinese students in foreign educational institutions did arouse close
cultural identification, as reflected in the heated discussions among COOCs. On this
topic, the responses contain more detailed cultural counseling through the exchange of
life lessons, cultural insights, and advice. For the purpose of discussion and
illustration, I selected two stories of academic quandaries and the comments evoked
by them. The quality of the discussion generated by these two stories of extreme cases
was the primary criterion for selection: both cases evoked a large number of responses
and stirred up fervent discussion among COOCs.
The first story relates to the case of Xuemei Han, a Chinese female Ph.D.
student at Yale University (Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005). According to reports, she
fought for a scholarship that had been cancelled when she transferred from one
department to another. Although the result of the fight turned out to be uneventful
(Han was offered a new scholarship in her new department), accounts of the strenuous
process to regain the scholarship disturbed the virtual Chinese community. The
second story involved another Chinese female Ph.D. student at Duke University,
Zihui Tang, who accused her adviser of psychological abuse and academic oppression
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(Duo Wei Shi Bao, Aug 22, 2006). Tang was later forced to leave the Ph.D. program
with a terminal master’s degree. In the first case, Han had more tension with the
institution than with specific individual faculty members—at least from the
information publicized. Han’s promised scholarship or assistantship was halted after
she transferred from the Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology but
reinstated at the same level by the Department of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
In the second case, Tang, a student majoring in Chinese history, had tensions with her
main advisor, Professor Sucheta Mazumdar—a prominent scholar of Chinese history
with an Asian Indian background. Tang publicized her battle in weblogs and accused
Mazumdar of abuse in detailed accounts. Eventually, Tang settled the dispute by
accepting a terminal master’s degree and left Duke. These different scenarios
(institutional vs. personal) influenced the ways the COOCs responded to the stories.
On the one hand, responses to Han’s case were predominantly critical of the Chinese
student and questioned her maturity and competence. On the other hand, responses to
Tang’s interpersonal conflict were mostly sympathetic. I will focus my analysis on the
strategies advocated in COOCs’ responses to the two cases.
Guided by the values of adaptation for survival, modesty, endurance, selfimprovement, dignity and individualism, four strategies were identified from these
responses: 1) get to know the system – study the norms of host society; 2) learn to
accommodate – be ready to comply with rules of local institutions; 3) keep a low
profile – avoid overt self-assertion; 4) lessen attachment to the cultural core –
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decrease attachment to Chinese culture. The first two strategies promote cultural
awareness, oriented outwardly in reference to norms, institutional rules, and power
structures of the host culture. The last two strategies work on suggesting how to
present oneself in the host society involving an inward orientation toward selfresilience as a way to improve an individual’s ability to cope with challenges. The
four general strategies are all pragmatic with nearly zero implications for idealism or
group activism. However, they do reflect a form of group identification in that they
construct the view that Chinese overseas share common predicaments as outsiders in
the context of their host societies, and that faulty decision making affects not only the
individual in trouble but also the reputation of the entire population of Chinese
students abroad.
Knowing the system. Many COOCs saw the quandaries of Han and Tang
partly as their inabilities to know the institutional system of American higher learning.
So in their counseling, COOCs provided their understandings of the U.S. institutional
system as well as some common social norms. The responses to the first case—Han’s
scholarship at Yale—were more focused on knowing institutional rules of the system.
The reactions to the second case—student/adviser dispute—were more about knowing
the power structure of the system. While some COOCs questioned the system, more
offered insights and reality checks on how to cope with the system as individuals. In
their responses, COOCs imply that knowing the system can help make one’s
expectation of the system more “realistic” and keep one from overreacting to
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something normal in the host culture but inapprehensible to the involved individuals.
For instance, some commentators pointed out that it was quite “normal” for a graduate
student to lose scholarship during the process of transferring from one school to
another. Another commentator, who criticized Han for the unnecessary controversy
she created, offered insights on institutional structure and rules:
Chinese students sometimes have such problem. They get into the Department
and quickly change their minds. They fire their American professors, who
might later become reluctant to accept other Chinese students. Ms. Han might
be just such type of student. Normally a department in a School of Arts and
Sciences would be responsible for grant money, and the faculty in Engineering
or Professional school would be responsible for financial aid because they
have their own grant money. So by transferring from the Department of
Ecology and Evolutionary Science to the School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies (a kind of professional school), Ms. Han lost the
promised financial aid, which is quite normal. I bet her original professor must
feel unhappy about this. If I were the professor, I would dislike her
(commentary to Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005).
The idea that institutional norms might not be written up as codes is seen as common
sense, something that does not have to be culturally specific, as one commentator
stated: “Changing departments and losing money. No exceptional even in BeiDa and
Tsinghua (two prime Universities in China).” Hence, according to commentators, the
fuss Ms. Han created was absolutely unnecessary and potentially harmful to the
reputation of Chinese overseas students.
In respect to the second case, the recognition of the hierarchy in U.S. higher
education is deemed crucial for Chinese students who should strive to get along with
the individual faculty members. Many commentators predicted that Ms. Tang’s battle
against her advisor would be doomed, something in vain like “an egg hitting on a
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rock,” because she failed to realize the “tyranny of the psychotic professor” and could
not recognize the unavoidable partiality for faculty members in the U.S. education
system. Several commentators generalized the particular profile of Tang’s advisor
into a stereotypical category to offer seemingly “insightful” admonition against thirdworld female professors: “It was wrong to find a female advisor. It was worse to find
an Indian female professor.” They considered Tang’s quandary as consequence of the
particular gender, culture, and status properties of her advisor:
I believe what she (Tang) said is all true. Professors with other cultural
backgrounds—especially those from India, China, and Arabic countries—
cannot attract American students, who don’t care about them. They dare not to
confront American students due to their limited language competence and
cultural background (commentary to Duo Wei Shi Bao, Aug 22, 2006).
Some commentators advised others to avoid third-world female professors in U.S.
graduate schools because they can become “psychotic” and “vindictive” after years of
“double-oppression” as female and foreigner. One commentator shared a personal
experience:
I had a similar experience. My truthful insight is that foreign professors are
normally harder to get along with than American professors, especially those
from the third world. That’s probably because they had experienced some
extra and prolonged hardships when they were students, so after they gained
their professorships, they would become meaner (commentary to Duo Wei Shi
Bao, Aug 22, 2006).
According other COOCs, finding an Asian Indian female professor was the
unequivocal source of all sufferings for Tang. As one stated:
As known by all global citizens, Hindus are the meanest of all species. They
have old feuds with the Chinese. Don’t ever look for an Indian advisor. My
husband was tortured extravagantly by his Ph.D. advisor who is a Hindu, and
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our whole family suffered so much during those darkest days (commentary to
Duo Wei Shi Bao, Aug 22, 2006).
Another commentator further referred to China-India relationship in elaborating the
cause of the personal dispute:
According to my experience, the saddest of all is that she had a Hindu advisor.
As everyone knows, most Hindu intellectuals despise Chinese from the inside
of their bones. In the past, they disdained the Chinese because the Chinese
were weak. Now they dislike the Chinese because they are jealous of a rising
China. Chinese students are too smart, too capable, and they’re afraid of the
Chinese students would become potential threat for their positions in academia.
Tang’s quandary is just a manifestation of the deep cultural feuds between
China and India. So change of venue is the only option (commentary to Duo
Wei Shi Bao, Aug 22, 2006).
As these examples suggest, discussion of the U.S. graduate education’s
hierarchy conveyed, through biased and prejudiced references to gender and national
differences, a sense of group cohesion along the lines of nationality. And at the
pragmatic level, these specific cases offer precautionary advice to other Chinese.
Learning to accommodate. With the recognition of the system’s structural
characteristics, the next prescribed strategy to follow is to deliberately align oneself
with the powerful and seek alliances with hosts, precisely because Chinese students
might be more prone to be oppressed. For commentators, these adjustments require
that Chinese students gain awareness of how they are viewed by those who can
determine their fates and, more importantly, use interpersonal communication skills
purposively to achieve cultural accommodation.
For instance, one COOC suggested helping one’s professor with some offduty, small tasks— like locating articles or copying papers—as a useful practice that
is considered absolutely normal for graduate students in the U.S., including American
141

students. Other commentator described Tang’s quandary in these terms: “Another
nerdy Chinese who doesn’t know the value of people skills. She should learn how
Chinese brownnose their bosses back in China.” Likewise, another COOC stated:
This girl student is apparently very naïve and immature. She doesn’t know
when to lower the head and tuck the tail. Those small errands she ran for her
professor are nothing compared to what I had done for my professor. He even
made me cook Chinese food. He got to eat Chow Mein while I had to bite
bread. Well, obviously, that was a blatant, fawning ingratiation. But why
shouldn’t we (commentary to Duo Wei Shi Bao, Aug 22, 2006)?

This idea that students need to accommodate, because of their marginalization as
cultural others, goes hand-in-hand with a reiteration of unequal and exploitative
relations as a norm in the academic institution:
Like my professor, who’s Chinese, supposedly without any discrimination or
cultural bias, also chased us like a German shepherd and made us do
everything. It’s quite normal for us to get email at midnight. Frankly, I think
this Professor is just a bit eccentric. But nothing she did to Tang sounds too
extravagant . . . As a student, you should learn to communicate with her more
frequently instead of evading her like plague (commentary to Duo Wei Shi
Bao, Aug 22, 2006).
For COOCs, accommodation is a strategy that calls for wisdom and willpower beyond
the academe for interpersonal skills can make one more competitive in any context.
As suggested by one COOC, Tang must consider the consequences of any act, apply
people skills, and “befriend the chair or dean and let him understand your position.
The more people you can befriend, the better your situation would be. Don’t just
complain.”
Modesty or keeping a low profile. Perhaps because they felt uncomfortable
with the high publicity of the two cases, some COOCs in these forums elaborated on
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the importance of modesty and humbleness as a behavioral principle and cultural
strategy for the Chinese overseas. Keeping a low profile is a strategy deemed to
facilitate adaptation and accommodation to a host culture. One commentator pointed
out that, like ingratiation, modesty is a distinctive element of “Chinese wisdom,” a
collective trait that should not be foreign to Chinese students: “As a Chinese, you
really should tuck your tail between your legs and realize that modesty is a tactic of
self-protection as well as an attitude of scholarship (commentary to Ren Zai Bei Mei,
Oct 23, 2005).” Some of the specific tactics discussed for keeping a low profile
included: 1) maintaining proper expectations of others; 2) increasing self-awareness
via self-evaluation and self-criticism; 3) stressing the value of avoidance (of conflict)
and endurance (of hardship). These tactics form a strategy directed toward achieving a
goal of adaptation as well as self-improvement.
Interestingly, the advice given by COOCs to keep a low profile resonates with
one of the fundamental principles of cultural identification inspired by SelfDiscrepancy Theory (Higgins, 1987). From this perspective, the mental stability of an
intercultural communicator is influenced by the discrepancy between evaluation of
one’s self in the perception of oneself and that from the others. In order to maintain
mental stability in intercultural context, during the process of cultural identification
one should keep a relatively modest self-evaluation and low expectations of others’
evaluations of oneself. Through this strategy, it is proposed, one can manage the
frustration caused by intercultural differences. As one commentator reminded others:
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Never self elevate as if you are someone. Out of home, come here (to this
foreign land), we’re all NOBODY. Know the story of ‘sleep on the brushwood
and taste the gall-bladder’ [or WoXin ChangDan, a common Chinese idiom
from a historical story]. Live your life (commentary to Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct
23, 2005).
The practice of self-criticism as part of keeping a low profile generated
discussion in the forum. Among those who pointed out weaknesses of Chinese
overseas students, unwillingness to learn English and dishonesty were mentioned.
One commentator stated: “Most of the time, English communication is just secondary,
while the primary problem is always about the credibility of Chinese (commentary to
Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005).” On this issue, one grouchy commentator criticized
the whole community of Chinese overseas students in the United States:
. . . a group of dishonest people once educated in a rotten society [referring to
Mainland China] . . . the Chinese could learn good English for the written tests
but they just don’t want to practice. Everyone is motivated to take some shortcuts to the high scores in those standardized tests . . . Now in the real academic
setting, their high scores mean nothing. Han is just one case. I support
returning more of those students and then we will learn what is the reality and
what is the cost of dishonesty (commentary to Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005).
Another commentator highlighted notions of cultural shame:
When I was in the New Oriental School [a famous private English school
headquartered in Beijing], I often heard one instructor boast how he helped
others take telephone interviews [from admission committees of universities in
English-speaking countries]. All [including myself] adorned him as if he were
a superhero. None of us ever thought that was a fraud, stately and shameless
cheating. Now when I recalled that scene, I can’t help but feeling shameful
(commentary to Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005).
Another set of tactics within the strategy keeping a low profile is avoidance of
conflict and endurance of hardships if conflict cannot be avoided. Avoidance is a
tactic that stresses precaution and is linked by COOCs to personal qualities like
wisdom, persistence, and tenacity. One commentator posited avoidance as indication
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of one’s emotional intelligence: “Not sufficient EQ (Emotional Quotient). She should
avoid conflict by all means and endure the hardship until graduation. Then there will
be more space, as deep as the ocean and as high as the sky (commentary to Ren Zai
Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005).” Other COOCs emphasized tenacity and persistence as in:
“After I read this note, I thought that she should have chosen another professor as her
supervisor if possible or just get a master’s degree. She can apply other university, too,
if she really wants a Ph.D.,” “Once she felt something wrong with the professor, she
should have made decision to switch her early on,” and “All Chinese should avoid
such bad professors, and they [the bad professors] will eat what they planted before
(commentaries to Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23, 2005).”
When avoiding confrontation fails and conflict ensues, the advice of COOCs
seems to underscore that endurance is the best strategy. As two commentators said in
relation to Tang’s situation:
If you don’t have the option, then you would have to endure the hardships
with great preparation, like my friend’s husband, who’s a free man now with
his Ph.D., after so many years of oppression by his Hindu advisor.
Don’t just complain like a groaning wretched. After all you’re just a student.
Endurances perhaps your only option (commentary to Duo Wei Shi Bao, Aug
22, 2006).
For the Chinese overseas students, who are seen by the virtual community as the
weakest of the weaklings at the bottom caste of the academic hierarchy, avoidance of
conflict and endurance of hardships are strategies to survive in the foreign land and
achieve academic success.
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Stress individuality rather than group membership. According the reports,
Han and Tang both tried to accuse the institution and individual faculty members in
question of racial discrimination or cultural prejudice. However, the strategy of
accusing others of discrimination did not tout much support in the virtual community.
Interestingly, even though COOCs discourse implies the understanding that Chinese
individuals face particular disadvantages and oppression, COOCs were reluctant to
validate the idea that the two cases were related to racism or discrimination. Rather,
they interpreted these cases as involving personality issues. Yet, they advised
individuality and lessening attachment to Chinese culture as a strategy to avoid
conflict based on the perception that: 1) Chinese identity is not an advantage in social
negotiations and 2) in a Western country like the U.S., people usually see “thing-initself instead of seizing upon cultural membership to distort the truth.”
Personalization and lessening attachment to Chinese identity implies avoiding the
politicization of issues. It is a strategy based on an individualistic reading of conflict
situations. Two comments illustrate this position: “Ms. Han deserves some sympathy,
but her problem can happen to anyone of any cultural background. She herself never
said that she was racially discriminated,” and “Her personal academic ordeal has
nothing to do with other Chinese students (commentary to Ren Zai Bei Mei, Oct 23,
2005).”
It may be argued that stressing individuality is a strategy that results from the
fact that in foreign cultures, where Chinese groups form an often invisible and
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marginal minority, identification with Chinese cultural membership is unlikely to
facilitate the resolution of intercultural conflict. Thus, lessening the Chinese cultural
core is a form of cultural identification that, though emphasizing individual
differences, may simultaneously reflect COOCs’ awareness of their disadvantaged
position and status as a group in the cultures of overseas countries. Furthermore, this
strategy raises the question of whether such sense of collective positioning in the
context of Western societies may discourage the development of any group agenda for
cultural activism, even in cyberspace.
In sum, the four cultural strategies identified in the responses to the two cases
of academic quandaries are all directed to individual adaptation for survival and selfimprovement. At the same time, these strategies reveal COOCs understanding of
what it means to be member of the Chinese population outside China. Their messages
suggest that for these commentators, the core of the Chinese cultural identity is not an
advantageous property. Although this understanding could lead to collective action
for fair treatment and social justice, the cultural advice given here by COOCs
privileges the strategy of individual alignment with the mainstream and those in
power as the only option for cultural adaptation. In the words of one commentator on
Han’s case: “the Chinese always like to imagine they are part of the White society and
therefore alienate themselves from other oppressed social groups.”
Ethnic/Racial Crimes against Chinese Victims
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The area of life predicaments encompasses discussion of contemporary
incidents where Chinese individuals were victims of hate crimes by members of other
racial and ethnic groups. The crimes discussed took place in different parts of the
world. Some examples of these crimes are: the pillaging of a Chinese community by
villagers in Malawi, African, along with the circulation of rumors that Chinese
businessmen killed one missing local girl for medical purposes (Ban Dao Chen Bao,
Dec 15, 2005); the beating of four Chinese pupils by a mob of 40 Italian youngsters
(Zhong Xin Wang, Feb 22, 2008); the brutal assault of Chinese vendors by local
police in Spain (Zhong Guo Bao, Oct 26, 2009); the violent, physical confrontation
between a group of Chinese overseas students and non-Chinese students at a for-profit
international college in Canada (Zhong Xin Wang, Dec 11, 2007); and the killing of a
Chinese Ph.D. in mathematics by four young locals in Melbourne, Australia (Zhong
Xin Wang, May 10, 2009). These are among the incidents in which Chinese
individuals were battered, insulted, and killed by individuals from other racial and
ethnic groups. Some of these events were reported in major U.S. metropolitan areas
like New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco (Ming Bao, May 23, 2007; Xing
Dao Ri Bao, April, 21, 2010; Xing Zhou Ri Bao, April 22, 2010; Zhong Ping She,
July 26, 2007; Zhong Xin Wang, May 21, 2007; Zhong Xin Wang, July 5, 2007). The
mishaps experienced by Chinese people overseas create a dismal scenario of
victimization, leading one commentator to bemoan: “We are so doomed, being beaten
up everywhere. It seems that the whole world hates us.”
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In effect, a close reading of the COOCs responses reveals that they identify
with Chinese victims in a manifestation of group membership. The incidents appeal to
a basic need for physical safety and cultural ascription as the responding COOCs, too,
are Chinese living in foreign lands and surrounded by people with racial and ethnic
backgrounds similar to that of the alleged perpetrators. In addition, COOCs’ messages
manifest a form of strategic identification that entails a sobering analysis of Chinese
group characteristics, discussion of guiding values, and prescription of strategies. A
significant part of the discussion offers rational interpretations of why and how these
brutalities happened to the victims, with close reference to perceptions of the negative
dimensions of the Chinese cultural identity. And beyond the sympathetic response and
analysis of the Chinese predicament, COOCs engage in the discussion of values and
strategies for managing situations of racial violence. Appealing to the values of
cultural survival, endurance and self-improvement, four strategies emerge from the
commentaries: 1) stressing avoidance and endurance; 2) improving cultural images; 3)
separating individuality from sociality; and 4) strengthening Chinese voices in the
host culture.
Stressing avoidance and endurance. Tactical avoidance of conflict and
strategic endurance are stressed in these forums about incidents of Chinese
victimization. Based on the perception that the Chinese overseas have a disadvantage
in terms of demographic proportion and political power, the value of endurance and
survival in the foreign context prevails in the discourse. The following examples
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illustrate this pattern: “In a foreign country, even a law-biding Chinese would be
bullied, oppressed or marginalized because nobody likes foreigners from the bottom
of the heart. So let’s just endure.” For another commentator, out of China, a Chinese
should be: prioritizing the principle of self-preservation and keeping trouble-free. Any
minority group with less than 2 percent of the total local population would have zero
political influence.”
The relatively isolated position of Chinese communities surrounded by local
ethnic groups is another factor that curtails their capacity to complain, protest, or even
to fight back against oppression and thus calls for endurance. One commentator
explained the beating of Chinese students by peers from other racial/ethnic groups in
Columbia College of Canada in this manner: “These Chinese kids are oftentimes in a
position so much isolated that they divided people into just two groups – Chinese or
non-Chinese. So in those conflicts, all non-Chinese become allies (against the
Chinese).” In their discussion, COOCs seem to have a realistic understanding of the
implications of being Chinese in a host society where the Chinese often have a hard
time making alliances with other groups. Based on this understanding, avoidance and
endurance are prioritized as a cultural strategy to cope with conflicts, especially with
the dominant local groups.
Improving cultural images. Many COOCs attributed the cause of
ethnic/racial crimes against Chinese individuals to the unattractiveness and
powerlessness of Chinese culture in the host society. While citing Western media’s
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negative portrayal of Chinese culture as contributing to the negative standing of the
Chinese in host cultures, COOCs also made reference to how the behavior and
physical characteristics of the Chinese overseas may be linked to their victimization.
To cope with external social pressure and immanent physical threat, some COOCs
proposed the strategy of maintaining, managing, and eventually improving the image
of the Chinese in the host culture. Guided by the principle of self-improvement, the
preferred tactics to win cultural respect from other groups were: 1) improving
physical condition and self-defense skills with Kung Fu and other practices, and 2)
increasing socio-cultural awareness through knowledge of social rules, norms, and
etiquette. While the improvement of physical condition is seen as a tactic that can
deter hostility and violence, acquiring social etiquette is seen as a way to ensure
cultural acceptance and integration with other cultures.
Regarding brutal physical abuse against Chinese individuals by perpetrators
with other racial and ethnic cultural backgrounds, commentators placed physicality
and image at the center of the discussion and gave direct suggestions to improve body
condition and build self-defense techniques. One commentator indicated:
For so many years, the Chinese had not become main targets of assaults
because we are honest, and Chinese Kung Fu stars and movies had some
deterring influence. Now [that the Chinese become easy targets] we need a
new superhero like Bruce Lee or a Chinese grappling world champion to
refuel the deterring influence. But this would be very difficult. I predict that
there will be more incidents like this, please take good care of yourselves
(commentary to Xing Zhou Ri Bao, April 22, 2010).
In traditional Chinese culture, one kind of ideal personhood for young people who are
still growing is Wen Wu Shuang Quan or “being versed in both literary and martial
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virtues.” In the online forums, some COOCs pointed out that contemporary Chinese
people overseas are predominantly academic, nerdy and feeble, lacking physical
strength and fighting will and, therefore, are becoming easy targets of the bullies. One
commentator—self-identified iamhereforfun—who claimed to be a master of martial
arts with training and street fighting experience—wrote: “You can’t say that the
Chinese are not good and experienced fighters. But those who came to the [United]
States are mostly not.” As an “experienced” fighter, this commentator offered tips to
the “nerdy and gentle” Chinese overseas:
Effective physical fight, to a large degree, is a kind of ‘habit.’ You cannot be
hard and fast if you don’t have such a habit (instinct) . . . Everybody, if you
don’t have such a habit and if someone intends to hit you, you should first
protect your front face immediately and hit back hard onto your opponent’s
eyes and nose. You can also thwack his throat (but don’t be too hard or you
can kill him) (commentary to Zhong Xin Wang, May 21, 2007).
Another COOC wrote:
It is useless to merely decry the bullies. We should build up our bodies and be
prepared with some basic self-defense skills. Situated in that environment, the
Chinese should carry some defense weapons such as sprays, knives, and
batons. Even if you cannot overpower the offenders, with these gears you can
make them suffer. Cowardice can only make you more vulnerable
(commentary to Xing Dao Ri Bao, April, 21, 2010).
As many stressed, besides self-protection, social awareness is much needed for
the maintenance of a positive cultural image and for cultural survival in the host
culture. One commentator nicknamed Old Cowboy suggested: “While we enhance our
ability and skills for self-protection and self-defense, we should do more things for the
public benefit and respect other ethnic groups (commentary to Zhong Ping She, July
26, 2008).” Another commentator even told a story about the parsimony of some
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Chinese residents as expressed by non-Chinese neighbors: “Chinese should really take
care of their public image . . . Other ethnic groups complain a lot about the Chinese
who are stingy and selfish (commentary to Zhong Ping She, July 26, 2008).” And one
commentator advised all Chinese overseas: “Outside China, we must keep our
graceful manner and follow local etiquette not to give excuses to the others . . . best if
we are all mindful and know the rules, so nobody can rag us (commentary to Xing
Dao Ri Bao, April, 21, 2010).” COOCs understand that people seen as physically
weak and socially inept by others are more prone to be bullied. To these
commentators, by being physically strong, socially wise, and mindful of cultural
etiquette, Chinese individuals can improve their personal and collective image and
thus minimize the chances of intercultural conflict.
Stressing individuality. Separating individuals from their social conditions
has the effect of downplaying the cultural representativeness of individual cases and
undercut the nationalistic passion or patriotic sentiment among the forum participants.
Through their messages, some COOCs appealed to the value of individualism in
efforts to avoid the cultural shame evoked by reported cases of Chinese victimization
in foreign contexts, These tended to personalize the issues and cutting off the cultural
connection. As one commentator stated:
. . . not all Chinese in the United States would be targets of prejudice,
discriminated, or brutalized like this. Don’t be so jittery. Stop abducting the
whole Chinese overseas community for personal interest. People should
respect law and order everywhere. Don’t blame others. It’s just matter of some
personal ordeal (commentary to Zhong Xin Wang, Dec 11, 2007).
Another attempted to depoliticize the incidents in this way:
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. . . not a political conflict, why wave Chinese national flags, sing the Chinese
national anthem? The last time in Europe, when the police were inspecting the
illegal Chinese vendors, those Chinese were also ‘holding high the flags’ and
‘singing loud the anthem,’ which was totally ridiculous (commentary to Zhong
Xin Wang, Dec 11, 2007).
For another commentator, if individual Chinese youngsters find themselves involved
in gang violence and mob behavior, their actions should not lead to sympathy based
on notions of patriotism:
… wasting their parents’ corruption money, these spoiled young gangbangers
developed their personal hobby of gang fighting, which is all right for them.
But what’s the point of waving national flags and singing national anthem?
Please don’t ever ruin the two words ‘Chinese Patriotism (commentary to
Zhong Xin Wang, Dec 11, 2007).’
In the perspective of these commentators, the sympathy evoked by individual cases of
Chinese victimization is pointless, unnecessary, and even harmful to the reputation or
image of Chinese culture. These commentators, in an individualistic and pragmatic
manner, detach themselves from supportive involvement with other Chinese personal
ordeals, even in the anonymous, emotional and virtual sphere of cyberspace.
Raising Chinese voices. In the discussion of victimization stories, many
COOCs appealed to the value of dignity and expressed concerns for the limited
participation of Chinese individuals in public debates in the host society. For some
COOCs, the Chinese overseas are too reserved, humble, inactive, passive, and even
timid to raise loud voices in benefit of their group. According to the analysis of some
commentators, rather than stressing avoidance and endurance, Chinese people in the
United States should organize public petitions and protests as a way to fight back
against the oppression of dominant institutions and the bullying of other ethnic groups.
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One called for changing the situation by drawing on the American proverb “Crying
baby gets milk first.” Another commentator referred to a series of Chinese
victimizations in the San Francisco Bay area as an opportunity for the Chinese to
make their loud voices be heard by the U.S. public:
We must defend our dignity. In North America, from our experience with our
children’s education, we know discrimination is a fact of the matter and the
louder you cry out, the more respect and attention you get. We must utilize
this opportunity to cry out for our dignity (commentary to Xing Zhou Ri Bao,
April 22, 2010).

Here, solidarity and organization are the basis for raising Chinese voices. While many
COOCs were just debating the causes and consequences of the brutalities against
Chinese, others tried to organize petitions and protests. For example, a commentator
sefl-identified as RenRenRen (three homophonic Chinese characters meaning
humanity, endurance, and tenacity) made this call for action:
I hope that all Chinese in California or the entire North America rise up and
speak out loudly in the form of online petitions and protest. Our purpose is to
make the legal system put the perpetrators on death row . . . We all should
realize that if Westerners still deem Chinese easy targets, then next victim
could be any of us (commentary to Xing Zhou Ri Bao, April 22, 2010).
RenRenRen asked: “Who knows some good blogs? How can we connect with more
Chinese?” Many commentators gave positive responses to this posting, and the
commentator offered his advice:
I feel: 1, we all agree to take action and avow determination to express
Chinese indignation and uphold dignity; 2, we don’t want to intensify the
existing tension among ethnic groups for this matter; 3, we are in unison
regarding the severe punishment of perpetrators. For action, we need some
principal guidelines: 1, for political negotiation, we must aim high to punish
the perpetrators with death penalty; 2, do not engage in any racial
accusation . . . the inhumane perpetrators are against all human beings, and our
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Chinese people need to win support from other racial/ethnic groups including
the Blacks; 3, our ultimate goal is to deliver the message that Chinese people
are not easy targets for someone in a bad mood; 4, avoidance and endurance
can make us look good only if nobody dares to bully us any more . . . Here’s
my call for action: 1, I propose to organize a signature petition among Chinese
all over the U.S. to make our convincing and powerful voice be heard; 2, hold
a county-wide parade protesting against racial hatred, the brutalization of
innocent people, and social violence. We need to get people of other ethnic
backgrounds involved. 3, people’s sympathy for the victims and indignation
against the perpetrators would be the basis of our success (commentary to
Xing Zhou Ri Bao, April 22, 2010).
This commentator was looking for support and to engage COOCs in action-planning
rooted in a high sense of identification with Chinese group membership. RenRenRen
reached out to other Chinese through online discussion and attempted to transform
indignation into political action. But I was unable to confirm if protests were
organized in San Francisco and Los Angeles.
In sum, in discussions about victimization COOCs responded with cultural
strategies that appealed to the values of adaptation, endurance, self-improvement,
modesty, individualism, and diginity as guiding principles for survival in foreign
contexts. The proposals reflect how COOCs enacted their positionality as a minority
group that is isolated, powerless, physically weak, socially awkward, and reserved.
The first three strategies—avoidance of conflict, improving cultural images and
stressing individuality—are pragmatic and directed to individual application to help
manage identity conflicts at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. The fourth is
more idealistic and political, rooted in the desire of some COOCs to use group
membership to change unfavorable social and cultural conditions faced by Chinese
overseas.
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Desperately Overreacting: Chinese Perpetrators
Stories about Chinese perpetrators who committed crimes outside China
sparked more heated discussion than stories of Chinese victimization because the
cases are more rare, sensational, and oftentimes high-profiled. If when discussing
victimization COOCs focused on Chinese weaknesses and isolation, when discussing
perpetrators they focused on mental health or moral flaws. I selected two high-profile
cases of Chinese perpetrations that occurred in the United States to illustrate this
pattern. Each case generated a series of headline news stories and blog entries that
attracted a wide range of participants leaving numerous comments. The two incidents
provoked the reaction of COOCs who seemed to agree that Chinese perpetrators cause
cultural shame and harm the cultural image of the Chinese in the host society. The
first case is about a Chinese Silicon valley computer engineer, Jinghua Wu, who on
November 14, 2008, killed three executives of the company that laid him off (Duo
Wei She, Nov 11, 2008; Zong He Zi CBS5, Nov 15, 2008. The second case is about a
Chinese doctor, Lishan Wang, who killed his former supervisor on April 26, 2010
(Qiao Bao, April 27, 2010; Shi Jie Ri Bao, April 30, 2010; Wenxue City Best Blogs,
June 4, 2010). In many of the comments, COOCs shared their interpretations of the
incidents with clear reference to how the Chinese cultural identity operates in a
foreign context. Based on their perspectives and interpretations, many prescribe
strategies to maintain mental health and reserve spiritual energy.
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The two perpetrators, Wu and Wang, are seen as desperate individuals facing
personal material losses and problems with life attitudes, inadequate social skills, and
lack of spiritual pursuit. Although their criminal behaviors are not considered
representatives of Chinese people in general, COOCs deemed their extreme actions a
reaction to conditions of oppression in the foreign, hierarchical, and competing work
environment. Since those conditions may be common to other COOCs, the strategies
proposed aim to prevent extreme reactions. Appealing to the value of endurance and
self-improvement, COOCs offered the strategies of 1) changing life attitudes; 2)
pursuing spirituality–putting more weight on spirituality than on materiality; and 3)
developing social skills.
Changing life attitudes. Psychological endurance is the ability to maintain a
positive mental attitude even under the weight of a negative reality. In the analysis of
the actions of perpetrators, many COOCs agreed that it was not life pressures but the
uncontrollable anger felt by the perpetrators what triggered the tragedies: the anger
that originated in the killers’ frustrating interactions with their victims. They generally
agreed that one’s psychological endurance can be strengthened by changing life
attitudes and exercising self, social, and cultural awareness. In the view of COOCs, a
positive attitude entails developing not only realistic expectations but also proper
behavioral guidelines and effective interpersonal relations. Interestingly, many
COOCs used the Chinese idiom Neng Qu Neng Shen or “bendable therefore
expandable” to refer to the attitudes and ideal personhood that can enhance the
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psychological endurance of marginalized individuals with limited social support and
power. Tolerance, empathy, avoidance, and transcendence are basic components of
such flexible life attitude and flexible personality. The COOCs’ online discussions of
strategies to develop endurance incorporate these notions. For example, one
commentator used the following analogy to stress flexibility:
I believe many of us have experienced similar unfair treatments at work. We
are just a group of yellow monkeys, leaving our own territory and searching
for fruits along with white monkeys. Our mentality and physique need to be
extremely tough. Since we are in the other’s territory, to survive, we have to
prove that we are useful. Not just pick our own fruits. We should also pick
fruits for the others without any complaint (commentary to Wenxue City Best
Blogs, June 4, 2010).
Another COOC prescribed the attitude needed to make it in the “other’s territory”:
Pretend that you are in a prison and your supervisor is the warden, who can
beat you up and get away trouble-free. At work, we should be able to play
with the powers with ease and peace. DON’T GET MAD, GET EVEN. Don’t
feel bad, take it easy. Nothing wrong with being flexible and flattering
(commentary to Wenxue City Best Blogs, June 4, 2010).
One commentator focused on avoidance using this approach: “With our cultural
background, we should try all means to avoid conflict. Sometimes we need to take
shit and probably be the shit (Wenxue City Best Blogs, June 4, 2010).” In another
example, a commentator stressed endurance and tolerance by referring to his or her
own career experience:
I have been working in an American IT industry for over 10 years and once
encountered seven or eight managers, the worst of whom was a female from
mainland China. Her jealousy and meanness were both first-rate. It was
nightmare working under her. She was probably the only person I once hated.
But now, everything is over and I don’t feel the hatred anymore because I
don’t want to punish myself with the hateful feeling. She was perhaps just
pathetic (commentary to Wenxue City Best Blogs, June 4, 2010).
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Developing a loose attitude based on low expectations, humor, and awareness of the
inevitable favoritism of employers toward members of the dominant groups in the
host society is also seen as something that can help people gain psychological
endurance. For COOCs, the deliberate lowering of social expectations and increased
self-esteem can make people more tenacious in dealing with hardship.
Strengthening psychological endurance by pursuing spirituality. In the
discussion of endurance and life attitudes, many COOCs approach spirituality as the
way to transcend the frustration generated by the material world. As some pointed out,
the material hardships one experiences are the result of loss of income and status (as
was the case with the Chinese perpetrators) or of comparing one’s past or present
economic situation to the situation of others. But since controlling or changing
material conditions is not always possible, COOCs stressed the need to overlook
material loss and rely on spiritual abundance to maintain a healthy attitude and
equilibrium in life. As one commentator stated when discussing the desperation that
drove Wu to commit a crime: “We all need to be unadorned materially and insatiable
spiritually. Let’s have more spiritual pursuit and less economic comparison
(commentary to Zong He Zi CBS5, Nov 15, 2008).” In the heat of discussions,
another commentator clarified the necessity of separating material success and
spiritual success, and proposed this strategy to manage frustrating workplace
relationships:
Success in the eyes of ordinary people is superficial, materialistic. If one is
easily gratified by material satisfaction but neglects spiritual pursuit, he will
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never be happy. So I think success should be both material and spiritual. In
responding to the case (Wu), I want to admonish those with a background
similar to Wu’s that spiritual and moral pursuits should coincide with moneymaking. With spiritual and moral preparation, you can treat the others with
tolerance and let go hatred (commentary to Zong He Zi CBS5, Nov 15, 2008).
Although the majority of comments do not associate spirituality with any particular
religious affiliation, a couple of commentators linked spiritual pursuit to religious
faith. One tried to promote optimism by alluding to the precept that God gives people
no more than what they can handle: “Be optimistic . . . because we are all in the grip
of the heaven (God).” Another believed that a fundamental tenet of Christianity is the
notion that discrimination and oppression are ubiquitous and people are born with
original sins; therefore, tolerance and forgiveness are stressed as key attitudes. For
these commentators, when material loss or hardship becomes a challenge,
psychological endurance is critically related to the ability to distinguish between
materiality and spirituality and opt for stressing the latter.
Developing social skills. In addition to, or in lieu of, pursuing spirituality,
many COOCs stressed the importance of developing social skills for mental stability
and psychological endurance. Developing social skills was seen as having awareness
of local social and cultural contexts and the ability to communicate in intercultural
environments. However, COOCs also seemed to acknowledge that people living in
other countries as travelers, immigrants or sojourners tend to have limited social
awareness, language skills, and intercultural competencies, even though they might be
mindful of the problem and be deliberately studying the local cultures. For instance,
when discussing the cases of the two Chinese perpetrators, some commentators
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argued that the most important aspect of social awareness was the understanding of
the “legal baseline.” As one commentator expounded, laws are objective guidelines
that can protect individual citizens:
In the legal society . . . sentimental reasoning is only secondary because one
hundred people could have one hundred sets of sentimental reasons. If you
want to work in the U.S., it is mandatory to accumulate some knowledge of
labor laws. You should be able to protect yourself with knowledge of laws and
then you would have some foundational baseline to survive without violating
the laws (commentary to Zong He Zi CBS5, Nov 15, 2008).

Then, the same commentator uses his or her experience to show how using
institutional rules can protect one’s interests:
Whenever my boss wants to trick me, I feel confident and assertive to handle
him. So I never get mad and even; now he knows that he has to provide me
with great reference. Remember: let your boss provide you a Working
Evaluation Performance every year. If the company still wants to continue
employing you, the evaluation would normally be very good (until one day
they don’t want you, when the evaluation would normally be very
contradictory). Keep all the evidence of unfair treatment or other
misdemeanors of the company for some day when you might need to fight
back (commentary to Zong He Zi CBS5, Nov 15, 2008).
In online forums, awareness of the social context also includes understanding
of the prevalent social ethos and hierarchies. For instance, one commentator asserted
that lack of sympathy for “weaklings” characterizes the American cultural tradition:
The mental oppression of weaklings in areas unprotected by the laws is rather
truculent, especially for those marginalized and isolated individuals who have
a hard time fitting into the society and can sometimes be mentally disoriented
and act abnormally (commentary to Wenxue City Best Blogs, June 4, 2010).
Another commentator stressed the perception of the structural hierarchy that prevails
in the U.S.:
In the U.S., the boss is always right. Respecting the boss is respecting the
system. Even if your boss is just a monkey sitting over there, he is still your
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boss. Americans (White men) are so good at groveling: they can behave like
the grandchildren of their supervisors, obeying them anytime at school and
work. This is the Western culture. It takes time (for the Chinese) to understand
such unchallenged hierarchical system (commentary to Wenxue City Best
Blogs, June 4, 2010).
These forms of advice serve to warn a Chinese audience who might have unrealistic
expectations about presumed equity and egalitarian in the U.S., and to discourage any
foolhardy challenges against authority.
Besides workplace hierarchy, the importance of managing interpersonal
relations among co-workers was another topic addressed in the forums. Some
commentators described workplace relationships as rivalries rather than team work; as
one commentator put it: “… the company sometimes has to constantly lay off staff,
and the employees are in life-or-death competition with each other.” Another
commentator compared the workplace to a battlefield: “The workplace is like a
battlefield. We can’t be so foolhardily rushing out without inspecting the topography
and finding shelters. Survival is the first priority. You want to survive, so do anybody
else (Wenxue City Best Blogs, June 4, 2010).” Alluding to the principle of smart fight
in the workplace, one commentator cited a modified version of Mao Tse Tung’s ideas
on guerrilla warfare:
We fight if there’s a contest, we walk if there’s no contest, and we take shit if
we cannot even walk away. You can only become somebody after taking a lot
of shit. A smart guy chooses to fight his own battles. It is groovy to leave the
enemy unharmed but our life goal is not to harm anyone (Wenxue City Best
Blogs, June 4, 2010).
Other COOCs discussed how favoritism and discrimination in the workplace
can be managed by knowing how to work with the communication styles of
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individuals. They emphasized communication competency as a key to improve one’s
social life, since for Chinese overseas, in general, “communication is a big problem”
and many life predicaments are caused by inadequate people’s skills and language
proficiency in the host culture. One commentator described the problem in this
manner:
I have one admonishment (for Chinese overseas): never be too proud of
yourself. When working in a foreign land, our problems include proving not
just our intelligence but also our communication competency, like mastery of
the foreign language and understanding of the foreign culture . . . Everyone
with working experience in North America knows that language is a big
obstacle. No problem with the work, but never easy to connect with other
people. Interpersonal relationships are critically important (commentary to Shi
Jie Ri Bao, April 30, 2010).
In sum, individual cases of Chinese perpetration triggered the process of
online collective cultural identification. Although the strategies for cultural survival
offered are multiple and sometimes at odds, these reflect some underlying, common
perceptions of the positioning of the Chinese as a marginal group facing unfavorable
work environments with limited political, social, cultural, psychological, and spiritual
resources to cope with cultural differences. COOCs tended to stress personal traits in
the prescription of a relaxed, flexible, edgeless life attitude apt to tolerance, avoidance,
empathy, and transcendence of conflict. For COOCs and the cultural group they
represent, survival seems to be always the first priority in lands that require a long
time and tremendous effort to be regarded as home.
COOCs’ prescription of strategies also allows exploration of how processes
of identification interconnect individuality and sociality, materiality and spirituality.
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On the one hand, COOCs’ attempt to distinguish the Chinese perpetrators from their
group, seeing the cause of criminal acts in individual problems such as unfit
personality or social maladjustment. On the other hand, their discussions and cultural
advice in effect identify the situation of perpetrators with one that the entire Chinese
group can relate to. Their comments serve to meditate the group’s particular position
in host cultures when they stress that a disadvantageous status can potentially affect
any member of the group. Yet, COOCs seldom envision a unified struggle to advance
the position of the Chinese group and instead focus on the necessity of enhancing
individual social skills and cultural accommodation. In this respect, cultural
identification among members of this virtual community features an interplay of
individuality and sociality, in which individual inadequacy is linked to social inability.
With the distinction of materiality and spirituality, some COOCs prioritize spirituality
over materiality in the management of life predicament. But for most, a recognition of
Chinese cultural group’s disadvantageous social position in the host culture leads to
emphasize individual self-improvement through cultural and social awareness and
communication competency rather personal faith or political activism to empower the
Chinese community in the host society. Thus although the problems identified may
have social and material conditions, the solutions tend privileged individual and
spiritual dimensions of identity.
Chapter Summary and Conclusions
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COOCs’ responses to stories of life predicaments reflect how they dealt with
unpleasant aspects of life abroad and reflected on Chinese cultural identity through
the exchange of experiences, insights, and strategic advice. In doing so, they enacted a
sense of group membership and positioning vis-à-vis the dominant cultures in their
adopted societies. As the analysis above shows, the strategies advised were not
mutually exclusive but interrelated and point toward the intersection of identity
properties.
In commenting stories of the life predicaments of other Chinese overseas,
COOCs engaged in strategic cultural identification, defined here as communication
acts that show awareness of existing and potential obstacles and challenges in
intercultural interaction and feature strategic advice for coping with the perceived
negative dimensions of one’s identity. In effect, in the forums examined COOCs
debated some of the negative aspects of their cultural identity, such as national
disgrace and tendency to victimization. In their comments, COOCs shared a realistic
assessment of the social positioning of Chinese individuals living abroad and offered
pragmatic approaches to survive and thrive as Chinese individuals in foreign contexts.
Through candid, sincere, emotionally intense, and compassionate messages, COOCs
generally identified with the situations experienced by the Chinese subjects profiled in
the stories discussed—even when they did not approve or sympathized with the
subject’s individual actions or decisions. COOCs manifested a sense of shared
Chinese cultural membership in these forums through the recognition of the
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disadvantaged position of Chinese overseas in the social hierarchies of their host
countries and the acknowledgement that they have had or could have similar
intercultural experiences as Chinese living abroad. This manifestation of cultural
attachment and group conscience to manage conflicts constitutes a form of strategic
identification.
It is important to note that COOCs’ strategic identification exhibits a certain
degree of complexity resulting from the various personal perspectives and vantage
points of participating commentators. For instance, while some saw problems
fundamentally as individual inadequacy, others spoke of structural barriers caused by
the group’s lack of power and negative cultural image. Therein, some proposed
cultural strategies oriented to self-improvement through individual intercultural
communication competency while others developed cultural strategies stressing
collective efforts to improve group cultural image, such as raising the Chinese voices
in the host society. Likewise, while some believed that prioritizing spirituality over
materiality could help overcome frustration and oppression, others stressed the
improvement of social and interpersonal skills as the strategy to avoid or solve
conflicts in the intercultural context. However, despite the diverse positions taken by
COOCs, the proposed cultural strategies highlight certain points of identification that
give a sense of cohesion to the members of this virtual community. These may be
summarized as follows.
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The discourse analyzed featured instances of COOCs sympathetic support for
other Chinese subjects facing the predicaments of life abroad. This positive
identification with other Chinese overseas shows indicators of group conscience and
cultural attachment that gives the virtual community a sense of cohesiveness. Binding
them as a group is the awareness of the disadvantaged social position and negative
cultural image of Chinese individuals and groups in the sociocultural contexts of host
societies. Notwithstanding the fervent discussions showing group solidarity and
cohesiveness as the dominant trend, some texts also reveal cultural detachment when
COOCs are reluctant to identify with their Chinese compatriots by relying on
individualistic approaches to life predicaments. In this sense, one may argue that
while the Internet helps facilitate the communal connection among COOCs, it also
allows for detached spectatorship as it maintains physical distance and anonymity.
The online discourse on life predicaments also featured a motivation to help
others avoid conflict and succeed in new societies. When discussing how to cope with
cultural challenges, COOCs showed a general inclination toward realistic and
practical approaches to intercultural conflict. In the prescription of strategies to cope
with the situation, COOCs suggested the moderation of the individual’s perception of
her or his aptitudes and the setting of realistic expectations when defining goals. Such
worldview leads to strategies directed to detachment from the Chinese cultural core
and self-improvement rather than idealistic activism. In this sense, messages stressing
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value of detachment and self-improvement indicate the COOCs’ general predilection
for flexible and resilient attitudes toward life.
In terms of the interplay of structural dimensions of identity enacted in these
forums, COOCs’ discourses on cultural strategies tend to differentiate primarily
between individuality and sociality, with a general tendency to privilege individual
solutions to life predicaments. In specific cases, COOCs posited that individuality (for
instance, a personality flaw, attitude or decision) and sociality (for example, a
negative cultural image or racial discrimination) can both be the causes of a life
predicament. However, with more emphasis on cultural detachment and selfimprovement, COOCs generally favored solutions at the individual level. In sum,
COOCs’ strategic cultural identification suggests the cultivation of cultural
detachment and self-improvement through lessening cultural core and stressing
individuality. These strategies are offered as ways to manage frustration, maintain
mental health, and improve social status.
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CHAPTER VI: TACKLING IDEOLOGICAL CLASHES AND POSITIONAL
IDENTIFICATION
As we may have expected, the one dimension of cultural identification that
generated the most intense interaction and jarring comments among contributors to
the online forums was the ideological debate on the position of China and Chinese
culture in the changing global context. This chapter focuses on how Chinese overseas
online commentators (COOCs) assume positions of identification in response to
different topics and forms of ideological debate and, more specifically, addresses
these questions: 1) What are the salient positions of identification constructed by
Chinese commentators when reacting to publicized ideological exposition? 2) What
are the salient positions of identification constructed by Chinese commentators when
reacting to criticism posed by outgroup and ingroup critics of China? 3) What do the
diverse positions enacted by COOCs on these ideological clashes reveal about
processes of cultural identification?
Three Forms of Ideological Debate
For the purposes of discussion, the ideological debate among commentators
will be mapped along the lines of three broad categories that emerged from the data
analyzed and underscored different rhetorical emphases: debates where commentators
responded to the ideological exposition on China’s internal and external affairs;
debates that focused on the response to criticism posed by non-Chinese sources
(outgroup critics); debates that focused on the response to criticism posed by Chinese
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sources (ingroup critics). Ideological exposition refers to discourse demonstrating
some particular ideological positions without explicit criticism against Chinese
cultural membership. Outgroup critics were identified as sources with clear cultural
memberships other than Chinese. Ingroup critics were identified as sources with clear
Chinese cultural membership. Each category of debate was coded in forums that
covered different topics of interest to online commentators. Among the most popular
topics—measured in terms of number and length of responses to news articles posted
on the Web site—were the environment, human rights, democracy, Chinese-Western
tensions, China’s relationship with Tibet, and the Beijing Olympics in 2010. Through
the engagement of multiple topics within these categories of debate, the virtual
community showed its internal divisions as well as some common patterns of
identification.
Based on a close reading of the data selected, this chapter presents three main
propositions. First, that the ideological positioning of COOCs nearly always relates to
processes of cultural identification because in tackling ideological differences these
individuals struggle to construct and negotiate their complex identities. In the online
debates we encounter how members of this virtual community construct a sense of
self and others through ideological positioning, while enacting varying degrees of
cultural attachment to Chinese society and culture. Secondly, the data also suggest
that a salient influence in such negotiation of identity among Chinese living overseas
are the contending perceptions of China’s global position and international relations—
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particularly the China-Western relations—and how these influence their personal and
social lives. Third, the findings also illuminate how the construction and enactment
of identity involves the activation of multiple points of identification, often
simultaneously: individuality, sociality, materiality, and spirituality, as dimensional
properties of identity defined earlier.
One of the central propositions in this chapter is that through the ideological
positioning that takes place in the interplay of internal divisions and clashes with
external sources, members of this virtual community enact a form of cultural
identification that I have labeled positional identification. This is a particular form of
identification with Chinese cultural membership that is enacted through the assertion
of a stable position in the ideological spectrum, the argumentation over the
righteousness of such position, and the rhetorical elaboration of the position with the
goal of influencing the political views of others. By examining the dynamics of
positional identification across topics and debates—and through arguments that
ranged from personal views to those based on a group perspective or social analysis—
one can observe how ideological positions constitute a continuum that runs from
attachment to detachment from the cultural core of identification with Chinese
cultural membership. The cultural core is defined in this research as a socially
constructed and varying sense of affiliation with one’s cultural membership that is
communicated spontaneously and connects various dimensions of identity.
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The analysis and discussion in this chapter is also informed by intergroup
sensitivity effect research to explore whether COOCs’ positional cultural
identifications manifested in their commentary responses to ideological debates were
influenced by the source of criticism. Intergroup sensitivity effect (Hornsey, 2002)
suggests that people tend to have different responses to criticism of their group raised
by critics from different group memberships. Previous research has suggested that in
the reception of and response to criticism by individuals whose culture is being
criticized, the source or origin of the critic matters (Hornsey, 2005). According to
Hornsey et al (2006), members of a group under criticism are more concerned with
the motive of critics than their credibility and the criticism per se. Further, members
of a culture facing scrutiny are expected to respond to the claims of outgroup critics in
more defensive manner than to the claims of members of the ingroup. For instance,
outgroup critics are perceived as meaner, with explicit ideological motives
representing conflicting group positions. Ingroup critics, on the other hand, are seen
more as individuals with unique political agendas.
Before presenting the findings, it seems relevant to note some of the particular
dynamics and context of online ideological debate in this particular virtual community.
Direct observation of website interactions shows that ideological debates seem
particularly appealing to the editorial staff of Wenxuecity.com. Their role in
facilitating and even encouraging debate cannot be ignored. With the freedom of
speech rights granted in host societies like the United States, the editors of
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Wenxuecity.com seem to take an eclectic approach when posting articles that favor all
sorts of political stances and ideological preferences—including dissidents’ critiques
of the current regime of China—in order to attract and maintain a wider range of
readership among Chinese overseas. In this sense, although one could argue that
COOCs’ participation in these forums is therefore influenced and framed by editorial
selection, the intensity of the exchanges and the diversity of views represented in the
discussions suggest a great deal of spontaneity and volunteerism among COOCs.
Undoubtedly, this exposure to a wider range of ideologies leads COOCs to present a
more kaleidoscopic ideological picture in their online commentary when compared to
the options available to their peers within China.
It is also important to observe that the personae of commentators and mediated
relationships established among COOCs also influenced the dynamics of ideological
debate. For instance, incompatible ideological stances that may not be manifested at
all in face-to-face encounters in social or professional settings are likely to surface in
anonymous online discussion because participants do not have to be cautious of the
effects of these ideological clashes on their personal status (Dong, 2009). As made
evident in the discussions examined, COOCs were not afraid of expressing their
views or even offending others because personal or institutional bonds among them
are not part of the context of interaction. At times, the hostility expressed seems to be
intended to hurt an opponent’s feelings and creating nasty exchanges in the virtual
community. Triggered by specific topics, such malicious comments occurred more
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frequently in this particular field of debate than in the discussions outlined in chapters
four and five. In these instances, in the “feedback” section, registered users might ask
the forum administrator to edit or “clean up” the page. In effect, the administrator of
a section titled “News Express” has the authority and ability to delete any postings
and even change wordings of some posts, either by his or her will or upon request
from readers. Administrators have set policies regulating civility such as no profanity,
no personal attack, no verbal threat, and no pornography, which are written and
published as permanent headlines in the specific administrative forums like the “News
Express.” Although the administrator of “News Express” has the ability to change
postings, evidences show that such acts were limited among the researched texts.
Identification through Exposition of Ideological Positions
In this category, the debate was generated by COOCs’ responses to news
articles published in other media and posted in Wenxuecity.com that featured news
and opinion on China’s internal and external affairs, international relations, and status
in the global society. Although the topics of the articles and the cultural background
of the authors varied, COOCs comments to these articles features a common trait:
they focused on the commentators’ exposition of her or his viewpoint to establish an
ideological position. To analyze how COOCs’ ideological exposition connected to
cultural identification, I selected four discussion forums around four news items that
focused on the internal and external tensions that the Chinese government and nation
are facing. The first article, titled “Attitude Firm: People’s Daily claims that China
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will never adopt Tripartite System for separating power,” reproduces an editorial from
China’s largest newspaper and party organ, People’s Daily, that clarified some issues
about the “integrity” of China’s political system, including the regime’s official
position on the separation of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers
(Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010). The second article was titled “China didn’t
bite the bait: Most of Asian democratic nations are bleeding now” from a personal
blog entry by an author using the identification name SuYi QingShan or “Plain
Clothes and Light Fan” (Zong He Xin Wen, May 26, 2010). In this blog entry, the
author ponders the value and praxis of democracy in the current global hegemonic
system while manifesting a clear pro-China or more precisely pro-current-regime of
China position. The third article, titled “US Declares: Resorting to war cannot be
eliminated to prevent the global power transition to China,” is a news report about a
symposium on China’s rise and its influence on the United States held in the U.S.,
where Dr. Denny Roy—an expert on Northeast Asian security—admonished that the
U.S. might resort to war to contain China’s movement towards becoming a dominant
global power (Dong Fang Wang, Nov 9, 2009). The fourth article was titled “China
dumbfounded by the US and Europe’s determination and scheme to ruin China
thoroughly” is another opinion piece by an anonymous author who claimed that
“China has been the Euro-American hegemonic powers’ long-term target of conquest”
(Zhong Hua She Qu, Aug 17, 2009). In the first two articles, the authors stressed
China’s internal tensions and how they related to flaws in its social system. The
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authors of the last two articles construct scenarios that related to the increased
external tensions China has to confront as a member of the global community.
COOCs’ responses to these four articles are ideologically divided in terms of
the commentators’ defense/support and criticism/rejection of China and the Western
powers in the exposition of their ideological stances. On the surface, the most
noticeably ideological divide in online debates is between the “left conservative” and
the “right liberal.” This categorization, which defies the common sense constructed in
the U.S. and other Western societies during the Cold War ideological battles, relates
to the peculiar China’s political spectrum. In China, the political stance of the left
wing turns to be conservative in that it stresses the maintenance of the existing
political system and traditional Chinese cultural values. On the other hand, the right
wing advocates the necessity of liberal political reform and openness to changing
cultural values. In the commentaries posted by COOCs, the left-wing political stance
stressed cultural attachment and tended to exaggerate the ideological tensions between
China and the West. Commentators with a right-wing political stance detached from
their cultural core in a critical manner—often equating attachment to Chinese cultural
membership with loyalty for the current regime of China—and embraced some
universal values promoted in Western societies, such as democracy and individualism.
However, upon closer examination, such binary categories turn out to be too
simplistic to fully describe the internal divisions manifested in COOCs’ commentaries.
For instance, a critical attitude against the current regime of China does not
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necessarily imply a pro-West political stance. Another example is how the arguments
advanced by the conservative left would normally reject the possibility and necessity
of adopting a tripartite system to separate state powers, while a far right liberal
commentator might also reject the tripartite system but argue from the standpoint of
distrusting the character of Chinese citizens with some cynical remark like this: “The
tripartite system is absolutely not feasible to China, because a roguish society has to
be ruled by super rogues” (Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010). The position
enacted in this comment is related more to a critical attitude toward cultural
membership than to the political stance.
Thus, COOCs’ ideological positions as manifested in their responses to the
four articles mentioned earlier showed different levels of attachment to or distancing
from the cultural core and seemed to be articulated in tandem with varying
understandings of how external (foreign) tensions affected China. The following
sections offer elaboration of two salient categories of positioning and their observed
combinations: the critique of the Chinese system and the distancing from the cultural
core, and the defense of China and the attachment to the core.
Criticizing the Chinese government and distancing from the cultural core.
Most of the commentators from the researched forums who were critical of current
Chinese policies aimed at discrediting the legitimacy of government leaders and the
Chinese Community Party (CCP) by labeling them anti-democratic and insatiable
exploiters of the Chinese people. For COOCs expressing criticism toward China,
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China’s current dictatorial regime is a source of shame that hampers their sense of
cultural membership. Predominantly, these commentators enacted varying degrees of
detachment from the Chinese cultural core. Many of these critical comments offer
clear, direct criticism against Chinese Communist ideology; for instance: “people will
realize that commies form a gigantic burden and tumor in Chinese society,” “commies
are the source of all Chinese sins,” “since its birth, from head to toes, in every pore of
Chinese communism is there full of blood and dirty stuff.” In some of these
comments, the democratic system that originated in the West is promoted as a
universal value by COOCs who might rejoice at the fact that they are “not part of” the
Chinese dictatorship. One commentator who denounced the hypocrisy of CCP that
refuses to admit the nature of its dictatorship, made reference of the advantage of the
Western political system in this manner:
. . . without competition and administrative rotation, the Chinese government
is definitely a kind of dictatorship. The separation and balance of powers in
Western society is multi-leveled . . . While the Western political system is not
flawless and omnipotent, it is perhaps the best that human beings have ever
had and on the path of continuous improvement and reform. Power separation
and balance is the kernel, plus the specific procedures and methods to support
the tripartite system (commentary to Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010).
Then, the same commentator used his or her own knowledge of the U.S. society to
support what he or she understood as the advantage of the U.S. system and thus built
an ideological position:
For example, the US administrative law has a “dual-channel” principle that
requires that both sides of a dispute must have the opportunity and capability
to counterclaim: When there’s the accusatory prosecutor, there must be the
refuting defense attorney; the police can give people citations and people
should be able to appeal; landlord could control the heating system in
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wintertime and the renters could call the police if they feel the room
temperature is too low. That is called a society (commentary to Xing Dao
Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010).
Another commentator used a sarcastic tone and a reference to a Chinese metaphor to
refute the argument of pro-Chinese commentators that democracy is a conceptual
pretext used by the West to control developing nations. This commentator stated:
The author seems to be suggesting that Chinese people don’t need democracy,
that the so-called democracy is a means applied by the West to control other
countries. So our Chinese people should never try that. Following our own
tradition, we should continue in a dictatorship because without dictatorship,
China would be in chaos like the enlisted countries. If so, how could the
social class the author represents continue to indulge itself in dissipation and
debauchery? How could they continue their days of “He Xie” (meaning river
crab, the Chinese homophones of harmony – a relatively new slogan promoted
by CCP)? (commentary to Zong He Xin Wen, May 26, 2010).
Many comments showing criticism of the cultural core drew on the perception
that tensions between China and the global community were increasing and
threatening China’s global position. For example, one commentator wrote: “China is
too self-gratified. It wouldn’t be too much more difficult for the U.S. to choke China
to death than handling Japan and Iraq before.” On the other hand, a seemingly pacifist
commentator replied with an English-language commentary that called for Chinese
non-engagement based on the view of China’s military inferiority before the
insurmountable military power of the Western hegemony:
No war, please . . . The best choice for China is “hibernating” like Japan and
Germany for the sake of billions of lives. Give up military expansion. Work
on economic development. Improve human rights and civilization . . . No one
can beat up the U.S.A. Put all the force together (including Russia if it helps
the Chinese), and China will not be able to defeat NATO. Know who is the
real boss on the earth, you might survive better! Don’t say that because you
have some extra money, you will be the boss. The real boss is the one who
knows how to use the money from your pocket as long as they want. Get it?
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Chinese are not good at war at all. Don’t try war, which is the worst choice
for the Chinese people. If the CCP lead the Chinese to another war, the one
billion Chinese people themselves will kick you out (commentary to Dong
Fang Wang, Nov 9, 2009).
Comments like the one reproduced above stirred angry counterpunches from COOCs
who defended China and also based their positions on the perception of China-U.S.
tensions. One of them wrote:
Do you really think that Chinese people are afraid of your American nominal
father and you SOB? Fifty years ago, (China) already beat up your American
nominal ancestors in the Korean peninsula, not to say now. Come on! Let me
castrate you – an American running dog (commentary to Zhong Hua She Qu,
Aug 17, 2009).
This commentator’s reply illustrated the position of those who showed attachment to
the cultural core along with a perception that diminished the power of external
influences to change China’s regime. The exchange is one example of the type of
inflammatory rhetoric exchanged between critics of China and nationalist COOCs that
led to virtual oral brawls or wars of words.
Among COOCs whose expository comments focused on criticizing China, a
few wrote comments that diminished the power of external pressures on China to
stress that China’s problems were internal. They criticized the hypersensitivity of
some Chinese commentators who make much ado in their assessments of external
tensions and conflict. For instance, one commentator posited: “China’s structure
causes China’s stagnation, which has nothing to do with the Euro-American West”
(commentary to Dong Fang Wang, Nov 9, 2009). For these commentators, the
internal causes of China’s contemporary ordeals are way much more critical than the
external ones. For example, when responding to the fourth article about a Western
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scheme to contain China, a commentator self-identified as Amazing Moonlight
Treasure Box stated:
Even as the most strategic nation in the world, the U.S. cannot reach such
level of conspiracy as the article describes, as if the few countries allied with
U.S. could handle China with such ease. China’s problems are fundamentally
internal problems. External causes can only be effective via internal causes.
Only Chinese people can change China. Don’t become cheap conspiracy
theorists. Since childhood, we are inculcated with the idea that it was all the
imperialist faults and the Party never did anything wrong. That was just a
transition of tensions (from internal to external) and discouragement of
independent thinking. Don’t shift our own problems onto the others’
conspiracy. We must first settle down our internal problems (commentary to
Zhong Hua She Qu, Aug 17, 2009).
This critical position was more often identified in commentaries that were intended to
refute those who defended China and perceived a threatening increase of global
tension and pressures on China.
The defense of China and the attachment to the cultural core. Among the
Chinese individuals living overseas who participated in these four forums there were
slightly more views expressing attachment than expressing the distancing from the
cultural core, although the proportion is almost even in regards to the debate on the
tripartite system in China. Messages in defense of the Chinese cultural core asserted
the rationality and realism of the current policies followed by the Chinese regime and
the uniqueness of the Chinese political system that seems to be misunderstood or
ignored by critics of China. Among defenders of China, attachment to the cultural
core was expressed often as pride in China’s national strength and the view that its
achievements are equivalent or superior to those of its Western counterparts.
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The COOCs who enacted attachment to the core refuted the claim that China
is a dictatorship and emphasized that Chinese democracy is a different kind of
democracy. For them, the description of China as a dictatorship is an unfounded
accusation, and the calls for democracy are a cheap, handy pretext employed by the
West to contain China. The following quotation is an example of the refuting
argument:
No need to sanctify Tripartite System for separating powers. Like Mao
Zedong once said: “Everything has two sides.” The tripartite System has some
advantages, but also can have a notoriously low efficiency. Besides, today’s
China is not in Mao’s-like dictatorship. The CCP has some internal
mechanisms for separating and balancing power and encouraging competition.
The current Chinese political leaders who are all winners out of this competing
system are not shy of their Western counterparts in terms of intelligence and
integrity. They call the Chinese system “democratic centralism,” “internal
democracy,” which is a kind of “elitist democracy” per se (commentary to
Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010).
The same commentator stressed the 30 years of accomplishments made by the current
Chinese government to prove the superiority of the Chinese political system and
diminish immediate external threats.
Along this line, other commentators focused on attacking Chinese dissidents,
as in this comment: “Back up ten thousand steps, even if China adopted the Tripartite
System, those dissidents of Du Yun Lun (Separatists, Democrats, and Fa Lun Gong)
would not have good fruits to eat” (commentary to Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July,
2010). Another commentator expressed his or her reaction with reference to the
hypocrisy of Western powers that denounce human rights violations in China now but
are unlikely to continue doing so once China reforms the system to accommodate
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Western interests: “Once the Tripartite System is established, all the wheels (Fa Lun
Gong practitioners) should be the first eradicated but then the West would have
nothing to say” (commentary to Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010).
Some of the comments defending the cultural core begin with criticism of
China’s current status quo but eventually display a deep concern for stability and
desire to maintain the establishment. For instance, this commentator who denies the
practicability of the tripartite system in China starts his or her argumentation by
criticizing inequality in China but ends up favoring the maintenance of the current
regime:
Up to nowadays, the head of a state-run company can earn compensation
hundreds times of a regular employee! The CCP has died with only a hollow
shell! Beijing University sets up senior executive programs to train American
high officials. In Wall Street, Keynes’ capitalism does not work! Today’s
world is calling for a brand new mode. So young fellows, please get to
understand “Marxism and Leninism” and “Keynes” and investigate the
realities of workers and farmers before working on creating the brand new
theory!! However, in a China with 1.3 billion people, the “Tripartite System”
must lead China to the dead end (commentary to Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang,
July, 2010).
Although not all commentaries make reference to tensions in the global
environment, as in the example above, in many cases the perceptions of increasing or
diminishing external pressures on China and their effects was an integral part of the
ideological argument. For example, one commentator, who enacted the position of
defending the current policies of the Chinese government and perceived increasing
tensions in the international sphere, stated his position in this manner:
A child less than one year old can fall and get hurt while running ... according
to this [common sense], people downstairs [meaning one or more particular
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previous commentators in the forum whose comments appeared below the
newer entries] conclude that what I mean to say is that we need to walk the
rest of our life, and infer that my opinion is that running is a bad sport? What a
ridiculous logic! As a matter-of-fact, in many Asian, African, and Latin
countries, democracy didn’t bring a wealthy and stable life to their people.
Successful democratic regimes have some basic characteristics: 1) they first
strengthen the nation and then promote democracy as Britain, U.S., Japan, and
most European nations did before building sophisticated democracies upon
relatively wealthy and stable internal environments; 2) they then select their
own path: every nation designs and perfects democracy according to its
peculiar situation (commentary to Zhong Hua She Qu, Aug 17, 2009).
Then, the same commentator began to refer and denounce the international
environment that applied external pressures on China:
In today’s China, the first characteristic has been achieved and democratic
reform can start right now. But the external environment does not lead to
optimism. We have to be cautious, moving slowly with small steps. Chinese
democracy needs a slower pace. Neglect the U.S. bullshit and never copy the
mode of other countries, because China is China. No other nation in the world
has ever traveled in the path of China (commentary to Zhong Hua She Qu,
Aug 17, 2009).
Thus, for this commentator the increasing external pressures on China to follow a
Western model of democracy and the growing influence of Western ideas are the
primary factors that slow down the pace of China’s political reform.
However, among those who enacted cultural attachment the most common
perception was one that diminished the threat that external pressures and international
tensions would cause negative effects on China. These COOCs maintained a positive
cultural identification through their assessment of China’s national strength as
equivalent or superior to their Western counterparts. In the identification process of
these COOCs, a sense of cultural pride outruns cultural shame, leading to
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manifestations of cultural superiority, nationalism, chauvinism, or ethnocentrism. For
example:
It’s too late to stop the transition of global power (from the West) to China ...
There have been an ill financial system in the U.S. for a long time, plus
Clinton’s government made a big mistake for it couldn’t eliminate a potential
war against terrorism that allowed China a chance to develop. Now the U.S. is
going down inevitably. If the U.S. dares to launch a nuclear war against China,
Washington D.C., New York City, Chicago ... will disappear although China
may lose more. No one could win (commentary to Zhong Hua She Qu, Aug
17, 2009).
Another example of this position:
Although the U.S. is the sole super power in the world, it’s going down like a
sunset. The U.S. is afraid of the fact that its position as global overlord is
being replaced by China and so is constantly making trouble with China.
While China has a lot of problems, China is winning people’s hearts in terms
of both internal and external policies. China’s development annoys the U.S.
that feels helpless. Even the threat of war would not work because China is a
nuclear power. The day when the U.S. declares war against China will be the
day when it becomes the second U.K. (commentary to Dong Fang Wang, Nov
9, 2009).
The position above is framed in a manner that underplays the rivalry and appeals to
Chinese cultural pride.
In sum, in the majority of instances COOCs’ comments construct ideological
positions based on a sense of detachment from or attachment to their membership in
Chinese culture and influenced by a particular perception of how the global context
influences China. In the process of identification, one can observe how dimensions of
cultural identity like sociality, individuality, and materiality become salient in shaping
positional identification. For example, the social dimension, or sociality, operates in
the awareness of the broader international context as well as the social norms and
dialectical engagement between self and society. Besides sociality, individuality is
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another dimension of identity that influences positionalities in ideological debates.
For instance, one commentator stressed his or her critical position with the frame of
individuality – individual interests and benefits: “Who cares what China needs?
Dictatorship?! Fine! Thank God, I am not part of it” (commentary to Zong He Xin
Wen, May 26, 2010). Another commentator also manifested his detachment from an
individualist perspective:
The CCP has determined to stick to this road toward a dead end until falling
into the dismal abyss. Fortunately I, my wife, and children have been out of
there [China]. Our lives are not much better, but the good thing is that we
don’t have to sacrifice ourselves together with them [the people under the CCP
regime] (commentary to Xing Dao Huan Qiu Wang, July, 2010).
In addition to sociality and individuality, materiality—or the emphasis on material
conditions and resources—is another dimension of identity influencing identification.
For example, one commentator identified as Pu Tou (or Sheriff) stated his defense of
China by stressing how building a solid economy was a pre-requisite before the
superstructure of democracy could be built:
Who are dreaming to see a chaotic China? I just feel that poor countries
adopting democracy can spoil the true meaning of democracy because,
without certain economic development, the people might still be starving.
And then how could they have the high-level of intelligence and morality
[required for the implementation of democracy]. In poor nations, democracy
might mean corruption and separation. We only want the democracy of
wealthy nations, not that of poor nations . . . China was once very poor and
now just starts to accumulate some resources. Following the same path, China
is very promising in terms of a smooth transit into a real democratic society.
For this I highly appreciate Deng Xiaoping’s great vision and foresight
(commentary to Zong He Xin Wen, May 26, 2010).
Another commentator who wrote about establishing the material or economic base as
a pre-condition for “real” democracy stated:
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Democracy in poor countries can only be counterproductive. The general
strategy of Deng Xiaoping is positive – Democracy can be extra good only for
a nation with extra resources . . . Only if the state gets rich, could its citizens
live a better life without need for struggling, fighting, competing, and hurting
each other (commentary to Zong He Xin Wen, May 26, 2010).
In this sense, the manifestation of an ideological position – based on varying degrees
of attachment or distance from the cultural core—involves the intersection of various
identity properties like sociality, individuality, materiality, and spirituality.
Responding to Outgroup Ideological Criticism against China
This section focuses on the analysis of COOCs comments responding to
ideological criticisms toward China from non-Chinese sources to explore how this
interpretive dynamic generated forms of identification. The forums selected for
examining how COOCs responded to criticism include reactions to three posted news
items featuring criticism of China from identified outgroup critics. The topics
addressed by critics were the environment, the Beijing Olympics, and economic
development. In the first forum, COOCs reacted to a news report that re-stated CNN
commentator Jack Cafferty’s derogatory comment on China and the declarations in
California of Chris Daly, a former member of the city of San Francisco’s board of
supervisors (Zhong Xin She, April 13, 2008). On 2008 April 9 CNN “Situation
Room,” Cafferty made the following remarks: “So I think our relationship with China
has certainly changed … I think they’re basically the same bunch of goons and thugs
they’ve been for the last 50 years.” Chris Daly, on his part, launched an unfounded
accusation during the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay in 2008 that the Chinese
government was funding pro-China demonstrators outside China. The second report
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refers to the criticism of foreign media led by CNN in regards to China’s
environmental problems at the time of the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 (Tian
Ya, Dec 9, 2009). In this one, critics put the spotlight on the infamous case of Linfen,
a polluted mid-city in Shanxi province. The third report is about some U.S.
American scholars who commented on China’s economic development (Zhong Qing
Wang, Jan 23, 2010). This report emphasized the critics’ view that China’s current
development and national strength were inferior to the U.S.: “Compared to the U.S.,
China is still in Kindergarten.”
In the selected forums featuring responses to outgroup criticism, the
commentaries of COOCs were predominantly—in terms of number—concerned with
defending China and counter-attacking outgroup critics. Similar to the responses to
ideological exposition, COOCs’ responses to outgroup criticism can be generally
placed in two broad categories related to the commentators’ sense of membership in
Chinese culture: attachment to China that in this case is expressed as resistance to
criticism or the distancing from the Chinese core expressed in this case as agreement
with outgroup critics. In resisting criticism, COOCs articulated a relatively unified
and stable rhetorical strategy: to question the motive of the critics even when they
acknowledged the factuality in the criticisms. Among those who agreed with
outgroup critics, there was a wider range of rhetorical strategies used to articulate
their positions, from viewing criticism as bitter “medicine” to raise awareness of what
is wrong, to making distinctions between the political regime and Chinese average
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people and the motherland, to underscoring China’s shortcomings when compared
with Western political, economic, and spiritual developments, to the search for a
middle ground when negotiating opposing arguments.
To some degree, outgroup criticism also becomes a catalyst for commentators,
as the initial critique from an outgroup source becomes irrelevant when the debate
among COOCs takes it own shape and direction in the form of internal debates among
rival commentators.
Resistance to outgroup criticism and attachment to the cultural core. The
response of COOCs who defended China used some familiar rhetorical strategies:
questioning the motive of the outgroup critics and of those obliging COOCs seen as
ideological rivals. Even when faced with legitimate accusations or factual
information, this group of commentators seemed to have the need to keep vigilant of
hidden motives in any criticism. These commentators generally assumed a position of
identification that privileged a Chinese group identity marked by nationalism, loyalty
to the motherland, and the dichotomy between “us” Chinese under the threat of
“them,” the political enemies of China. Through this ideological positioning, COOCs
provided their interpretations of national and global issues, including the tensions
between natural environment and economic development.
For instance, in addressing Jack Cafferty and Chris Daly’s accusations,
commentators pointed out their perception of the critics’ real agenda. One said:
From CNN performers such as Lou Dobbs and Jack Cafferty, who are
mouthful of “communist China,” anyone with a brain can see what their
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ulterior motives are. Check out the recent US Air Force recruitment ads, is
that misleading or what? What could we expect? After all, what can really
back us up is our own motherland (commentary to Zhong Xin She, April 13,
2008).
Another commentator in this forum tried to discredit outgroup critics by questioning
the larger cultural context, particularly racial and ethnic prejudice in U.S. society:
Beneath the veil of warmth and kindness, there is the prevalent racial
discrimination. Americans are heirs of former Puritans and deserters, who
were once discriminated in their ancestral lands. In this land rich in the
tradition of discrimination, severe racial discrimination will always exist, only
that is more hypocritically covered under a veil (commentary to Zhong Xin
She, April 13, 2008).
And one commentator directed the counter-criticism to another commentator in the
same forum who had previously blamed the CCP for ruining China’s international
image:
Don’t say how bad the CCP might be. It gains favorable public opinion by
winning and hosting Olympics. How about you? You’re worse for advancing
your political agenda by defaming the whole Chinese nation! It’s not easy to
host Olympics, which can make all Chinese feel proud and elated. You want
the whole world to see us as jokes. Then how good could you be?
(commentary to Zhong Xin She, April 13, 2008).
As illustrated here, counter-criticisms are often directed toward questioning the
political motive and character attributes of the critics, including those of ingroup
commentators who shared the same view of outgroup critics.
In the forum about foreign media’s reports on China’s environmental
problems before the Copenhagen Summit, one commentator self-identified as
thinkaboutsomething offered an argument on the relationship between factual
statements and communication motives:
Anyone with a brain would know that even if CNN’s report is real, at this
sensitive moment, its purpose is absolutely not for the benefit of Chinese
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people but for the benefit of American people (commentary to Tian Ya, Dec 9,
2009).
In order to further ratify this point, thinkaboutsomething used an analogy:
This is like two people that are going to be on a live TV program. A sees B’s
pants unzipped but does not tell B until the broadcasting begins. Someone
downstairs who said CNN was kindhearted might also think A is helping B
rather than tricking B (commentary to Tian Ya, Dec 9, 2009).
Another commentator directly identified CNN’s reporting activity as “ideological
reporting” and explained: “Even a factual report cannot convince the Chinese, who
must suspect its real intent.”
Through this ideological frame, COOCs provided their interpretations of
issues in the global context and, more specifically, of the tension between natural
environment and economic development. COOCs who resisted outgroup criticism
focused on discrediting the source of information and revealing the hypocrisy of
outgroup critics rather than addressing to the criticism directed toward China. For
instance, the following excerpts are from different commentators in the same forum:
The U.S. never wants to be responsible . . . Statistics show that the U.S. is the
world’s largest and longest polluter. Even those fawning Chinese cannot deny
such fact-of-the-matter. In this Summit, the U.S. attempts to lead the old
industrial European nations to evade their responsibility: first to put the blame
onto the new industrial nations; second to employ this opportunity to add
waste gas import duties to strangle the newly developed nations and continue
their mode of dominating the world with new.
...
How the Earth becomes so fragile today is mainly because of the sins of the
past 200 years of Western industrialization. In order to shift their
responsibility, Westerners try all means to exaggerate the role that the third
world industrial nations play in the production of global pollution.
...
This is a world of “first comes first serves.” The developed countries had
ruined the global resources before everybody realizes the environmental
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problems and then clean up their own countries and shift the pollution to the
poor developing countries (commentaries to Tian Ya, Dec 9, 2009).
Some of these commentators even provided statistical data to support their countercriticism led by goal of protecting their cultural membership as Chinese.
In effect, as these quotations suggest the positions of COOCs who objected to
outgroup criticism generally show greater levels of cultural attachment, expressed in
notions of national pride, historical victimization by Western industrial powers,
concern for the motherland, and a sense of group identity in which the Chinese
“people” are imagined as a monolithic group under attack.
Agreement with outgroup critics and detachment from the cultural core.
In these forums, commentaries in agreement with outgroup critics are significant.
Most of these commentators reinforced and expanded the criticism of outgroup critics,
exerting their critical position and asserting a sense of cultural shame. Some
commentators aggrandized the ammunition of critics to discredit the legitimacy of the
Chinese government and uncover structural flaws in the current political regime.
Some even blamed founders of traditional Chinese schools of philosophy, such as
Confucius and Mencius, as the root of all evil in today’s China. Other commentators
made a point in differentiating average Chinese people from the Communist regime
when making statements about China. Some labeled the responses of rival proChinese commentators as too “jittery and bigoted” because news reports were
showing just plain facts, while others prescribed that the right strategy for interpreting
outgroup criticism was to remove any ideological factors and listen only to the facts.
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The diverse perspectives offered by this group of COOCs share some common
positionings when it comes to the response to outgroup criticism and the construction
of particular relations toward Chinese cultural membership: 1) the view of criticism as
hard “facts” that can serve as a “medicine” or incentive to gain awareness of what is
wrong and move beyond shame and towards change; 2) the rejection of the political
regime and its ideology but identification with the Chinese average people and the
motherland; 3) the assessment of China’s levels of economic growth, political
development, military strength, and cultural and spiritual contributions in terms of
inferiority or backwardness when compared to the West, and 4) the search for a
middle ground when negotiating opposing arguments.
One set of comments that showed agreement with or support for outgroup
critics, stressed the potential benefits of criticism as a “bitter medicine benign for
health.” For instance, in the forum debating foreign media’s reporting on Linfen’s
pollution before the Copenhagen Summit, commentators stressed the factual base of
the outgroup criticism and suggested the potential benefits of such criticism: “If after
CNN reporting, China’s pollution improves, then we will have to appreciate them [the
critics];” “I can understand your indignation but pathetically could you really think
that China’s pollution is not severe?;” “. . . we should support the CNN reporter who
brought us with the real and general view that some Chinese reporters will never
[bring],” and “China as a world factory has some industrial cities highly polluted,
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which is a fact. No shame to admit it. Be brave to admit it, is the start of resolving
the problem.”
In a second set of comments, the emphasis was on denouncing the regime but
identifying with the people and the motherland. For example, in responding to Jack
Cafferty’s “thugs and goons” comment, two commentators made a series of lengthy
comments to reinforce outgroup criticism and expand the ideological critique of the
CCP regime while separating the government from the people. Although Cafferty did
not specifically distinguish Chinese people from the Chinese regime by saying the
Chinese were “basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they’ve been for the last
50 years,” the commentators interpreted that his real intent was to refer to the Chinese
government and not to the Chinese people—a point that was made after the comment
on a CNN apology statement. A commentator under the name Le He or “Happiness
and Peace” helped make the distinction between the Chinese people and the
“Motherland” and the Chinese government in his commentary:
Communist China is not far away from the definition of a “thug”: externally, it
is hostile to Western nations and, at the same time, it hopes to be on equal
terms with them and earn their money; it befriends North Korea, Cuba, Iran,
and Yugoslavia. Internally, it is only crueler; it was anti-government in the
40s and beat up the Nationalist army; it was anti-Right-wing in the 50s and
beat up Chinese intellectuals; it was anti-Capitalist-roaders in the 60s and beat
up every Chinese . . . anti-humanity and anti-democracy in the 80s and beat up
Chinese students . . . beat up the Taiwanese, Tibetans, and Fa Lun Gong . . .
The CCP officials are tireless in beating up everybody. That’s way they are
really a bunch of “thugs.” We should not obscure the concepts of “Motherland”
and the lout “THUG” Government. Nothing wrong with the “Motherland,”
just a little over polluted. The lout “THUG” Government manipulates Chinese
people (including Taiwanese and Tibetans) in external and internal policies to
make the Olympics become the pageant for extreme nationalists of Han
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supremacists. That is the key issue (commentary to Zhong Xin She, April 13,
2008).
Another commentator self-identified as Fan Gong Xian Feng or “Anti-Communism
Pioneer” expanded the criticism by questioning the representativeness of the CCP and
the identity of its supporters:
To the CCP and its running dogs: don’t gild your faces. When has your
representation of Chinese identity ever been approved by the people? Only
less than 5%, how could you represent the Chinese? Anyone is qualified to be
against the CCP because you’ve snatched their resources . . . Ordinary people
have the right to depose the CCP (commentary to Zhong Xin She, April 13,
2008).
The distinction between the Chinese “ordinary people” and their identity and the
Chinese political regime is crucial among this set of critical commentators for the
articulation of their ideological positions. Identifying with “ordinary people,” these
agreeing commentators set up their critical rationality against the dominating Chinese
ideology on the basis of their individuality. This illustrates further the
interrelationships between different identity properties in identification.
A third type of response was articulated by COOCs who did not make a
distinction between the government and the people, opted to establish their
ideological position by offering assessments of China’s levels of economic growth,
political development, military strength, and cultural and spiritual contributions.
They expressed a sense of cultural shame by asserting the inferiority or backwardness
of China when compared to the West and by critiquing the foundations of Chinese
humanities and philosophy as inherent hindrance preventing China from regime
change and from becoming a global power that can match the Western alliance.
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For example, in the forum about the US experts on China who said China is
still in “kindergarten” when compared to the United States, many obliging COOCs
not only embraced the idea but also endued such statement with richer connotations.
One commentator reverberated with the criticism: “China itself knows its GDP per
person cannot even be on the world’s top 100 . . . Kindergarten is a very realistic
assessment!” Others extended the criticism to China’s social ethos: “In terms of
democracy and human rights, China probably hasn’t yet entered preschool . . .” and
“. . . such a great country has such small mind, sigh, sadly.” One commentator
expressed his or her position from the perspective of increasing external pressures on
China:
The US national defense and military power is the greatest in the world. U.S.
is the only nation that has the capacity to finish a nationwide rally in a war
situation within 24 hours . . . China’s military power is no contest compared
to the U.S., not to speak of other deformities such as air pollution, population
quality, and corruption (commentary to Zhong Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010).
When another COOC stated: “Honestly, China cannot become world super power . . .
In the past, we had Confucius and Mencius, but what do we have now (commentary
to Zhong Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010)?” A different COOC even denied the
contributions of Confucius and Mencius because they “did not bring wealth and
power to China . . . They just offered a basic philosophy about how people should live
under the king and elders, how the king should rule peoples (commentary to Zhong
Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010).”
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The debate on the significance and uses of Confucius and Mencius’
philosophies as China’s cultural foundation induced another commentator to utter a
self-deprecating statement that enacted cultural shame:
Where’s the power? What a shame?! The eternal Confucius and Mencius have
been the root of all evil. They fawn over power and despise the honesty of
labor. The kind of culture that evolves under their teachings is that of the
eunuch. Even the seemingly benign doctrines they preach are twisted in the
current Chinese society. Without a spiritual revelation at the grass-root level,
there won’t even be the courage to be strong. Talking about ruling the world
is so naïve at this stage. Think about it . . . (commentary to Zhong Qing Wang,
Jan 23, 2010).
These assessments of China’s cultural conditions and contributions generated
heated debate among commentators who resisted or obliged to the original critique
raised by outgroup sources but now turned their attention to debating within the
ingroup. For instance, one commentator elaborated on the spiritual dimension of
identity as a weak aspect in Chinese culture, one that presents no alternative to other
forms of spirituality in the West and Middle East:
Talking about a Chinese domination, one has to answer the question – what
would the Chinese provide to replace the spiritual foundation of the Western
culture . . . Only if some idea could come out of China that receives universal
acceptance as superior to Christianity, Muslim, and Judaism so that
Westerners would like to convert to live a Chinese life . . . The Chinese elite
(not the people) struggles to survive and strive to master, engaging in a life of
wealth-chasing and devoid of any spiritual ideal. What can one expect out of
this—ruling the world? What a crazy idea (commentary to Zhong Qing Wang,
Jan 23, 2010)?
Along these lines, a commentator identified as jinghuaren or “Chinese in Beijing”
reiterated that the rise of a great nation necessitated an advanced philosophic and
humanistic system and then said contemporary China lacked such systems of faith
(commentary to Zhong Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010). Another COOC reinforced
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jinghuaren’s doubts with a sarcastic note: “Does China have humanities? Yeah, which
is to live like pigs and believe in money can buy everything (commentary to Zhong
Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010).” This type of statement provoked the quick responses of
COOCs who resisted the criticism against China and offer rebuts like the one posted
by a commentator identified as Supernova1:
China’s rise relies exactly on a strong humanistic thinking system. For
example, based on the tradition of Confucius and Mencius, we developed
some rather innovative and pragmatic thoughts: “Practice is the sole criterion
for testing truth,” “crossing the river by feeling the stones (taking one step at a
time),” and “Bu Zheteng” or “No self-inflicted setbacks,” which are in the
guidance of the principle of absorbing the quintessence and discarding the
dross of the Western culture (commentary to Zhong Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010).
The debate peaked with several lengthy commentaries on the spiritual values of
Chinese traditional cultures and Western religions offered by two primary debaters or
opinion leaders from both sides: Supernova13 and 6grizzly. For 6grizzly, Western
religious culture provides tools for harnessing the insatiable desires of human beings
and constitutes a foundation for social stability and economic growth. On the other
hand, Supernova13 argued that Chinese culture is superior to Western religions,
which are “ridiculous” and “causing a lot of problems in today’s world and may
eventually result in the demise of human civilization (commentary to Zhong Qing
Wang, Jan 23, 2010).”
Likewise, the dynamics of the debate generated by the foreign media expose
of China’s environmental problems suggest how outgroup criticism turns into a
contentious internal debate where COOCs use different types of responses and
assume different degrees of identification with Chinese cultural membership. For
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example, a commentator identified as petergodson saw outgroup criticism as an
opportunity for the Chinese to be more aware of their own real problems and therefore
more hopeful for “locating the crux and solving the problems (commentary to Tian
Ya, Dec 9, 2009).” And for this commentator, the crux of China’s problems was the
“irresponsible government and the gullible Chinese people.” Then, drawing on his or
her experience living abroad, the commentator compared conditions in China and in
cities abroad to indict the Chinese government’s policies:
We have to face the reality . . . We can strongly object the US-led Western
countries’ deliberate defamation. However, at the same time, we should even
more strongly protest our own government, which is so irresponsible to
environmental pollution. Any Chinese who live or have ever lived abroad
would be impressed by the fresh air quality and governmental policies for
environmental protection in these countries. We sacrifice the people’ living
environment for economic development. It is a shame that few people dare to
protest against the Government’s misconduct due to our nationalism. When
we cry out for justice, we shouldn’t shield off our own shortcomings . . . All
responsible and conscientious Chinese, let’s protect our justice with the
weapon of justice, but meanwhile don’t forget to defend our right of
survival . . . for our later generations (commentary to Tian Ya, Dec 9, 2009).
This type of statement would provoke reactions of rival commentators like
thinkaboutsomething, who described critics of China as “Chinese living abroad who
strive to get rich by selling China’s flesh (commentary to Zhong Xin She, April 13,
2008).” In turn, another commentator using the identification mxu12 replied by
positing that the Chinese should overcome their inferiority complex in order to be
more tenacious:
Unless you are a person with inferiority complex, you don’t first question a
person’s motive every time he writes or says something about China . . .
About who are the victims of Chinese pollution . . . exactly those guys rather
die twenty years earlier, breathing filthy air, than be criticized by some
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foreigners who cause no real harm . . . Your fellow Chinese breathe filthy air
on a daily basis, and you feel good denying it and calling other people traitors,
people like you are indeed traitors of the Chinese people (commentary to
Zhong Xin She, April 13, 2008).
Thinkaboutsomething, reproducing the pattern described in the previous section of
this chapter, would counteract the critique by questioning the commentators’ true
motive and cultural identity:
You don’t have to list China’s environmental problems like you’re attached to
an American spy satellite circling the orbit all the time. The thing is –
Suppose the environment can bring people a 10 dollar profit, America wants
to take 5 dollars and only give China 50 cents. While you hope China should
only take 30 cents and give America 5 dollars and 20 cents. Say you’re not a
national traitor, who would believe it (commentary to Zhong Xin She, April
13, 2008)?
In the ensuing exchange, mxu12 and other commentators engaged
thinkaboutsomething with cursing and name-calling. Then, thinkaboutsomething
continued to rebuke until the debate died out with his or her last comment, as follows:
How come some Chinese who grew up in China forget about their own mother
[motherland] so quickly after they got abroad! What I said is reasonable . . .
for some downstairs, it doesn’t matter if you’re Chinese or not, the most
important thing is whether you still treat yourselves as Chinese. See, Mr.
Siwuwei [one of the commentators in this forum] has distinguished himself out
of the Chinese group. I feel Siwuwei must be able to watch CNN and get
access to Internet and look Chinese but refuse to think of himself as “Chinese
netizen.” That is interesting (commentary to Zhong Xin She, April 13, 2008).
Engaged in such verbal brawls, commentators showcased the tensions at the root of
their positional cultural identification. However, it is not uncommon to find among
COOCs who accept outgroup criticism and take a position of distance from the
cultural core the use of pronouns like “we” and “our” to refer to Chinese people and
culture to signal a degree of cultural ascription. Yet, among rivals in cyberspace,
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these virtual characters were on bad terms with one another as if they were
archenemies. The scene can become quite nasty and the conflict highly emotional.
A fourth group of responses showed an emphasis on trying to balance
opposing views. These commentators strived to neutralize internal tensions and
attempted to transcend specific ideological positions with a sense of detachment.
They did so by separating the questionable motives of outgroup critics and the reality
in outgroup criticism. On one hand, these commentators resisted outgroup criticism
as deliberate “defamation,” showing a stronger attachment to the Chinese cultural
core. On the other hand, they stressed the significance of acknowledging the
factuality of the problems revealed by outgroup critics. In this sense, these
commentaries are both resisting critique and obliging to it. For instance, in the debate
on China’s environment, one COOC mentioned: “I’ve been in LinFen, which was far
from having a vastly clear and blue sky. CNN’s defamation is an issue, but LinFen’s
pollution is way too severe.” Another wrote: “. . . we don’t care what CNN talked
about, just let them bullshit whatever they want; but we have to take care of our own
health (commentary to Tian Ya, Dec 9, 2009).”
Responding to the criticism of US experts on China, one commentator who
defended China accepted the criticism in this way: “This could be good for cooling
down the popular theory of China threat in the West.” Another one accepted the
criticism but reasserted his defense of China while emphasizing the significance of
truthful and realistic assessment of China’s development:
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I sincerely hope that our motherland becomes stronger, but we have to face the
reality. Although China has been developing fast, according to economic
principles, lowering the growth rate is mandatory. More importantly our
political reform is over slow-paced hindering the economy from further
development. So we have to admit that we are still so far away from being the
number one. My fellow Chinese, we have to be self-motivated and work
harder (commentary to Zhong Qing Wang, Jan 23, 2010).
More so than in other COOCs, these commentators negotiated internal divisions in a
way that asserted their sense of cultural attachment by selecting the reasonable
arguments of outgroup critics and diverting the negative points of other ingroup
commentators to transform the negative critique into positive affirmation. Such
positional cultural identification can be seen as very strategic and consistent with need
of Chinese overseas to culturally survive outside China. These commentators might
represent a subgroup of opinion leaders within the Chinese community that can help
with communication between China and the rest of the world.
In closing, COOCs who agreed with outgroup critics showed a more
fragmented and heterogeneous range of positionings and degrees of attachment to
cultural membership than COOCs who resisted criticism. While some accepted
criticism while showing concern for and identification with the “motherland” and its
people, others expressed a sense of detachment based on a view that conflated
government, people, and culture and placed them in a position of inferiority or
backwardness in relation to the West.
Responding to Ingroup Ideological Criticism
Ingroup ideological criticism refers to the scrutiny and evaluation of China
and Chinese culture posed by Chinese sources. Drawn from basically deductive and
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quantitative experimental research schemata, intergroup sensitivity effect suggests
that people tend to be harsher and more defensive in responding to outgroup critics
than ingroup critics. However, the current research shows seemingly an opposite
pattern with more insights on some qualitative differences in COOCs’ responses to
outgroup and ingroup criticisms. Generally, the textual analysis indicates that
COOCs think outgroup cultural criticisms are more understandable than ingroup
cultural criticisms due to different group stances. Hence COOCs provided more
profound interpretations for the causes and motives of ingroup cultural criticisms,
which are qualitatively different from their understandings of outgroup cultural
criticisms. Specifically, such qualitative differences drawn from the analyzed textual
data lie in the more elaborate interpretations about the causes and motives of the
criticisms in terms of the ingroup critics’ individualities often perceived as more
distinctive than outgroup critics. Those who agree with the ingroup criticisms put
themselves more aligned with the ingroup critics than outgroup critics as similarly
elite individuals distinguished from the general Chinese mass. Those who oppose
ingroup criticism exhibited their harsh critical attitude against the ingroup critics’
peculiar individuality, accusing them of xenocentrism. Such critical attitude differs
from COOCs’ defensive attitude when dealing with outgroup critics out of their group
agenda. The opposing COOCs also used different labels for ingroup critics such as
calling them dissident or separatist “Du,” “Yun,” and “Lun,” who are regarded
deviating ingroup individuals alienated by the Western influences. Therewith
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individual alignment and harsh personal attack features COOCs’ responses to ingroup
cultural criticisms.
The analysis of the diverging ideological positions enacted in reaction to
ingroup criticism of China is based on the reading of responses to four forums. The
first forum centered on a blog article posted only a couple of days before the Beijing
Olympics opening ceremony, warning the Chinese that they should not take too much
pride from the success of this event (Wo De Zhong Guo, Aug 18, 2008). In this
article, titled “An Alternative Voice: Do not get over-elated with Beijing Olympics,”
the ingroup critic reached out to the Chinese audience to try to make them coolheaded
and persuade them to resist the hyper national sentiment generated for the event. The
second forum was stimulated by a report regarding a Voice of Germany’s interview
with the man who alleged to be the designer of the prototype of the Beijing Olympics’
main stadium known as the Bird Nest (De Guo Zhi Sheng, Aug 13, 2008). In this
radio interview, Ai Weiwei—a renowned avant-garde visual artist and son of a
famous Chinese contemporary poet—blatantly accused Zhang Yimou—the director of
Beijing Olympics’ opening ceremony—of being socially irresponsible and morally
soulless. The third forum is formed by responses to another blog article titled “My
dear motherland: Please stop your degeneration (Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).”
In this blog, an anonymous author labored a lengthy critique of the contemporary
social ethos in China with a rather hopeless and pessimistic tone. The fourth forum is
composed of commentaries on a CNN’s television interview with a famous,
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outspoken, and young social critic and literary writer, Han Han, who managed to
publish despite government censorship (Zong He Xin Wen, June 2, 2010). During the
interview, Han criticized the Chinese government for suppressing freedom of speech
and advocated a free environment for artists in China. All four articles contain
negative evaluations of China in their central arguments.
As with the responses to outgroup critics, when commentators focused their
attention on criticism against China or aspects of Chinese culture raised by ingroup
members, three types of reactions were salient: COOCs who sided with ingroup
critics and exhibited a distancing from Chinese culture and a sense of cultural shame,
COOCs who opposed the criticism to defend a group stance to enact distinctive
cultural affiliation; and a few commentators who offered mixed responses such as
acknowledging the legitimacy of the criticism and yet questioning the motive of the
critics in the same commentaries. However, each subgroup shows further
differentiation in terms of the nuances of their positions.
Agreeing with ingroup critics: detaching self from Chinese group identity.
Among COOCs who agreed with ingroup criticism directed toward the Chinese
government and culture, the comments feature a common pattern: a distinction
between self and group in which commentators create a distance between them and
the Chinese reality and thus enact a sense of identification. Yet, this position is
articulated in different ways, as COOCs stressed different dimensions of their
identities when taking positions. Two most salient ones intersecting in their
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ideological positioning were the individual and the social dimensions. Hence one
group of COOCs established the distinction between self and group by stressing their
personal qualities and those of likeminded ingroup critics as superior to the negative
attributes ascribed to the Chinese government and people in China. A second group
of commentators established a distance by stressing social dimensions of the Chinese
reality while minimizing or omitting references to their individualities. Yet, both
groups tended to share a critical view of the Chinese government, culture or people
and to locate themselves as superior to an undifferentiated Chinese nation or ingroup
mass. It is important to note, however, that an emphasis on individuality or sociality
does not eliminate the enactment of other identity dimensions in the articulation of
views. As the examples below will illustrate, the comments also show how
ideological and material dimensions intersect with individual and social dimensions in
the process of positional identification.
The commentators that stressed an individualist stance tended to separate
their positive personal traits such as social responsibility, artistic sensibility, critical
thinking skills, and etc. from perceived negative group attributes like passivity,
complicity, stubbornness, frivolity, insensitivity, moral degeneration, mass behavior,
ignorance, and etc. that seem to cause a sense of cultural shame. Often, a sense of
self-righteousness was inspired by and projected onto ingroup critics of China. For
instance, one commentator who expressed agreement with a critic who wrote that
China was degenerating reiterated:
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Like Lu Xun [arguably the most famous and influential liberal and progressive
Chinese writer and social critic from early 20 th century], I also feel sorry for
the misery of our fellow Chinese and at the same time angry at their inability
to contend. You and I are similarly socially responsible but both incapable to
change the situation. I appreciate your sincere words for they contain the
messages that I myself want to say (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar
18, 2010).
This commentator identified with the ingroup critic to take a position that
distinguishes him or herself and the critic from a Chinese mass that lacks the ability to
fight the system. Some other commentators included rival COOCs as part of the
Chinese collectivity from which they wished to distance themselves. One COOC
referred to the Chinese who are physically outside China but support the Chinese
government as “stubborn with their granite heads” as the Chinese living in China, and
as despicable as the “Chinese men’s soccer team.” Another COOC, who argued that
individual and independent thinking was a crucial principle for the survival of the
Chinese nation, did so by distancing himself or herself from the Chinese “crowd”:
I am amazed there are so many people here that do not understand and respect
art at all, and also do not have an individual mind, not even talking about
having a soul! I feel truly sad . . . When the emperor is wearing his “new
clothes,” do not be the crowd, try to be the kid! If more Chinese could think
like that, then this country will have more hope (commentary to De Guo Zhi
Sheng, Aug 13, 2008).
In this type of responses, the commentators’ positions were enacted primarily
through the lens of individuality. But in other cases, COOCs who agreed with
ingroup critics of China stressed a dimension of their identity: their connection to the
social reality of China. The perception that today’s social reality in China is
disenchanting is an important perspective through which commentators enacted a
sense of individuality through the scope of sociality. In their comments, references to
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China’s deteriorating social structure and degenerating political ethos provided a
departing point for the enactment of their ideological positions. Through social
critique, commentators constructed a perception of self in which they positioned
themselves as critical ingroup members with relatively pessimistic views of China’s
socioeconomic conditions and political leadership. For example, they refer to the
current economic prosperity in China as “fleeting excitation on a deathbed” and
would argue that the “broken boat of Chinese government” will not “float” long.
“Look at China’s reality,” one entreated: “ordinary Chinese don’t have place to live
in . . . few can afford cars, high commodity prices, high prices for gasoline
(commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).” Another seemed to even put a
curse on the nation: “China, a terminal patient with both AIDS and cancer, should die
earlier to get reborn earlier (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).”
When agreeing with an ingroup critic’s view that China was facing a national
crisis, one commentator identified as Yuguo79 expressed the same depressing view of
China’s social reality:
A real patriotic article well-written . . . Hope the CCP could reach some
consensus with a greater sense of urgency! China is now entrapped in a
dilemma: to develop, China needs to get away from Mao’s “close-door” policy
and connect to other countries. While upon the international connection, the
economy has developed to become 70% reliant on foreign trade. Officials
corrupted, citizens frivolous. “Foreign flies” now are replaced by domestic
insects! “One step at a time” and “feel the rocks to cross the river” – but what
about if the river were too deep to reach the rocks and people could be wiped
out (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).
In the same forum, another commentator offered a similar analysis:
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I couldn’t agree more. Great article that says what I want to say. China has
really come to the brink of a dooming abyss. Internal turmoil and foreign
threats can be worse than the late Qin dynasty. And people are the same,
numb and immoral. Upper class aristocrats oppress crazily! Perhaps this is
also their last craziness. Pathetically, all Chinese people will become their
grave sacrifices. Is it worth it (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18,
2010)?
And yet another offered this view of the Chinese supreme leaders in their enactment
of a position of identification as a critical observer:
. . . these leaders in an autocratic or authoritarian regime never went through
popular election or revolution for their high positions, which have been
bestowed by the totalitarian mechanism. They do not have to be concerned
about public image. How could and would they salute their people with full
attention like those Western and Taiwanese leaders who would bow deep to
their people . . . not to say to the two groups of Chinese (Taiwan and Hong
Kong) in the free world… (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).
In sum, one may argue that both the commentators who stress China’s social
reality and those who stress their individuality when asserting their positional
identification situate themselves at a distance from the Chinese cultural core. Both
positions involve negative associations and attributions toward China’s regime and
peoples and show an absence of references to notions like motherland or even use of
collective pronouns like “we” and “our.” In this case, the dichotomy between the
responses anchored on a sense of individualist and social-structural analysis does not
lend itself to different ideological positions. Furthermore, we see how these two
dimensions, individuality and sociality, crisscross concerns over material and spiritual
dimensions to build positional cultural identification. More specifically, it seems to
suggest that from individuality one sees more of materiality while through sociality
one feels more of spirituality.
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Opposing ingroup criticism of China. The reactions of commentators who
opposed the criticism posed by ingroup critics showed three main themes, often
intermingled in the discourse: the attack on the personal character of critics, a
questioning of the critics’ identity as Chinese, accusation of xenocentrism, and the
affirmation nationalism and positive Chinese identity. In all cases, in the process of
positioning themselves in opposition to critics, these commentators enacted a
heightened sense of cultural attachment to China and positive identification as
members of the Chinese culture.
Among COOCs who rejected ingroup criticism of China, there is a perception
that critics who attack China are jealous of the Chinese current achievements because
they are not a part of them; that critics are incapable of taking pride in China’s
progress as a nation because of their self-righteousness and ego-centrism; and that
critics are individuals who are alienated by the influence of the West. One
commentator who reacted to the article admonishing the Chinese not to be too proud
of the Beijing Olympics stated her or his position in a scoffing mimicry of the critic’s
voice (italic words are used to stress sarcastic intonation):
Regardless of whether it is good or not, if I’m not part of it, I would badmouth
it unflinchingly! . . . The Olympics can help the Chinese people get rid of the
negative mentality resulting from so many years of being bullied and
oppressed, including the fear and glorification of Western culture. After
reading this article, I smell something sour: I’m smart, intelligent, and
important . . . why I am still being excluded from the “elite” group in Beijing,
only able to survive in the remote and occlusive countryside of a foreign
nation and to get some attention by ventilating my cynical rants upon the
opportunity when tens of thousands of people are watching the Olympics.
Sigh (commentary to (Wo De Zhong Guo, Aug 11, 2008)!
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In comments like this one, ingroup critics are portrayed as self-centric and
westernized, as individuals who live outside China and will not partake in China’s
proud historical moment because they are not included in national life. Others see
ingroup critics as “self-indulged” and “narcissistic,” as “anomalies” linked to Chinese
culture on a physiological or genetic basis only. As one commentator stated:
I am amazed by LZ [Lou Zhu or 楼主, meaning owner of the house referring
to the author of the fourth article in this section, around which the forum was
formed], who can be tearfully nitpicking. With a mix of rationality, sensitivity,
discontent, and self-righteousness in him, LZ is indeed a psychopath and an
anomaly [as a Chinese] (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).”
Thus, a common rhetorical strategy used to assert an ideological position is to
discredit a rival critic by ascribing to his or her personality flaws.
Another strategy is to question the ingroup critics’ motive and identity as
Chinese. Commentators who rejected ingroup cultural criticism characterized critics
as dissidents and separatists and used labels like “Du” (independence), “Yun”
(democracy), and “Lun” (Fa Lun Gong) to refer to them. Critics are seen as
individuals who have won sympathetic support from the West and therewith would
like to say something against China that the West would like to hear. Their loyalty to
the nation and Chinese identity are, in the last instance, put into question. The
motives of ingroup cultural criticism are incomprehensible for these COOCs. As one
commentator stated: “According to my judgment, you are not Chinese at all for you
cannot bear something good happened to China.” Another wrote: “Don’t be so mean,
unless you’re not Chinese.” In another example, one indicated:
I don’t believe that this was done by some who loves China. There are
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complaints and malcontent for misguiding and instigating people. Apparently
the author is heinous, with evil intent to harm the Chinese people’s cultural
esteem (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Mar 18, 2010).
Often, messages end up ostracizing ingroup critics, as in these examples:
He [Ai Weiwei, an outspoken ingroup critic] is an enemy of us Chinese.
He [Ai Weiwei] is just like you [referring to one of the ingroup critics],
another traitor who is relying on selling your old country to make a living.
Tell me why would we care about what he and you have to say? (commentary
to (Wo De Zhong Guo, Aug 18, 2008).

Thus, in responding to ingroup cultural criticism COOCs mixed the
denigration of the personality and identity of rivals with the affirmation of their own
Chinese identity and cultural pride. In these cases, positive and even unconditional
attachment is more important than critical reflection. For example:
To the writer [the ingroup critic]: YOU ARE WRONG. I respect your analysis
and, indeed, some of the problems you pointed out are true. BUT you chose
the wrong timing and you are too prejudiced! Yet let me say that for modest
Chinese people, the most important combination is passion + pride, as Chinese
people suffered a lot, sacrificed a lot in the past, and it is time for them to
stand up and say, “WE ARE THE BEST!” Never feel ashamed to say that
when you are succeeding, as this is your right to say so. National confidence
is far MORE crucial than self-criticism for China. The problems you
mentioned are in general everywhere in the world. Why do you have to
particularly discourage Chinese people when they’re feeling well and making
progress? If you're Chinese, I strongly recommend you to be more positive
about your people, your country. If you are not Chinese, PLEASE, show your
respect to the great Chinese people and this great Nation (commentary to Wo
De Zhong Guo, Aug 11, 2008)!
This commentator attempted to be assertive with his or her positive cultural
identification and refused to tolerate the negativity embedded in ingroup criticism.
Another commentator further explained why ingroup cultural criticism against
Olympics was improper in the “concurrent” time frame:
I’m not incapable of listening to different voices. I am just disgusted by the
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author (not his or her position), who brought out a bowl of shit when others
were trying to enjoy some delicious dishes and with some seemingly profound
messages. When we eat, we can’t think of the other end of the food passage,
which is shit. Let’s just enjoy the meal and look to the future, when we could
have a greater variety of foods and maybe get to land on the Moon or Mars.
You don’t have to make us sick with some shit in every meal we eat
(commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Aug 11, 2008).
Implicitly or explicitly, in the rejection of ingroup criticism COOCs appealed
to notions of xenocentrism and nationalism. While ingroup critics are labeled
xenocentrics motivated by materialism, those loyal to China present themselves in the
light of a nationalistic spirituality. Such a position also implies a reflection on the
COOCs’ perception of fundamental cultural differences between China and the more
developed Western world. For example, when one commentator joins the debate on
Ai Weiwei’s qualifications as an artist, the reference to xenocentrism and materialism
is clear:
I’m thrilled to hear that Ai Weiwei’s European artistic activities were
sponsored by the Europeans. Downstairs “Highly Asymmetric” [the user name
of another COOC who sympathized with ingroup critics] hopes to prove Ai
Weiwei’s accomplishment with the fact that he was once awarded European
financial aid. This is something we should really pay attention to . . . It is
quite natural and normal for him to say something that the West would like to
hear as he is a beneficiary of such financial sponsorship (commentary to De
Guo Zhi Sheng, Aug 13, 2008).
On the other hand, commentators could also react to critics by stressing their
nationalist position in opposition to materialism and xenocentrism, as in this example:
The meaning of many human activities cannot be measured with money. This
Olympics might be commercially successful or not. More important is the
psychological impact it brings about, including those on foreigners and those
on Chinese ourselves. [It can] help reestablish Chinese pride and scatter the
mental shadows amassed over years of oppression, including the xenophobia
and the resulting xenocentrism (commentary to Wo De Zhong Guo, Aug 11,
2008).
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In sum, COOCs responded to ingroup ideological criticism by making sense of
the critics’ individuality, sociality, materiality, and spirituality and, simultaneously,
manifesting their own cultural identification. In this sense, the internal ideological
debate becomes a way in which self-other perceptions are constructed and lead to
relatively stable ideological positions of cultural identification. For instance, in
regards to individuality we find that at the same time when they COOCs accuse
ingroup critics of being jealous and self-righteous, they reflect their own positions as
proud members of the Chinese culture. And by questioning the ingroup critics’
credibility and group membership, they stress their cultural attachment and pride.
Through ascribing the ingroup critics a xenocentric mentality driven by materialistic
self-interests they exhibit their nationalism as an unchallenged spiritual preference.
Chapter Summary and Conclusion
COOCs participating in heated political forums present the ideological
heterogeneity within the cultural group they represent. However, their diverse
responses to different topics of ideological debate show peculiar patterns that manifest
how the Chinese in the diaspora enact their positional cultural identification and enact
different levels of attachment or detachment from Chinese cultural membership.
Overall, COOCs’ cultural identification in ideological debates is manifested primarily
through an ideological divide between pro-China and pro-Western perspectives. Of
course, in almost all selected forums there were also commentators who attempted to
reach a middle ground with objective or neutral comments, but close to none aimed
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for the reconciliation of the two sides. In this sense, cultural attachment becomes
ideology in the selected forums.
The analysis of the data showed that on both sides of the divide, the debate
leads commentators to assume positions of attachment or detachment from Chinese
cultural membership not in a set of binary oppositions but as a continuum with
varying degrees. Theoretically, cultural attachment should be conceptually different
from the patriotic ideology promoted by the current regime that always strives to align
and juxtapose loyalty to the nation, loyalty to the party, and loyalty to the people.
However, the implantation of CCP party line in the educational experience of COOCs
might actually precondition the ideological clashes observed in the selected forums.
Those who take a defensive position toward China are likely to emphasize the
inseparability of nation, government, and people. Other COOCs with critical
positions were more likely to stress the differentiation between one’s attachment to
Chinese culture and tradition and one’s detachment from the regime and its
Communist ideology. More specifically, attachment to the cultural core was
expressed in these forums primarily as 1) the defense of the rationality and the
justification of the decision making of Chinese political authorities and their
economic system, 2) affirmation of the positive qualities of Chinese culture and
people, and 3) the celebration of the historical, economic, or social achievements of
China and its peoples. Manifestations of cultural attachment generally conveyed a
sense of cultural pride and positive identification as a member of the Chinese nation
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or culture. Detachment or distance from the cultural core was expressed in positions
that 1) criticized the ideology and decision making of Chinese authorities and called
for regime change, 2) focused on negative aspects of Chinese culture and the
character of its peoples, and 3) denounced Chinese failures and abuses committed
through time. Manifestations of a cultural detachment were more commonly linked to
a sense of cultural shame and separation from the dynamics of Chinese politics and
culture in the mainland. Across topics and forums, cultural attachment is conveyed in
the construction of self as loyal to the Chinese motherland and people, and as proud of
China’s progress and achievements, while others are perceived as disloyal,
opportunistic, or envious. Cultural detachment is conveyed in constructions of self as
an independent and critical thinker knowledgeable of Western culture and systems
while the others are conceived as dictatorial, conformist, vulnerable or backward. It is
important to observe that attachment and detachment is always a continuum rather
than an opposition of extreme ends. This is most evident among COOCs who are
critical of China and may distance themselves from the Chinese political and even
cultural landscape and yet use pronouns like “we” and “our” when writing about
China; it is also seen among COOCs who are critical of China’s policies and cultural
climate but express their concern with the fate of the nation or its ecological balance.
Overall, attachment to cultural core leads to an affirmation of identity that is
more unified and stable for it conflates the self with the collective, the land and the
culture, and the government and the people. Distance from the core leads to the
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affirmation of more complex, ambivalent, and fractured identity. Here, we found
positions split along the lines of: rejecting the political regime but affirming
attachment to notions of the Chinese “motherland” and “people;” of criticizing
China’s politics and culture while showing concern with the fate of the nation and its
ecological balance; accepting criticism only to reinforce the legitimacy of the status
quo and Maoist principles; or separating self from the collective by stressing the
inferiority of the political, social, cultural, and even human elements of the Chinese
nation.
This examination of the dynamics of positional identification also revealed
how the four prongs of cultural identity intersect in the construction of identities.
Although ideological debate activates primarily the dimension of spirituality, the
other three, individuality, sociality, and materiality form part of matrix of identity that
allows individuals to define their sense of self and perceptions of others. Thus, the
responses to ideological debates show how COOCs—whether critical or defensive of
China—might define a position stressing individuality and the distinction between
individuals and the mass. While some might be more driven to sociality, striving to
connect to the social reality of China to enact a sociocultural affiliation, others
respond through the scope of materiality, prioritizing economic bases and
accentuating material necessities in their assertion of Chinese identity. Yet another
set might approach directly to the spirituality, elevating cultural attitudes and national
sentiment as the basis for identification. The boundaries among these positionings are
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not clear-cut for the different dimensions are mingled in the constitution of a
particular position of identification. For example, cultural pride or patriotic sentiment,
reflective of one’s sociality, might be expressed along with one’s view on the
imperative of meeting the material needs of the people, which reflects the dimension
of materiality. In other cases, commentators start with references to individual human
factors and move on to talk about China’s social reality, based upon which they
might establish their ideological/spiritual preferences in a direct manner – as in the
case of COOCs that challenged the CCP by arguing that its dominance is the reason
for China’s social and moral degeneration. This position was clearly articulated by
one commentator in this manner:
Incrementally, the Central Administration is losing its credibility and
adherence from its people. When the real crisis comes forth and the Central
Administration could no longer call upon its people, China will become the
former Soviet Union, out of the will of all anti-China forces. China, yes
indeed, you cannot continue to degenerate like this. Only a government that
prioritizes people’s benefits can lead its people towards real national
prosperity. China, please don’t get rid of your real spirit established in the
Mao’s era.
Lastly, the analysis of data identified that yet another prominent feature in
COOCs’ construction of their ideological positioning is how perceptions of China’s
position in the global environment mediate the enactment of individual and group
positions of identification. Generally, the articulation of an ideological position and
sense of cultural membership is supported by a particular stance on and analysis of the
relationship between China and the West, which is often posed as one’s position in
regards the rivalry between China and the United States. Often, COOCs’
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understandings of China in the global context were expressed as either a perception
that tensions between China and Western hegemony were increasing and would lead
to change along the lines of the democratic reforms favored by critics of the regime,
or a perception that diminished the capacity of Western powers to dominate China
and viewed a global environment with less competition and hostility against China.
These debates suggest the importance of intercultural contact for the construction of
identity positions among Chinese living abroad.
In reference to the research line of intergroup sensitivity effect, the current
textual analysis shows more complicated and essential differences between COOCs’
responses to outgroup and ingroup criticisms. Such qualitative differences can be
attributed to the characteristics of COOCs’ cultural identification, which is inherently
related to their perception of global context and China’s current and historical position.
More exposed to outgroup cultural criticisms against China, perhaps more aware of
China’s quandary as the world’s punching bag, and more used to Western Chinabashing propaganda, COOCs might be on the lower end of individual ethnocentrism’s
scale. In order to cultivate cultural detachment necessary for their survival overseas,
COOCs are more readily tolerant than their peers in China of cultural criticisms
originated from non-Chinese sources. On the other hand, due to strengthened cultural
core in both directions of cultural shame and cultural pride, COOCs’ responses to
ingroup cultural criticisms tend to be complicated with more plausible interpretations
in making sense of the motives of the ingroup critics from the scope formed by their
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individuality, sociality, and materiality. Out of cultural shame, the COOCs who agree
with ingroup cultural criticisms might stress individual distinctiveness in their
alignment with the critics. Out of cultural pride, those who oppose ingroup cultural
criticisms might emphasize the significance of elevated cultural position in one’s
social and mental stability. Generally, according to the analysis of this chapter,
different from the pattern indicated by intergroup sensitivity effect, COOCs showed
more references of individuality in their interpretations of the motives of ingroup
cultural critics and more references of global context for taking outgroup cultural
critics for granted.
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Review of Study
This dissertation examined how Chinese individuals living overseas who
participate in the cyber-ethnic community created by the website Wuencity.com
interact with one another in this virtual community to make sense of intercultural
differences in their new environments, cope with life challenges in the multicultural
settings they inhabit, and assert their ideological positions regarding the position of
China in the global context. The analysis presented here shows how in the articulation
of their reactions to news and opinions about China posted online and in debates with
one another, these Chinese overseas online commentators (COOCs) enact a sense of
Chinese cultural identity that conveys both the heterogeneity within this population as
well as some group peculiarities. Furthermore, the communicative practices observed
allow us to explore the complexity of identity performance in processes of cultural
identification that are prompted by intercultural interaction.
In the present study, I employed an interpretive approach to intercultural
communication and the procedures of grounded theory methodology to elucidate the
problem under study. The works of three intercultural communication scholars—
Carbaugh, Collier, and Hecht—who have advanced the interpretive perspective to
communication and identity informed the theoretical framework guiding the
conceptualization of the problem, methodological design, and interpretation of data.
The procedures of grounded theory methodology were followed for the processing,
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coding, and analysis of data selected to identify relevant categories and concepts and
their relations. In this chapter, I will summarize the answers to the main research
questions explored, and discuss the theoretical implications of the findings of this
study for the study of identity, its limitations, and suggestions for further study.
The main research questions that guided this investigation were:
1. How do Chinese individuals living overseas use online communication to
construct a sense of identity in the context of intercultural interaction abroad?
2. What does online discourse reveal about the dynamics of cultural
identification among the Chinese in the diaspora?
3. What does online communication processes tell about the complex
interrelations among dimensions of identity?
In response to research question1, the analysis of data revealed that COOCs
used online communication via Wuencity.com to engage in three primary
communicative practices through which they performed a sense of identity: a) to
make sense of perceived cultural differences in the multicultural societies they inhabit
through self-other comparison, b) to give and receive practical advice on how to
manage conflict, suffering or misunderstanding that result from exposure to new
cultural environments outside China, and c) to debate and assume ideological
positions in reaction to criticism posed by Chinese and non-Chinese critics of China.
In response to research question 2, I posit that each of these categories of
communicative practice revealed a particular dynamic of cultural identification that I
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have labeled perceptual identification, strategic identification, and positional
identification. Each of these forms of identification reflects the internal tensions and
heterogeneity of the group in question as well as the shared understandings that give
the group a sense of cohesion as members of the Chinese culture. And in response to
research question 3, I will argue that the data also illustrate how identity enactment is
about the dynamic intersection and rotation of the dimensions of identity that I term
individuality, sociality, spirituality and materiality in the complex matrix of identity.
COOCs’ Cultural Identification
COOCs’ commentary messages evoked by China-related news topics are
reliable and meaningful textual proofs reflecting their group psychology, which can
be represented and interpreted by the concepts of cultural identity and identification.
Online setting and global context permit and facilitate such discursive manifestation
of COOCs’ cultural identification at such a large group level. According to social
identity theory, what motivates COOCs to connect with other ingroup and enact their
cultural identity with their commentary responses is about everyone’s internal demand
for positive and distinctive cultural image. Cultural identity theories integrated in the
matrix framework of cultural identity can further explain the prevalent internal
fragmentations and positional heterogeneity among COOCs. From divergent cultural
cores, in diverse contextual perceptions, and through various prismatic lenses formed
by different identity dimensions, the fragmentation and heterogeneity of COOCs’
manifested cultural identification seem consequential. As Stuart Hall (1996) posits,
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sometimes study of internal fragmentation of cultural identity can be more meaningful.
Notions developed from close analyses of the selective data can be utilized to answer
the three general research questions:
RQ1: How do Chinese individuals living overseas use online communication to
construct a sense of identity in the context of intercultural interaction abroad?
The analysis of data revealed that COOCs used online communication via
Wenxuecity.com to engage in three primary communicative practices through which
they performed a sense of identity. First, they use self-other comparison to make
sense of perceived cultural differences in the multicultural societies they inhabit.
Responding to perceived racial, gender and other cultural differences, COOCs tend to
use self-other comparison as a strategy to communicate their sense of place in the
social order of their adopted societies. Through comparison, some stress cultural
opposition to maintain a sense of unity within and distinction of their cultural identity,
while some downplay cultural differences to stress individuality and enact different
degrees of cultural detachment from Chinese culture. Second, COOCs use online
communication to give and receive advice on how to manage conflict, suffering or
misunderstanding that result from exposure to new cultural environments outside
China. Responding to cultural challenges and seeking to foster a positive group
image, COOCs engage in a form of cultural counseling to offer practical strategies for
cultural survival across national borders. Third, the virtual community serves COOCs
as a forum for ideological debate where they assume ideological positions in reaction
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to criticism posed by Chinese and non-Chinese critics of China. In ideological
debates, COOCs manifest their positions as critics or defenders of China and its
peoples, thus showing their internal heterogeneity via vehement positional clashes.
Through these communicative practices, commentators enacted processes of
individual and group identification as Chinese living overseas.
RQ1a: How does the immediate multicultural living environment
influence identification processes? Intercultural contact in global contexts
facilitates COOCs’ process of cultural identification. In close proximity to the host
society, COOCs become more aware of their cultural identity as individuals jutted in
contrast to other local or global cultural groups. As presented in Chapter four, the
most salient cultural differences in the local context that generated discussion among
COOCs were race, gender and group stereotyping and nationality. On the topic of
race and ethnicity, self-other comparisons involve the construction of hierarchical
racial orders, with strong emphasis on creating oppositions between groups. Overall,
the discussion of racial differences leads to the self-positioning of the Chinese as a
disadvantaged group in local and global racial hierarchies. Simultaneously, through
polarized generalizations about Chinese vs. Western sojourners, some commentators
asserted their perception of the disadvantageous reality faced by Chinese individuals
abroad when compared to the privileged treatment of Westerners in China. Likewise,
when reacting to gender and other group stereotypes, COOCs generally perceived
themselves as a cohesive group singled out for negative characterization by outsiders.
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They tended to identify themselves with Chinese culture in a gesture of spectatorship,
cheering or booing as they accepted, rejected or re-thought the stereotypes constructed
by others in Western cultures. Using comparison through opposition, COOCs saw
their gender/sexual identity bound by common lines of racial and ethnic identity and
history as Chinese. In contrast to discussions about race and stereotyping, discussions
about national character featured a much more fragmented spectrum of positions of
identification and fluid sense of individual and group identity. Overall, the debates
exposed a divide between critics of Chinese culture and society and those who defend
the moral traits of the Chinese collective identity while accusing Chinese critics of
xenocentrism. Defenders of Chinese culture enacted a clearly defined sense of group
identity bound by loyalty and affective attachment to Chinese nationality and
citizenship. This positioning places them in an antagonistic relation with COOCs
who compared Chinese and Western nations to stress the moral flaws of the Chinese
and the economic and social underdevelopment of China, while affirming
identification with the superiority of Western values and social systems. Those who
are critical of Chinese culture and peoples tend to enact a more individualist and
pragmatist sense of identity that allows them to seek accommodation or conciliation
of differences as a rational strategy for cultural survival and economic success in their
host societies. Thus, as they make sense of their differences and similarities with
other groups, some react by expressing strong sentimental connections with their
motherland and attachment to Chinese culture while others prefer to curb emotional
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attachment and cultivate different degrees of cultural distance from their Chinese
cultural core to deal with negative images and perceptions of their group and culture
in the host societies.
As discussed in Chapter five, textual evidence also indicates that lived
experiences of life predicaments in host societies also provide insights about self and
other cultures that COOCs’ exchange online in the form of advice to preserve
individual and collective well being. The discourse analyzed showed that
intercultural conflicts prompted instances of COOCs sympathetic support for other
Chinese subjects facing conditions of marginalization and victimization as outsiders
in a foreign culture. Binding them is the awareness of the disadvantaged social
position and negative cultural image of Chinese individuals in the contexts of host
societies. Notwithstanding the fervent discussions showing solidarity and
cohesiveness as a dominant trend, some texts also reveal how some COOCs are
reluctant to identify with their Chinese compatriots by relying on individualistic
approaches to life predicaments.
Overall, COOCs’ responses indicate that intercultural interaction heightens
their awareness of differences and prompts identification processes in which they
stress group unity when they discuss social disadvantages faced by the group.
Simultaneously, group division and various degrees of detachment from Chinese
culture tend to be enacted when the attention shifts to what to do about negative
perceptions or situations encountered by Chinese individuals overseas.
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RQ1b: How does global politics influence identification processes? The
data presented also suggest that a salient influence in the negotiation of personal and
group identity among Chinese living overseas are the contending perceptions of
China’s global position and international relations—particularly the China-Western
relations—and how these influence their personal and social lives. In a context that
heightens global awareness and due to different perceptions of global power
structures, COOCs favor a variety of ideological positions that affect their the
enactment of their sense of identity, as illustrated in Chapter six. For instance, among
those who perceived mounting external pressures against China, the divergent
tendencies were to stress cultural attachment and a defensive attitude or to stress a
critical attitude and individualist detachment from group membership. In this sense,
their ideological position on China’s global position was a major factor influencing
their identification with Chinese culture.
RQ2: What does online discourse reveal about the dynamics of cultural
identification among the Chinese in the diaspora?
Across these three levels of interaction, COOCs’ cultural identification is
characterized by the interplay of convergence and division. This dialectic tension
between group convergence and division is expressed through a set of recurring
interpretive framework and rhetorical strategies featuring a) emphasis on cultural
opposition or cultural similarities when defining cultural boundaries, b) cultural
attachment or detachment to Chinese culture, and 3) expression of cultural shame and
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cultural pride. These tensions are fueled by participants’ life realities and their
negotiation of the multiple dimensions of their cultural identity.
RQ2a: What are the most salient points of convergence within the group?
With increased multicultural awareness, COOCs demonstrated points of convergence,
the most salient of which are their common sense of marginalization, low status in
host societies, poor image in host cultures, and heightened nationalist sentiments. As
elaborated in Chapters four and five, in responding to debates of perceived cultural
differences and compatriots’ life predicaments, COOCs consensually manifested their
sense of marginalization in the host society. Their commentary responses also
contained concerns about inevitable challenges resulting from the low status and poor
image of the Chinese culture in the host societies. In most cases, when the discussion
shifts to the solutions to such challenges, divergent points emerge to fuel debate and
divide the group.
RQ2b: What are the most salient internal divisions within the group?
The diversity of opinions aired in COOCs’ messages attests to the fragmentary nature
of cultural identification among members of the ingroup. The main sources of
division in the group are caused by COOCs contending ideological positions
regarding China’s political regime; varying levels of attachment to or detachment
from a Chinese nationalist sentiment vs. levels of attachment to or detachment from
the perception of Western societies as superior; and the split between
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individualist/pragmatic and collective/idealist in the approach to intercultural conflict
and negotiation of solutions to it.
RQ3: What does online communication reveal about the complex interrelations
among the dimensions of identity?
COOCs’ responses to specific topics and debates demonstrate how these
activate different dimensions of cultural identity. Even though COOCs’ responses
have focal points that emphasize identification through perceptions and interpretation
of cultural difference (Chapter four), principles and strategies for action (Chapter five),
or ideological positionings (Chapter six), some underlying dynamics of the
complexity of identity enactment are revealed across focal points.
Generally, identification is articulated through strategic rotations of the four
identity dimensions described earlier: individuality, sociality, materiality, and
spirituality. For example, in dealing with negative stereotypes of Chinese identity in
the host culture, many COOCs stress the significance of individuality and downplay
their cultural affiliation (sociality), even when acknowledging the social dimensions
of being stereotyped by Westerners. And as illustrated in Chapter five, in order to
deal with the burden or shame regarding China’s historical disgrace, many COOCs
advise other ingroup members to separate and rotate from individual shame to social
or group affirmation of national pride (sociality). Although the discourse on
nationality exhibits significant fragmentation and group division, COOCs can
manifest group cohesion as reflected in their affirmation of a positive and distinctive
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group identity along the lines of national pride or favorable characterization of moral
character (spirituality) over individual pragmatism (materiality).
However, as a general trend and as they gain a more profound understanding
of the multicultural realities of their host societies, COOCs recognize that Chinese
identity—the central nexus defining their group membership and identity in the eyes
of others—is neither powerful nor favorable. Therefore, to foster positive cultural
identification, they tend to rotate to personal achievement (individuality) as more
significant than group image or collective action (sociality). In this sense, as textual
evidence shows, there is a tendency toward spectatorship among COOCs, with only a
very limited number of comments mentioning group efforts or a concrete political
agenda to collectively address biases, discrimination and hate in host societies.
Although sensitive to how their cultural image is shaped in the eyes of others, and
interested in developing strategies to prevent frustration and overreaction in other
ingroup members, generally COOCs distance themselves from political and cultural
arenas where they expect to see others prevail.
Cultivating individuality and cultural distance turns out to be a basic tactic
among COOCs who want to maintain emotional stability and thrive across borders.
In sum, growing individuality, the strategic management of cultural attachment to
Chinese culture to ensure professional success (materiality) and social adaptation
(sociality), and deep fragmentation along ideological lines (spirituality) become the
most salient identity dimensions in COOCs’ online cultural identification.
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Discussion: Theoretical Implications
This dissertation is a qualitative study grounded in online textual data guided
by an interpretive framework integrated from theory of cultural identity. The
analytical findings illustrate some tenets and principles of cultural identity theory and
meanwhile also extend this framework of cultural identity via the communication
perspective of complexity. Cultural identity is defined here as one's self-concept
formed and performed in communication that emphasizes one's connection to cultural
membership. Cultural identification is the enactment of cultural identity. Cultural
identity is a complexity construct equivalent to the concept of self across cultural
borderline. Cultural identification is the communication of cultural identity’s
properties in its structural and dynamic complexity. The complexity of cultural
identification involves the diversity, fragmentation, and interplay of cultural identity
manifested in particular communication channels. COOCs’ commentaries evidence
such complexity. This section discusses about what theoretical contribution the
current study can make to the study of cultural identity in the communication
perspective of complexity. First, I discuss some conceptual dialects that constitute the
fragmentation of cultural identity. Second, I argue that the tree forms of cultural
identification identified in this study have relatively divergent positional features
defined by the structural salience of different identity dimensions. Third, regarding
the interplay among cultural identity dimensions, I elaborate the theoretical
implications in light of the contextual influences and constraints of online and
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intercultural settings on the manifestation of individual and group cultural
identification. Lastly, I link the results of the current study to literature of identity,
media, and Chinese diaspora to illuminate a complex model of Chinese identity. The
discussion of theoretical implications is followed by a section on limitations and
future orientations of the current research.
Fragmentation Represented by Dialectics
As Hall (1996) posits, cultural identity’s internal fragmentation is more
important than its often assumed homogeneity for the outsiders. Heterogeneity from
within can represent one primary aspect of the characteristics of cultural identity.
This tenet is particularly true for intercultural communication scholars in an era of
Internet, when people can be more connected with each other and therewith more
exposed to differences and more expressive with different personal views. Analytical
findings from chapter four, five and six illustrate such internal fragmentation of
COOCs’ cultural identification, which can be represented and explained by a series of
conceptual dialectics – critical vs. defensive cultural core, depreciated vs. appreciated
perception of external tension, cultural opposition vs. cultural similarity, and cultural
shame vs. cultural pride.
These dialects constitute COOCs’ internal tension manifested in their
commentaries, which can then be interpreted by the concept of cultural spectatorship.
These concepts are developed from the application of cultural identity theory in the
analysis grounded in selected COOC’s discourses. These concepts can be applied to
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describe and interpret COOCs’ identity performance. The theoretical value of these
derivative concepts lie in how they can extend the systematic understanding of the
complexity of cultural identity.
Critical vs. defensive cultural core. The cultural core is defined in this
research as a socially constructed and varying sense of affiliation with one’s cultural
membership that is communicated spontaneously and connects various dimensions of
identity. In the matrix of cultural identity, the cultural core interconnects the four
primary dimensions. Such a structural feature implies that cultural core has a relative
stable positioning and can be reflected through the scopes formed by combinatorial
effects of different identity properties. Individuals with similar sets of life realities
might have quite opposite cultural cores. Among COOCs’ commentary responses, the
demarcation of critical and defensive cultural cores is clear and their conflict is hard
to reconcile, especially in the forums with political and ideological theses. In
understanding one’s cultural identity, through the lenses of one’s life realities, we
expect one’s cultural core to vary in reference to identity dimensions and to influence
rhetorical strategies. When examined through the matrix of cultural identity proposed
in this dissertation, COOCs’ messages can become heuristic for probing the cultural
core even though individual life realities do not necessarily determine the cultural
core. The concept of cultural core in the total structure of cultural identity can be
applied in communication studies to many meaningful themes related to culture,
ideology, and relationships.

235

Cultural opposition vs. cultural similarity. One primary force driving
cultural identification originates in cultural comparison. Particularly in perceptual
cultural identification when people are responding to perceived cultural difference,
they tend to resort to cultural comparison in enacting or asserting their cultural
identity. As the analytical findings in Chapter four indicate, when making sense of
differences through cultural comparison, COOCs might either highlight cultural
oppositions or downplay and trivialize differences while deliberately stressing cultural
similarities. Generally, from the perspective of cultural opposition, intercultural
contact becomes more problematic and challenging; in the perspective of cultural
similarity, cultural accommodation becomes necessary and valuable. However, those
who stress cultural opposition and those who value cultural similarity might have the
same set of motives: to manage inevitable uncertainty and anxiety in intercultural
contact through different orientations. Those for cultural opposition might hope to
ease out personal cognitive uncertainty by blaming it on the systematic
incompatibility of two cultures. Those for cultural similarity may be inclined to cope
with intercultural uncertainty and anxiety by transcending differences through the
stress on the ontological or essential commonality of cultures. Both interpretive
orientations are apparent in the commentaries examined. This suggests that
comparison is a driving force in cultural identification and it might be more dynamic
and situational than the manifestation of the cultural core. The orientation of cultural
comparison is not reflexive of cultural core but might be easily confounded as
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reflection of cultural core by the others. For instance, messages stressing cultural
opposition may be more easily regarded as from defensive cultural core while
messages with cultural similarity more inclined to be taken as from critical cultural
core. Potential intercultural tension resulting from cultural misunderstanding might
root in such cultural misperception. Certainly, this dialectic of cultural opposition and
cultural similarity and its relationship to the cultural core can open a line of research
about intercultural conflict and resolution.
Cultural sensitivity vs. cultural detachment. The seemingly contradictory
concepts of sensitivity and detachment might both be strategic goals pursued by those
who have to manage their cultural identification across cultural borderlines. Cultural
sensitivity or the ability to perceive cultural differences has been widely researched in
areas related to human interaction involving two or more cultures. Cultural
detachment is not necessarily an antithesis of cultural sensitivity or cultural
insensitivity. In effect cultural detachment can be seen as a degree of cultural
sensitivity that reflects deliberate neglect. Detachment may be an individual’s
strategy to manage prejudice or maltreatment by culturally different others. As shown
in Chapter five, cultural detachment is a strategy recommended by many
commentators in their practical advice to others when discussing life predicaments
encountered in intercultural contact. The analysis of COOCs’ commentaries
containing cultural strategies implies that cultural detachment can be promoted,
learned, and cultivated on the basis of cultural sensitivities. Cultural detachment can
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help prevent oversensitivity and any consequential overreaction. At perceptual and
cognitive levels, it is cultural sensitivity; at strategic level, it becomes cultural
detachment. Compared to cultural sensitivity, cultural detachment might be more
significant for those who are underprivileged, marginalized, and in relatively low
power position in their interaction with the more advantageous culturally different
others. In the imbalanced power structure, cultural sensitivity is more demanded for
those who are communicating with the underprivileged cultural others and cultural
detachment is more needed by sojourners like COOCs in their interactions with
mainstream host individuals and institutions. The interconnection of and distinction
between cultural sensitivity and cultural detachment as illustrated in Chapter five can
inspire another line of intercultural communication research.
Cultural pride vs. cultural shame. Self-bound cultural sentiment related to
positive or negative attitude toward one’s cultural membership can be revealed in
COOCs’ online commentaries. In cultural identification, one can express one’s
cultural pride or positive sentiment or reveal one’s cultural shame or negative
sentiment towards one’s own culture. Expression of cultural pride might be perceived
as cultural threat by outgroups with cultural animosity and therein discouraged by
strategic ingroups. On the other hand, marginalized and oppressed in the host society,
sojourners like COOCs might feel special need for expressing cultural pride to amend
their impaired self-esteem. Around a tensional line between expression and
discouragement of cultural pride are there often heated discussions in the researched
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forums since the participants are presumably in countries other than China. The
arguments are often related to the participants’ perception of the external cultural
environment. Contrary to cultural pride, cultural shame is assumed to be more
consonant with outgroup audiences, particularly those with political or cultural
animosity against China, and is expressed by some COOCs to foster cultural
detachment. Cultural shame might be more easily expressed by more self-content,
ego-centric ingroups with critical cultural core, who have appreciated perception of
China’s external tensions. The cultural sentiments of pride and shame can be mutually
transformed in certain topics by some COOCs. For instance, in discussions about
China’s historical burdens and national disgrace, the expressed cultural shame evoked
by memory of national disgrace is purposefully transformed into China’s moral
advantage as source for cultural pride by COOCs with defensive cultural core. In the
researched forums, COOCs often engage in debates about the moral, sentimental, and
practical basis of Chinese nationalism expressed as extreme forms of cultural pride,
and on Chinese xenocentrism expressed as an extreme form of cultural shame. In
short, the interplay of cultural pride and cultural shame characterizes COOCs’ online
cultural identification, which can be linked also to the notion of cultural spectatorship.
Cultural spectatorship. Cultural spectatorship refers to a mindset in which
cultural members are driven to observation and discussion of their culture’s
interaction with other cultures from a certain distance due to personal preference or
restriction, especially when such interaction turns into some sort of competition or
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clash. Curiosity and sentimental distance help define cultural spectatorship. COOCs’
forums are like bleachers where spectators are allowed to watch the game and choose
a side between the guest team and the host. Cultural pride and cultural shame
influence the spectators’ choices of favorite sides. Under the influence of cultural
pride, the majority of cultural spectators like COOCs might choose to support their
own culture as the guest team competing in the host arena. Guided by the feeling of
cultural shame and constrained by the host environment, some of the spectators might
convert themselves to support the host and meanwhile make critical commentaries
against the visiting team. Such a notion of cultural spectatorship can help describe the
characteristics of COOCs’ online cultural identification and explain its fragmentation.
It can also help depoliticize or reduce the ideological implication of the internal
divisions among the COOCs, who can be viewed more as people opting for freedom
outside their homeland.
In a nutshell, internal fragmentation or the heterogeneity of cultural identity
can be represented by a system of dialects such as critical vs. defensive cultural core,
cultural attitude defined by perceptual opposition or homogenization, and cultural
sentiment characterized by cultural shame or pride. The two dimensional dialects of
cultural identity’s primary properties are also integral part of such a dialectic system,
whose theoretical implications will be illuminated next.
Positional Saliencies in the Three Forms of Cultural Identification
Variance of cultural identification can be defined by the salient positions of
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different identity dimensions. Cultural identification can occur in all kinds of
communication channels. In Chapter two, cultural identity is defined as one's selfconcept formed and performed in communication that emphasizes one's connection to
cultural membership. Cultural identification is the enactment of cultural identity. In
the perspective of communication, cultural identity is formed and reflected in one’s
realization and manifestation of their life realities – individuality, sociality, materiality,
and spirituality. COOCs’ messages evidence the aforesaid internal fragmentation,
expressed through interpretive frameworks that are shaped by COOCs’ life realities.
COOCs disclose their diverse attitudes, attributes, strategies, and preferences via
contingent and yet profound sentiments in reference to various sets of identity
dimensions. For instance, to deal with negative stereotypes against Chinese cultural
image, some stress individuality over one’s sociality in terms of their group
membership or cultural identification. It seems that they might feel less stress if they
feel responsible only as individuals. Some other COOCs just avoid personal
responsibility for positive self identification by blaming their cultural affiliation. It
seems that these individuals can feel reassured by highlighting their disadvantaged
group position or culturally defined social status. To manage life predicaments,
COOCs propose various strategies and advocate cultural detachment by deliberately
undoing cultural stigmas developed through the indoctrination of their old country. To
settle down internal ideological clashes, some resort to spirituality while some others
go to materiality for balancing solutions. Overall, different salient positions of the
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four structural dimensions of cultural identity characterize the three main categories
of COOCs’ cultural identification – perceptual, strategic, and positional cultural
identification.
The salience of individuality in perceptual cultural identification. In
perceptual cultural identification, one reinforces one’s sense of self in contrast to
cultural traits observed in the host society. The individual culture-crossing experience
in cross-cultural contexts might more effectively activate self-awareness simply due
to daily contact with other ingroups. Therefore one might start to view oneself and the
outside world more through the scope of individuality, with reference to personal
merits such as career, achievement, strength, and perceived positive disposition. Even
in the Internet virtual community where they can encounter other ingroups, COOCs
still stress the significance of individual matters in the host society and promote
avoidance of group avowals when dealing with stereotypes against Chinese identity.
Although to manifest one’s cultural identity when perceiving cultural differences one
can refer to the others’ life realities, a steadfast preference to their individuality turns
out to be apparent in COOCs’ forums. In the salient position of individuality, one’s
cultural identification is enacted with reference to the uniqueness and autonomy of the
individual as the principal premise that dictates orientations to sociality, materiality,
and spirituality.
The salience of sociality in strategic cultural identification. In strategic
cultural identification to help other ingroups deal with life challenges in intercultural
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context, an individual might have the inclination of emphasizing the impact of group
membership on the individuals’ cultural survival in the host society. The interpretive
basis of cultural consulting lies in the debate between individual versus group causes
for maltreatment of ingroup individuals in the host society. Hence, sub-elements of
sociality such as cultural membership and group position might be relatively more
often highlighted in advising. Since the observation is more directed toward
understanding other ingroups’ life predicaments, one’s internal demand for positive
cultural membership might be activated as the dominating motivation for
communication acts of cultural identification. In the salient position of sociality, one’s
cultural identification is enacted with reference to cultural membership as the
principal premise that dictates orientations to individuality, materiality, and spirituality.
The salience of spirituality in positional cultural identification. In
positional cultural identification to assert one’s ideological preference and tackle
ideological clashes in the global context, one might develop arguments with an
interpretive tendency towards spirituality. Arguments with reference to individual,
social, and/or material dimensions tend to be oriented to the manifestation of an
individual’s ideological position. The heuristic dimension of spirituality is deeply
rooted in and profoundly reflective of one’s cultural core and can be seen more in the
online’s anonymous settings even if constrained to topical specificity (Dong, 2009). In
the salient position of spirituality, cultural identification is enacted with reference to
ideological and affective positions as the premise that dictates orientation to
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individuality, sociality, and materiality.
In this research, the difference in salient positions of identity dimensions is
categorical though it suggests its value for an empirical, quantitative study of its
variance. Categorically different salient positions might be further classified into
some finer categories or subcategories, which is beyond the scope of current research
and to be discussed in terms of this research’s future orientations.
Interrelationships between and among Identity Properties
Variance of cultural identification can also be defined by the rotation of four
different identity dimensions. Such rotation might result in gaps, discrepancies, and
interplays between identity dimensions, which might represent different psychological
states of the identifier. In the world of online discourse, relatively stable salient
positions are the result of rotations that result in different forms of cultural
identification. However, in real life and person-to-person or entity-to-entity contexts,
the rotation can be highly contextual, temporary, fluctuating, and variegated. A brief
discussion about the potential correlations between psychological states associated
with identity gaps and the structural rotation of identity dimensions can help
illuminate an important aspect of the theoretical implications of the identity model
employed in the current study.
One theoretical premise of these correlations is that gaps or discrepancies
between identity dimensions are the result of differential positional salience and
perceptual orientation of individuals. Yet, different degrees of saliency of identity
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dimensions might cause individual difficulty to manage smooth rotation of the
identity structure. The following discussion lies on this notion that seemingly
contradictory identity positions are the result of the positional salience of certain
dimensions of identity. The concept of salience means the different degrees of
activated awareness or mindfulness of one’s various life realities. Constrained by
certain contexts, salient positions might lead to inadvertent oblivion of some other
identity dimensions, which might become mental basis of certain temporary
personality disorders such as narcissistic, schizoid, and dependent ones. For instance,
an individual given a high power position might have a different degree of awareness
of such power or social position than others relative to one’s awareness of realities.
Perceptual orientation refers to how one’s observations lead to enactment of cultural
identity. Around the four basic identity dimensions, such perceptual orientations might
include the two pairs of dialectic tensions from individuality to sociality or vice versa
and from materiality to spirituality or vice versa. For instance, cultural spectatorship
as illustrated in Chapter four is a psychological state featuring individuality-tosociality perceptual orientation. In other cases, such as online commentaries regarding
how to deal with negative stereotypes against Chinese cultural image, the
observational direction features more of sociality-to-individuality. In forums of
political, ideological debates, the perceptual orientation from materiality to spirituality
tends to be more prevalent. The intersection of the two pairs of dialectical tensions
can result some more delicate categories of perceptual orientations, which can explain
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the variety of online commentaries.
In a nutshell, the structure of the four-prong cultural identity model and its
dynamic features might be a key to the intricacy of individual and group psychology
in cross-cultural and intercultural context. The application of this key can help
provide heuristic insights for more regional and specific practical challenges and
empirical inquiries.
The Complexity of Chinese Identity in the Global Context – Connecting to
Literature on Identity, Media, and Chinese Diaspora.
With a focus on one unique, clamorous cyber ethnic quarter in the bustling and
boisterous Internet “megalopolis,” the results of this study resound with current
literature on identity issues in media and cultural studies. The results reinforce Stuart
Hall’s exposition on the increasing fragmented identity manifested in discourses that
are produced by those who share the same identity ad are more accessible to mass
audiences (1996). Beyond nation, race, class, and ideology, the current study
identified new, finer categories to represent the differentiation of cultural
identification even from the same cultural group. These categories illustrate the
structural multidimensionality and dynamic rotation of identity positions. The
reported internal divisions in this study can illustrate Hall’s idea on the internal,
“psychic mechanism” of identity, which has become more evident in the new media
environment with constantly expanding ranges of participants. Furthermore, the
observed trend to individualization among COOCs exemplifies Hokinson’s (2007)
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proposition that the Internet helps society become more and more individualized. On
the other hand, this study also corroborates Mitra’s (2002) observation of the cultural
convergence effect of the Internet. The current study expands the literature by
stressing the dialectic tension between the trend of individualization and the effect of
cultural convergence – the Internet becomes a place for ingroup individuals to
collectively express their preference for individualization.
This study is also linked genealogically to literature on Chinese identity in
diaspora. The findings relate to the more current status of newer members of the
Chinese diaspora worldwide and reflect finer internal divisions and more diverse
survival strategies in the more contemporary, post-colonial, post-911, and broader
global context. COOCs, who are the source of the current study’s textual data,
represent what Chan (2006) described as the new migrants from China in global cities
who are relatively more educated and from more diverse regions of origin than the
earlier colonial coolies from a couple of southern provinces in Chin and therein face
more identity options and internal debates. Not only can the heightened online
discussions by COOCs fit the ideological model identified by Ward (1965, quoted in
Chan, 2006) but the augmented chasm and intensified fragmentation embedded in
blatant ideological debates might form a new complex model of Chinese identity in
global context. On the one hand, such a complex model of Chinese identity can lead
to a more profound understanding of Chinese global presentation; on the other hand,
the increased complexity in Chinese national characterization represents the
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maturation of the nation and advancement of a national culture. Hence the chaotic
internal division described by Keane (2003) as “China imploding” might have
positive implications if given a more complete and more balanced interpretation with
richer data. This coincided with my impetus for writing this dissertation.
Limitations and Future Orientations of the Study
The current study is an application of an integrated cultural identity model in
the interpretive analysis of online discourse purposefully selected. This close reading
of data does have some methodological and theoretical limitations that imply future
orientations.
The most obvious limitation of this study is the purposeful selection of online
discourse data. With new events constantly coming out on a daily basis, more forums
with more heated discussions seem always better than the old pool of data. For
example, around the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Xiaobo Liu and Chinese
American pianist Lang Lang’s White House performance, online debates were
unprecedentedly fervent. However, the concepts developed from this data grounded
analysis can be applied in the analysis of randomly selected instances of discourse in a
new, larger data set for future projects aiming to contribute to the construction of
cultural identity theory.
Another limitation of this study is related to the representativeness of the
selected website and the participating commentators as members of the Chinese
overseas community. As I observe, among my Chinese friends, Wenxuecity.com is
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only one of several major Chinese portal websites. Besides Wenxuecity.com, other
popular Chinese overseas websites include mit.bbs.com, backchina.com, and
boxun.com. Of course, wexuecity.com is still the one that attracts the largest number
of commentaries. Many of my Chinese friends, especially younger ones, who just
arrived, seem to be more dependent on the major Chinese portal Websites
headquartered inside China, such as sohu.com, netease.com, sina.com, and qq.com.
They were already seasoned netizens before leaving China. For some Chinese with
critical cultural cores, Wenxuecity.com is too “pro-China” and thereby to be avoided.
So the internal divisions over some political debates within the COOCs might not
empirically reflect the actual internal divisions among the Chinese and not even
among the Chinese overseas.
In addition, the characteristics of COOCs’ cultural identification summarized
in the findings are heuristic for understanding Chinese culture as manifested in its
members’ collective understandings but might be problematic in terms of empirical
representation of the group. First, online anonymity and the website’s easy
registration allow one individual to post commentaries under multiple aliases. Some
of the COOCs might actually play both sides (trolling) by disguising themselves with
their opponents’ intonation and then attacking accordingly to create the scenario that
might or might not fit their positions over certain issues. Second, participants with
varied motives might contribute to various forums by contingency. On the one hand,
COOCs participate voluntarily with no explicit external pressures such as institutional
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requirement or monetary benefits, so the data contain spontaneous messages that
reflect their mentalities. On the other hand, participating COOCs themselves might
have unique character profiles that distinguishes them from general Chinese overseas,
for instance being inclined or more subjected to extreme ideological positions.
Besides, the timing of hot debated events might also influence both quantity and
quality of commentaries, such as in summer time, holidays, or final week in the end of
semesters. Third, the website’s webmaster or forums’ administrators have the
capability to delete posted comments and permanently or temporarily ban particular
user IDs, and evidently they often execute such regulatory power. For attracting more
viewers, the editorials might actually deliberately pretend to be either or both sides of
the debates to instigate more tensions if necessary. So to some degree, the online
scenarios might actually reflect the preferences of the personnel with technological
authority even though the website claims to be neutral and eclectic. This limitation
suggests that future research should include a larger data set as well as personal
interviews or survey to enhance representativeness of this population.
Finally, although the three general forms of cultural identification manifested
in COOCs’ commentaries are not mutually exclusive, through “constant comparison,”
the three categories proved to be stable and therefore valid as interpretive tools.
However, finer subcategories might be further defined but have not been developed in
the current study. Regarding this limitation, future research could consider further
conceptualization to refine subcategories for more specific research purposes.
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Regarding these limitations, future research could consider addressing issues of
representativeness by employing a positivistic paradigm and using research methods
such as random sampling of Wenxuecity.com texts, surveys, and in-depth interviews
with users. The corroboration through interviews with actual users can not only
strengthen the validity of present study but also extend and even alter the conceptual
system developed from current research. However, the heuristic value gained from the
current study can still be a productive start along the way of exploring how people
culturally survive over the cultural borderlines.
Conclusion
This dissertation presents an interpretive study of online discourse with
emphasis on the textual analysis of cultural identification patterns among Chinese
overseas online commentators. The interpretive framework of cultural identification
draws on the theories of three intercultural communication scholars—Donal Carbaugh,
Mary Jane Collier, and Michael Hecht—to stress the multi-dimensionality of identity,
dynamic interaction between self and social context, and the centrality of
communication in processes of cultural identification. Following some of the
analytical strategies of grounded theory methodologies, I identified and labeled three
primary forms of cultural identification—perceptual, strategic, and positional cultural
identification—to suggest ways in which COOCs make sense of who they are as
individuals and as a group of sojourners self-expelled from their homeland. In debates
about historical vicissitudes, academic power structures in the host culture, racial
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hierarchy, and global hegemonic structure, COOCs showed their increased cultural
awareness, various personal strategies to cope with life abroad, and diverse
ideological positions. The resulting fragmentary process of cultural identification can
be interpreted with an analytical framework informed by an integrated theory of
cultural identity. The framework focuses on four dimensions of identity: individuality,
sociality, materiality, and spirituality. Using this model, this research argues that
heightened individuality, stressed cultural detachment, and divided spirituality
characterize COOCs’ cultural identification as manifested in the discourse examined.
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